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Death of the PostHuman undertakes a series of critical encounters with the 
legacy of what had come to be known as ‘theory,’ and its contemporary 
supposedly posthuman aftermath. There can be no redemptive posthuman 
future in which the myopia and anthropocentrism of the species finds an exit 
and manages to emerge with ecology and life. At the same time, what has come 
to be known as the human—despite its normative intensity—can provide 
neither foundation nor critical lever in the Anthropocene epoch. Death of the 
PostHuman argues for a twenty-first century deconstruction of ecological and 
seemingly posthuman futures.
Claire Colebrook is Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Penn State 
University. She has written many articles and books on visual culture, poetry, 
literary theory, queer theory and contemporary culture, including most 
recently Theory and the Disappearing Future with Tom Cohen and J. Hillis 
Miller (2011). 
Cover Image: “Shriek & Flash” (detail) 
Dominic Minichiello © Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-SA 
Oil on board, 2009 
Series: Critical Climate Change

Death of the PostHuman
Critical Climate Change
Series Editors: Tom Cohen and Claire Colebrook
The era of climate change involves the mutation of sys-
tems beyond 20th century anthropomorphic models and 
has stood, until recently, outside representation or address. 
Understood in a broad and critical sense, climate change 
concerns material agencies that impact on biomass and 
energy, erased borders and microbial invention, geological 
and nanographic time, and extinction events. The possibil-
ity of extinction has always been a latent figure in textual 
production and archives; but the current sense of deple-
tion, decay, mutation and exhaustion calls for new modes 
of address, new styles of publishing and authoring, and new 
formats and speeds of distribution. As the pressures and re-
alignments of this re-arrangement occur, so must the critical 
languages and conceptual templates, political premises and 
definitions of ‘life.’ There is a particular need to publish in 
timely fashion experimental monographs that redefine the 
boundaries of disciplinary fields, rhetorical invasions, the in-
terface of conceptual and scientific languages, and geomor-
phic and geopolitical interventions. Critical Climate Change 
is oriented, in this general manner, toward the epistemo-
political mutations that correspond to the temporalities of 
terrestrial mutation.
Death of the PostHuman
Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1
Claire Colebrook
with Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor
2014
OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS
First edition published by Open Humanities Press 2014
Freely available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ohp.12329362.0001.001
Copyright © 2014 Claire Colebrook
This is an open access book, licensed under Creative Commons By Attribution Share Alike license. 
Under this license, authors allow anyone to download, reuse, reprint, modify, distribute, and/or copy 
their work so long as the authors and source are cited and resulting derivative works are licensed under 
the same or similar license. No permission is required from the authors or the publisher. Statutory fair 
use and other rights are in no way affected by the above. 
Read more about the license at creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0
Cover Art, figures, and other media included with this book may be under different copyright restric-
tions. Please see the Permissions section at the back of this book for more information.
ISBN-13 978-1-60785-299-5
www.publishing.umich.edu www.openhumanitiespress.org
Open Humanities Press is an international, scholar-led open access publishing collective whose 
mission is to make leading works of contemporary critical thought freely available worldwide. Books 
published under the Open Humanities Press imprint at Michigan Publishing are produced through 
a unique partnership between OHP’s editorial board and the University of Michigan Library, which 
provides a library-based managing and production support infrastructure to facilitate scholars to pub-
lish leading research in book form.
OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS
Contents
Acknowledgements 7
Introduction 9
1. Extinct Theory 29
2. The Sustainability of Concepts:  
Knowledge and Human Interests 46
3. A Globe of One’s Own: In Praise of the Flat Earth 59
4. Earth Felt the Wound: The Affective Divide 73
5. Destroying Cosmopolitanism for the Sake of the Cosmos 96
6. Time And Autopoiesis: The Organism has No Future 116
7. Face Race 140
8. Posthuman Humanities 158
9. Why Saying ‘No’ to Life is Unacceptable 185
10. The Joys of Atavism 208
Works Cited 230
Permissions 245

Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the patience, dedication and support of Open 
Humanities Press, and Sigi Jöttkandt in particular.  For ongoing intel-
lectual stimulus and friendship I thank Tom Cohen, Jami Weinstein 
and J. Hillis Miller.

Introduction
Framing the End of the Species: 
Images Without Bodies
Society invents a spurious convoluted logic tae absorb and 
change people whae’s behaviour is outside its mainstream. 
Suppose that ah ken all the pros and cons, know that ah’m 
gaunnae have a short life, am ay sound mind etcetera, 
etcetera, but still want tae use smack? They won’t let yae do 
it, because it’s seen as a sign ay thir ain failure. The fact that 
ye jist simply choose to reject whit thae huv to offer. Choose 
us. Choose life. Choose mortgage payments; choose washing 
machines; choose cars’ choose sitting on a couch watching 
mind-numbing and spirit-crushing game shows, stuffin fucking 
junk food intae yir mooth. Choose rotting away, pishing and 
shiteing yersel in a home, a total fucking embarrassment tae 
the selfish, fucked-up brats ye’ve produced. Choose life.
Well, ah chose no tae choose life. If the cunts cannae handle that, 
it’s thair fuckin problem. (Irvine Welch, Trainspotting, 187-88)
There are three senses of extinction: the now widely discussed sixth great 
extinction event (which we have begun to imagine and witness, even if 
in anticipation); extinction by humans of other species (with the endan-
gered species of the ‘red list’ evidencing our destructive power); and 
self-extinction, or the capacity for us to destroy what makes us human. 
All three senses of extinction require a nuanced conception of climate. 
Climate is at once an enclosing notion, imagined as the bounded milieu 
that is unavoidably ours, and a disturbing figure, for it is with the recogni-
tion that there is climate, or that the human species is now recognizable as 
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a being that for all its seeming diversity is nevertheless bound into a unity 
of destructive power. (This is so much so that geologists are arriving at 
consensus regarding an ‘Anthropocene epoch’ where man’s effect on the 
planet will supposedly be discernible as a geological strata readable well 
after man ceases to be, even if there are no geologists who will be pres-
ent to undertake this imagined future reading (Crutzen 2000). Climate 
is not only, then, the surface or terrain upon which we find ourselves, but 
something that binds us to this time on the earth, with its own depletions 
and limits.) 
There is, of course, the standard meteorological notion of climate 
which increasingly attracts our already over-taxed attention; but this 
concept of climate is only possible because of a broader thought-event 
where humans begin to imagine a deep time in which the human species 
emerges and withers away, and a finite space in which ’we’ are now all 
joined in a tragedy of the commons. I would suggest that just as Darwinian 
evolution altered the very modes of scientific and imaginative thinking, 
such that new forms of narrative and knowledge were required to think 
of man as a species emerging within time (Beer 1983), so global climate 
change is similarly catastrophic for the human imaginary. It becomes 
possible to think of climate as the milieu that is necessary for our ongo-
ing life, and as the fragile surface that holds us all together in one web of 
risked life, even if we cannot practically grasp or manage the dynamics of 
this totality (Gardiner 2006). The concept of climate is also split between 
knowledge and denial: on the one hand talk of climate draws all bodies 
(organic and otherwise) into a single complex, multiply determined and 
dynamic whole; on the other hand, any brief glance at climate change 
policy and politics evidences a near psychotic failure to acknowledge or 
perceive causal connections with dire consequences. In this respect we 
need to embark on a notion of climate change that includes the radical 
alteration of knowledge and affect that accompanies the very possibility 
of climate. It is only possible to think of climate change in the meteorolog-
ical sense—with humans now bound to volatile ecologies that they are 
at once harming and ignoring—if some adjustment is made to the ways 
in which we think about the relations among time, space and species. A 
necessarily expansive sense of climate change encompasses a mutation of 
cognitive, political, disciplinary, media and social climates. The fact that 
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we start to think about climate as a general condition that binds humans 
to an irreversible and destructive time means both that climate becomes 
an indispensable concept for thinking about the new modes of knowl-
edge and feeling that mark the twenty-first century in terms of our grow-
ing sense of precarious attachment to a fragile planet, and that climate is 
an alibi. We talk about climate, ecology, globalism and even environment 
(as that which environs) even though the experience of climate change 
reveals multiple and incongruent systems for which we do not have a 
point of view. We are at once thrown into a situation of urgent intercon-
nectedness, aware that the smallest events contribute to global muta-
tions, at the same time as we come up against a complex multiplicity of 
diverging forces and timelines that exceed any manageable point of view. 
In a recent fable that allegorized the human relation among memory, 
destruction and the future of life, Nick Bostrom suggests that the human 
species would remain complacent about its catastrophic history and 
future as long as it continues to forget that its situation is catastrophic. 
We have taken the catastrophe of human existence as natural and irre-
deemable: only a counter-narration in which we vanquish destruction 
will let us see just how death-inured we have become (Bostrom 2005). 
More recently, climate change scientists have started to play with new 
strategies for awakening public affect: perhaps the focus on hope needs 
to give way to mobilizations of fear, whereby we learn to ‘hug the mon-
ster,’ in order to shift from inertia and quiescence to action.1 How is it 
that the human species, seemingly so hungry for life and dominance, has 
conveniently forgotten its own self-extinguishing tendencies? We can 
only pose the question of human extinction—the fact that humans will 
become extinct, the fact that we cause other extinctions, and also that 
we are extinguishing what renders us human—if we locate the problem 
of climate change inaction in a broader terrain of ecological destruction. 
The very climates—cognitive, industrial, economic, affective, technolog-
ical, epistemological and meteorological—that render our life possible 
are also self-destructive (both destructive of the self, and destructive of 
climate itself). 
There is a widespread lament regarding a trajectory of self-extinction 
occurring in the human brain. According to Susan Greenfield, in her 
book ID, we are losing identity: where our brains once operated by a 
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synthesizing power of grammar, syntax and critique we are now seduced 
by a culture of stimulus (Greenfield 2008). We are not just losing one 
of our critical powers—our power to represent or synthesize what is not 
ourselves—we are losing our very selfhood. For ’we’ are—as human, as 
identities—just this evolved synthesizing power. Greenfield locates her 
diagnosis of identity within a broader argument regarding the brain and 
its self-forming capacities. A certain self-loss is required for stimulus and 
pleasure, but a certain neural extension and order is required for meaning 
and self. In her earlier work Greenfield had argued for a healthy or nor-
mal balance between the capacity for the joy of fleeting sensation (such 
as the first taste of morning coffee) and the ability to link sensations into 
some broader network of selfhood and significance (Greenfield 2002). 
If there were no capacity to enjoy the simple moment we would suffer 
from depression, or an extreme search for meaning that we may never be 
able to fulfill; drugs that treat depression enable a release from the grip 
of significance. But today—perhaps—it is the fleeting insignificance 
that is taking over twenty-first century neural architecture. The diagnos-
tic dimension of Greenfield’s work lies in its lament regarding the new 
modes and temporalities of visual culture, where the transient ecsta-
sies of video games overtake the sustained focus and pleasure of com-
plex narrative and argument. This lament of human self-loss achieved 
through the over-consumption of stimulus is not Greenfield’s alone. 
Her work keeps company with Carr’s The Shallows: What the Internet is 
Doing to Our Brain (2010), Jackson and McKibben’s Distraction (2008), 
Wolf ’s Proust and the Squid (2007), Winifred Gallagher’s Rapt (2008), N. 
Katherine Hayles’s (2007) theory of the transition from deep attention 
to hyper attention, and Bernard Stiegler’s (2010) lament regarding the 
short circuits of transindividuation (with humans having lost the orienta-
tion of care). Precisely at the moment of its own loss the human animal 
becomes aware of what makes it human—meaning, empathy, art, moral-
ity—but can only recognize those capacities that distinguish humanity at 
the moment that they are threatened with extinction.
It is possible to argue, as Giorgio Agamben (1998) has done, that there 
has always been a sense of the human capacity for failing to be human. 
We can lose ourselves—extinguish ourselves—because we are nothing 
more than potentiality. If humans were always and already fully human, 
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if humanity were a simply actuality, then there would never be the pos-
sibility of failing to realize either one’s reason, or to recognize rational 
humanity in others. This is why Agamben has isolated a last chance for 
redemption precisely at this point in our history when it becomes appar-
ent that what we are is not something essential that will necessarily come 
into being: our humanity is not an actuality from which we can draw 
grounds for action. The fact that we forget our impotentiality—that we 
treat humans as factual beings with a normality that dictates action—has 
reached crisis point in modernity, especially as we increasingly suspend 
the thought of our fragility for the sake of ongoing efficiency. Both totali-
tarianism and democratic hedonism are, for Agamben, forms of deaden-
ing managerialism. Both act on the basis of man as an actuality. It is at this 
point of exhaustion, when we have become frozen spectators in a world 
in which images appear as ready-mades, that we can see both that there is 
no guarantee that we will be human and that it is human to forget oneself. 
For Agamben it is both the modern horrors of totalitarianism (where 
humans are reduced to so much manageable and disposable matter or 
animality) and modern democratic hedonism (where we become noth-
ing more than the targeted consumers of dazzling spectacle) that demon-
strates human impotentiality, our essential capacity not to actualize that 
which would distinguish as human. 
Most importantly, this highly human inhumanity seems to center 
strangely on the organ that organizes the human organism; for it is the 
same eye that reads and theorizes—that looks with wonder at the heav-
ens—that is also seduced, spellbound, distracted and captivated by inan-
ity. Immanuel Kant already drew on a tradition of philosophical wonder 
when he isolated man’s capacity to look into the heavens as both a source 
of delusion that would draw him away from grounded knowledge into 
enthusiasm, and as the necessary beginning of a power of thinking that 
would not be tied solely to sensation (Kant 1999, 269-70). The eye is 
geared to spectacle as much as speculation, with speculation itself being 
both productively expansive in its capacity to imagine virtual futures and 
restrictively deadening in its tendency to forget the very life from which 
it emerges. Indeed there is something essentially self-destructive about 
the human theoretical eye: our very openness to the world—the very 
relation that is our life—is precisely what seduces us into forgetting that 
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before there is an eye that acts as a camera or window there must have 
been something like an orientation or distance, a relation without rela-
tion. I would suggest that we ought to think, today in an era of climate 
change, about moralizing laments regarding human reason’s self-loss 
alongside various posthuman theorizations that human reason is consti-
tuted by a certain self-forgetting. The human animal or human eye is torn 
between spectacle (or captivation by the mere present) and speculation 
(ranging beyond the present at the cost of its own life).
There are two directions this criticism of the embodied eye can take: 
one is to expand the sense of the body, to imagine a receptive or percep-
tive power that is not a simple snapshot of the world but a full and expan-
sive openness. Here we might identify a pseudo-Heideggerian criticism of 
Descartes that was taken up by cognitive science: Heidegger had already 
diagnosed Western metaphysics with Descartes as a fulcrum: Descartes 
is able to establish man as the ’subject’ (or as that which remains present) 
because Western thought has always proceeded by forgetting the tempo-
rality through which all being comes into presence (Heidegger 1968). 
By the time Descartes establishes the subject as that which precedes and 
provides a foundation, ’humanism’ has definitively forgotten that there 
is no such thing as man as a simply existing thing with an essence. For 
Heidegger what is required is not a retrieval of some pre-Cartesian con-
nectedness to the world, with man and world being co-present; rather, 
before there is the dyad of man and world there is something like dis-
closure or revealing. Contemporary cognitive science and certain phi-
losophies of the human have drawn upon this anti-Cartesianism to insist 
that man is not a camera, not a computer, and the eye is not a window 
(Wrathall and Malpas 2000; Thompson 2007; Wheeler 2005). Where 
such contemporary uses of Heidegger differ from Heidegger is in their 
diagnosis of Cartesianism as an accidental lapse rather than as evidence 
of humanity’s self-forgetting ’essence.’ These pseudo-Heideggerian diag-
noses suggest that Cartesianism can be overcome by returning man to the 
richer expansive life from which he has become detached. The subtitle of 
Andy Clark’s book says it all: ‘putting, brain, body, and world together 
again’ (Clark 1997). For Heidegger, though, there is a necessary forget-
ting in any disclosure of being: to experience the world as present for me, 
and to begin questioning—as we must—from this already given world, 
Framing the End of the Species: Images Without Bodies 15
relies upon a hiddenness or non-revealing that we must leave behind in 
living the world as our own. We begin in media res, always already thrown 
into a world that appears as so many natural and separate things. Our ten-
dency to forget, and to live life inauthentically—not recognizing Being as 
the site for all clearing, as though the world were just this way naturally—
is not something one can simply place behind oneself as an unfortunate 
philosophical error. For Heidegger in-authenticity or humanism (where 
we simply take ourselves to be a privileged thing among things) is not 
an external and unfortunate event but has to do with the very mode of 
being’s appearance: we see being appear, but do not attend to its coming 
into being. One mode of phenomenology after Heidegger has, however, 
taken the form of a correction or adjustment: we should overcome the 
deep problems of how we know or arrive at having a world and accept that 
the world just is that which is always already given and meaningful for liv-
ing beings. Phenomenology should be naturalized and tied to a process 
of embodied knowledge. We are not minds who represent a world, but 
organisms from which the capacity and figure of knowing mind emerged.
But there’s another path, another way of dealing with man’s tendency 
to reify himself. This other departure from a restricted subjectivism pro-
ceeds not by broadening the self to include emotions, dynamism and the 
non-cognitive, but by tearing the eye from the body. Rather than restore 
the human to some unified and expansive vision it might be possible to 
think of the eye as a machine. This machine would not be a computer, 
for a genuine machine does not have a central organizing program but 
is put to work through connections; one could consider synthesizers as 
computers receiving inputs and turning out data, or as machines in their 
creation and recreation of connections. For Deleuze and Guattari, the 
reference to synthesizers is not another metaphor for thinking, where 
we substitute one machine for another. Thought is a synthesizer: just as 
musical synthesizers take the sounds of the world and repeat, create and 
mutate various differences, so thought can maximize rather than dimin-
ish the complexity of sensations:
 A synthesizer places all of the parameters in continuous 
variation, gradually making ‘fundamentally heterogeneous 
elements and up turning into each other in some way.’ The 
moment this conjunction occurs there is common matter. It 
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is only at this point that one reaches the abstract machine, or 
the diagram of the assemblage. The synthesizer has replaced 
judgment, and matter has replaced the figure or formed sub-
stance. It is no longer even appropriate to group biological, 
physico-chemical and energetic intensities on the one hand, 
and mathematical, aesthetic, linguistic, informational, semi-
otic intensities, etc., on the other. The multiplicity of sys-
tems of intensities conjugates or forms a rhizome through-
out the entire assemblage the moment the assemblage is 
swept up by these vectors or tensors of flight (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 121)
Before exploring the ‘multiplicity of systems of intensities’ in detail, we 
can go back over the relation between the eye and human self-extinction, 
between the eye that views the world in order to enable survival, and the 
eye that then becomes frozen or seduced by its own imaging power—to 
the point where the eye takes in a frozen image of its self. Bergson has 
argued for an economy of the eye and creative difference: in order to 
release itself from merely surviving in the world, the human eye orga-
nizes the world into conceptualized units, mastering the world by reduc-
ing difference. This intellectual process allows for increasing technolo-
gies and the furtherance of systems of order: the intellect is at home with 
technology and matter, or that which remains the same through time and 
can be mastered though repetition. What is abandoned is intensity—the 
infinitesimally small differences and fluxes that the eye edits out. For 
Bergson the problem with this difference-reducing mode of the intel-
lect is when mind turns back upon itself, and fixes upon a static image: 
thought is no longer intuited (as it should be) as a dynamic creative force, 
but appears as a brain, representing self, thinking substance or ‘man’ 
(Bergson 1913, 196).
This argument for the self as not being a substance but, rather, the 
condition for the organized perception of substance, has a long philo-
sophical and moral history. If Aristotle argued that what distinguished 
us as humans was not merely perception of the world, nor consump-
tion of the world but the capacity for perception and consumption to go 
beyond what is to consider what ought to be, and if Plato also argued that 
we should not merely perceive but think about that which gives itself to 
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be perceived, this moral distinction becomes formal in modernity. That 
is, Plato and Aristotle concede that man is a biological being but with 
a capacity for reason, a capacity that distinguishes humans from other 
beings. But the modern theory of the subject, with Descartes positing 
a different substance—or res cogitans—makes a difference of kind and 
modality with regard to humans and their relation to images. ‘Man’ is the 
being to whom the world is given for representation; what man himself is 
can never be known in itself, but only after the event of perception of the 
world. For Foucault, it was this shift from a world that possessed its own 
order and hierarchies to some distinction between ordered world and 
man as representing being that marked a historical a priori: what shifted 
was not an event within time but the modality of time itself. In moder-
nity historical time is that through which ‘man’ both recognizes that he 
emerges from material conditions, at the same time as the very logic of 
life that requires him to labor, speak and form social wholes can only be 
known after the event (Foucault 1970). 
If pre-moderns sought to elevate humans among other animals, moder-
nity increasingly rejects human superiority and refuses to see man as 
rational animal; for man is pure reason. Kant does not argue that we have 
to be more than merely biological or animal beings, he insists that we are 
not beings at all. Rather, there are only beings because there is something 
like an organizing or synthesizing power. There is a world because there is 
a subject to whom a world is given. It makes no sense to strive to perceive 
or know the self, to try and capture the self as something that might be 
viewed. In the beginning is a potentiality for viewing from which we con-
stitute a viewed world. We then imagine—ex post facto—that there must 
be selves who would be there to be viewed. Whereas Kant argued that 
there must be something like the subject who existed as this condition 
for all intuition (even if this subject cannot be known), Bergson (1913) 
argued that there was no subject who intuited images, just images or per-
ceptions from which we posit some thing—the brain—that provides the 
illusory image that would cause all images. 
But if pre-modern philosophy from at least Plato onwards argues that 
we ought not think of ourselves only as appetites, for we are responsible 
for our organizing relation to the world, modern philosophy argues that 
we are only organizing relations. There is not a self who perceives; there 
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are perceptions, from which something like a self is constituted. We 
cannot explain the self ’s relation to images because of the interests and 
appetites that are its natural base. Desires and appetites are possible only 
because there is imaging: in the beginning is the relation. We can think 
of Freud here for whom pleasures are possible because of a prior genesis 
of a relation between desire and desired; the libido is a force that forms a 
relatively stable or ‘cathected’ pool of ongoing equilibrium, relating to the 
outside world in terms of its own tendency towards quiescence (Freud 
2011). The desiring self is possible only because of a prior distribution 
that emerges from perception; a relation between self and other is formed 
through perception and does not precede perception
Something quite distinct structures modern claims for the relation 
between mind and image. It is not only the case that the self emerges 
from organizing perception, but also that perception can destroy the self. 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud observes his grandson throwing a 
cotton reel in and out of his cradle, while intoning ‘Fort/Da’ (away/here) 
and it is from this observation that Freud argues that in addition to the 
self ’s formation of a stable border between itself and the world, there is 
also a tendency to want to destroy or annihilate that distance. If pleasure 
is managing the relation between perceiver and the manageable influx of 
stimulus, then beyond pleasure there lies a tendency towards annihilation 
of distance, a dissolution of the bounded and perceiving organism.
What if the brain that is supposedly properly (in its human mode) 
oriented towards synthesis were at risk of falling back, of devolution? 
For some time it has been noted that there is an anxiety regarding mere 
images: the society of the spectacle (Debord 1973), a world of simula-
tion (Baudrillard 1994), a world of passive consumption (Adorno 2001) 
or mere exhibition without aura (Benjamin 2008), a world of hyper 
attention rather than deep attention (Hayles 2007), at once seems to 
destroy the brain’s evolved powers, and yet also give the lie to a certain 
destructive illusion regarding the brain as image. If we have lamented 
for so long—since Kant at least—that man tends to forget that he is a 
subject and tends to take himself to be just substance, then why are we 
so alarmed today by the brain’s tendency to destroy any image or sense 
of itself, to be nothing other than the stimulus it receives? After all, this 
loss of self seems to be the fulfillment of a long modern striving for 
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anti-self-consciousness or pure immediacy (Hartman 1970). Have we 
arrived, perhaps unwillingly, at Emerson’s transformation of the self into 
a transparent eyeball (Emerson 1982, 39)? And yet this achievement of 
what was once a Romantic and existential imperative for consciousness 
to be nothing other than its perceptual relation to the world, a pure pro-
cess without reifying ground, is being met with mourning and alarm.
First, consider all the ways in which ’we’ are now reacting with horror 
to our own capacity not to be ourselves.
This ranges from neo-Kantian claims that without the commitment to 
some idea of who I am—without some ongoing identification of what I 
would do if I were to remain true to the idea I have of myself—then ’I’ am 
not a self at all (Korsgaard 2008, 86). There are also neurological claims 
regarding the importance of ongoing synthesis, ranging from Greenfield’s 
moral anxiety over a culture of mere stimulus, to Antonio Damasio’s 
claim that the self is not, as Descartes would have it, a thing that feels, but 
a receptive and creative structure of feeling from which it might then be 
possible to have a snapshot attitude to reality. If we lose sight of that feel-
ing self, of the emotional brain, or of the naturally affective, connected 
and world-oriented self then we risk mistaking mind for mere machine or 
computer (Damasio 2000). 
When today—with horror—we look at young minds, we ask how they 
have become nothing more than cameras or computational devices. The 
young brains of today are not affected or world-oriented; they manipu-
late Facebook numbers with ruthless algorithmic force, and ingest images 
without digestion or rumination. We watch, with horror, as the human 
brain reverts to being not so much a reader of Proust as akin to a squid, 
or mere life (Wolf 2007). This tendency to be nothing more than a screen 
for images is observed as at once the brain’s horrific tendency towards 
self-extinction (an internal and ever-present threat) and as accidental or 
extrinsic (something that has assaulted us from without, by way of tech-
nology and modernity).
The diagnoses of the brain’s and humanity’s capacity to destroy itself 
are persistent and manifold, ranging from a supposed neural devolution 
caused by spectacle-stimulus culture to various anxieties about over-
ingestion (where we glut ourselves on destructive images and various 
psychotropic drugs that diminish the brain’s synthesizing powers). And 
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yet, at the same time, this release of the intuition of images from the orga-
nizing self of Cartesian subjectivism is hailed as redemption from the 
rigidity of man: no longer do we enslave ourselves to the notion of the 
autonomous, disembodied, affectless and world-divorced subject. One 
of the many and varied modes of posthumanism hails an end to human 
exceptionalism and cognition-oriented models, and instead begins from 
one already integrated, dynamic and connected world. There is no ‘really 
hard problem’ about the relation between mind and world, for the mind 
is an effect of relations, not something that has to act in order to repre-
sent a world to which it must subsequently relate (Flanagan 2007). It 
is not the case that we begin life as observing, representing beings who 
then become through receptivity. Rather, in the beginning is a dynamic 
and world-oriented receptivity from which organized cognition, and the 
sense of the self as subject or man emerges. It is from a primary openness 
to the world, a primarily sensed world, that there emerges the sense of 
one who sees.
This ambivalent observation of the self-extinguishing tendency of the 
brain’s capacity for imaging does not pertain only to philosophy, theory 
or recent theses of the brain. There are also popular accounts of our self-
attrition, with our over-consumption of everything from the internet and 
Facebook to empty fats and calories, indicating that the very mechanisms 
that led to out expansion are the same that will lead to our demise. Beyond 
all the laments and moral proclamations regarding our falling away from 
the activity of human reason, and beyond all the posthuman celebrations 
that there is no such thing as ‘man’ and that we are really always already 
at one with one web of life, we might ask how it is possible for humans to 
have this panicked (or joyous) apprehension of self-loss. If humans really 
are at one with the world of which they are nothing more than living and 
creative perceivers, why have we felt for so long that we are disengaged 
and rational minds? How did ‘Descartes’s error’ take hold? Or, if mind 
and reason are our proper self-creating potentialities, how is it that the 
spectacle of the world has lured us into destroying ourselves? Why are 
our own creations, technologies and desires the very mechanisms that 
preclude us from being most properly ourselves? It is as though our 
excessive glutting on images—from the seduction by media labels and 
visual stimulus to the voyeurism of disaster porn—evidences the brain’s 
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fragility to be nothing more than itself, a mere screen rather than a prop-
erly self-organizing whole. The thousands of years of evolved complexity 
can fall away through overconsumption. Just as the very desire for fats 
and sugars that propelled the body to hunt and develop technologies for 
metabolic stability and survival will drive the modern body into obesity, 
hypertension and an early grave, so the darting eye that stimulated the 
brain into becoming a reading and interpreting animal, may also be at the 
forefront of the human species’ cognitive atrophy. And does this not say 
something profound about climate: that the human species’ damaging of 
its own milieu is not an accident that we might otherwise have avoided, 
precisely because climate—as our milieu—is something that our very 
dependence upon will preclude us from ever really seeing?
Both of these questions—of self-destruction and milieu-destruction—
are economic problems. (Both Freud and Bergson argued that the self 
was an effect of investment, by postponing the discharge of energy and 
allowing a pool of force that would be relatively stable through time.) The 
human animal delayed consumption of immediate resources, developed 
hunting and farming techniques in order to store energy, and so then 
freed energy and resources for further technical-intellectual-moral devel-
opment (Ayala 2010). The viewing eye also delayed immediate response, 
developing concepts and perceptive technologies that enabled greater 
representational sophistication. V.S. Ramachandran speculates that the 
self and the notion of mind emerged in a survival tendency to anticipate 
the actions of others (Ramachandran 2003). The viewing eye becomes 
a reading and organizing apparatus, allowing ’man’ to become a subject. 
These same replicating technologies, and life-propelling investments—
allowing us to fashion cinematic, computational, virtual reality and tele-
visual technologies—would eventually sacrifice the reading brain to the 
merely stimulated eye.
Apart from the general interest of observing a widespread anxiety 
regarding the brain’s own capacity to destroy itself through the very per-
ceptive power that generated its supposedly proper potentiality in the 
first place, it is possible to orient this discussion towards the perception 
of futurity.
Is not the problem of both sides—the dire prediction that we are los-
ing our capacity to synthesize ourselves and the posthuman affirmation 
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that we are really, properly, nothing more than a dynamic power to per-
ceive—that there is still (for all the talk of loss) a reliance on a norma-
tive notion of the human, whereas what is required today is an inhuman 
perception? For all the talk of climate change we assume that the climate 
is what environs us, and that change—or the danger of change—needs 
to be calculated according to the degree to which it enables or precludes 
ongoing existence of humans (Mann 2009). If biodiversity is a prima 
facie good then surely any ecosystem—even one that emerged after 
human extinction—would answer the requirement for ongoing life? 
And if biodiversity is not a prima facie good, and is only good insofar as 
it offers ecosystem services for humans, then the very reasons why we 
might finally act in order to maintain biodiversity—in order to continue 
to live—seem to be hampered by our drive for life. The very eye that has 
opened up a world to the human species, has also allowed the human 
species to fold the world around its own, increasingly myopic, point of 
view. Today, we might start to question the appropriate point of view 
from which we might observe and evaluate the human viewing eye: from 
our own greater will to survive, or would it not be better to start to look at 
the world and ourselves without assuming our unquestioned right to life?
Our very narration of the brain and its emergence as the properly syn-
thesizing milieu from which all other imaging milieus need to be consid-
ered, shelters us from the thought of the inhuman images that confront 
us at the limits of the embodied eye. We can recall, here, Deleuze’s criti-
cism of Bergson, which is technical and counter-vital. Bergson, like so 
many other early modernists mourned the living and dynamic eye that 
had been sacrificed to technological expediency. For Bergson the intel-
lect cuts up the world in order to achieve managerial efficiency and then 
subjects itself to that same technical calculus. The mind starts to operate 
with an image of itself as some type of viewing machine. Redemption, 
for Bergson, lies in retracing the path, regaining a vitality that would no 
longer be that of the bounded organism. Intuition would pass beyond its 
enclosed self-interests to arrive at the perception of life’s duration or élan 
vital. For Deleuze, by contrast, the problem is that the eye remains too 
close to the lived. (So, today, when we demand ‘reality’ of television and 
cinema, or if we criticize cultural production for being too irrelevant or 
divorced from everyday life, we do so because we think there is such a 
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thing as life and reality to which vision ought to be subordinate.) Rather 
than asking the eye to become organic once more, and to re-find its place 
in life, Deleuze asks for an inhuman perception: can we imagine the world 
without us, not as our environment or climate? Drawing on Bergsonism, 
rather than Bergson’s concrete example of the fallen nature of cinematic 
perception, Deleuze calls on philosophy to ‘open us up to the inhuman 
and the superhuman durations (durations which are inferior or superior 
to our own), to go beyond the human condition’ (Deleuze 1988, 28). It 
is the cutting power of the eye that needs to be thought: the eye would be 
approached as a form of synthesizer, but as an analog rather than digi-
tal synthesizer. That is: the eye does not need to free itself from imposed 
distinctions to return to the flow of life, but should pursue ever finer cuts 
and distinctions, beyond its organic thresholds.
How might we imagine a world without organic perception, without 
the centerd points of view of sensing and world-oriented beings? Is there 
such a thing as perception without a world? (Think, here, of Heidegger’s 
remark that a stone ‘has’ no world, which is a way of saying that a stone 
has no climate, for a stone has no concern for ‘its’ world or environment.) 
This would not be a world without reading, as though abandoning the eye of 
grammar would return us to an inhuman lifelessness. Instead, the reading 
would take a radically different form. After humans have ceased to be 
present on the planet, their history will remain readable in a quasi-human 
sense: the earth’s strata will be inscribed with scars of the human capac-
ity to create radical and volatile climactic changes. But one might con-
sider a form of reading beyond this quasi-human and discerning mode: 
if, following Heidegger, the stone has no world, how do we account for 
the fossil records or archives borne by the stone? What might be thought 
is the extinction of the climactic eye: can we imagine a mode of read-
ing the world, and its anthropogenic scars, that frees itself from folding 
the earth’s surface around human survival? How might we read or per-
ceive other timelines, other points of view and other rhythms? The fos-
sil record opens a world for us, insofar as it allows us to read back from 
the brain’s present to a time before reading; strata will continue beyond 
human reading, but if inscription continues is it too much of a stretch 
to say that the earth will remain as a ‘reading’ of at least one point of the 
universe? We use this term in literary and art criticism frequently, saying 
24 Introduction
that a certain film offers ‘a reading’ of a certain event: we do not simply 
mean that the author is reading an event, for that may not have happened. 
The earth, after humans, will offer ‘a reading’ of a species’ history, just as 
we might say that Robinson Crusoe offers ‘a reading’ of race, empire and 
capitalism, even if neither Defoe nor his readers actually actualized the 
sense of the reading.
Why have we assumed that reading and readability should take syn-
tactical forms?
Here I want to refer to what geologists have posed as the new anthro-
pocene era, where it is imagined—after humans—that our scar on the 
earth would be readable for something like a future geologist. Not only 
do we imagine what would be readable for a world without readers, we 
also have to deploy and imagine (from within geology) a different mode 
of stratigraphic imaging. Stratigraphy, at present, is a mode of reading 
past layers, but the positing of the anthropocene era relies on looking at 
our own world and imagining it as it will be when it has become the past. 
In imagining this world after humans we are reading what is not yet writ-
ten or inscribed. We can see, now, from changes in the earth’s composi-
tion that there will be a discernible strata that—in a manner akin to our 
dating of the earth’s already layered geological epochs—will be readable. 
This strata or text of the earth does not yet exist; we abstract from the 
human eye and its reading of the inhuman past, to imagine what would 
be readable, after humans, in a mode analogous to the human eye. One 
can only open up to this post-Anthropocene point of view if we start to 
view this world beyond the bounds of climate, and see climate as one 
expression—among many—of a broader time and broader (inhuman) 
life. Perhaps, then, the moral outrage about the death of active and syn-
thesizing vision, or the premature hailing of the world as already posthu-
man, needs to be tempered by the thought of the seeing brain that looks 
beyond itself. What we should not do is try to retrieve or repair a proper 
human vision; nor should we think, too easily, that we have abandoned 
human myopia once and for all. 
This allows for a new thought of the brain’s self-extinguishing tendency. 
If there is an anxiety regarding the eye-brain’s seduction by images to the 
point of distraction, is not the figure of the evolved, self-organizing, con-
nected and connecting brain also a lure or figure that precludes us from 
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questioning the worth of the imaging brain? There is a strange torsion 
operating between the shrill cries lamenting the brain’s captivation by 
spectacle, and the supposedly opposing counter-image of the good flour-
ishing mind-brain. In response we might ask seriously what all these diag-
noses of the reading brain and its atrophy amount to for a thought of art 
and climate change. 
First, if the reading eye did have a proper mode—if the human brain 
had as its proper potentiality the mode of syntactical, synthesizing and 
world-ordering vision—how would we evaluate the last centuries of aes-
thetic judgment, which have relied on destroying the brain’s capacity for 
comprehensive consumption? One doesn’t have to be a fan of Duchamp 
and the avant-garde to note that there is something interesting, at the very 
least, in visual productions that short-circuit recognition. Indeed, one 
might say that climate change should not require us to return to modes of 
reading, comprehension and narrative communication but should awake 
us from our human-all-too-human narrative slumbers. 
In Danny Boyle’s 127 Hours (2010), in the film’s revelatory final quar-
ter, the central character’s voice provides a voiceover declaring that all 
moments in his life have been leading up to this point. The screen is split 
into three panels, with one of the panels depicting the depleting battery 
indicator on his camcorder. At this stage, and for all the character knows, 
his self-made film and testimony will never be viewed, and yet—even 
so—he proclaims a moment of destined union between the end of his 
own life and the earth’s history: from the first comet that struck the earth 
to create life to this final point of self-narration, all this was destined to 
converge on this filmed present (or so he believes). This temporal point—
one of the film’s peaks—is at once one of human heroism, confirmed by 
the final scene where the protagonist and his family are seated on a sub-
urban sofa viewing the cinematic audience the way we have just viewed 
his triumph. And yet at the very moment that this central character’s des-
tiny is related, the film’s visual field explodes into a geological vision—the 
camera eye being taken over by the dazzling sun, which in turn dissolves 
into layers of rock and water beyond human time and perception. This 
cinematic seduction is quite different in kind from our tendency to be 
captivated by faces, bodies, objects of consumption and order. 
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This geological eye operates alongside the lulling eye of the forming 
human power; it is not the simply destructive eye of the visual avant 
garde. It is not just the willful assertion of the desire for the human to 
assert its mastery by freeing itself from instrumental and comforting 
images. It is a positively geological vision, a seduction not by the light 
that warms and illuminates but a radiation that moves beyond organi-
cism. This light appears through the cracks of our own survival mecha-
nisms: in Danny Boyle’s cinema alone we can see it in Sunshine of 2007 
(where the sun of light towards which the space mission travels is figured 
as that which must be viewed but which remains as not viewable), and in 
the sublime scene of the Sydney opera house as a frozen wasteland in 28 
Weeks Later (2007). The very titles of these films—hours, weeks, days—
are intensive lived periods in which something like the unlived and unliv-
able takes hold. 
Jacques Rancière has commented on a certain double nature of the 
image that defines art: commenting on Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida, 
Rancière notes that Barthes (who had begun his career by aiming to strip 
images of their myth or lure and did so by reading what appeared to be 
enigmatically frozen as actually the outcome of human history and labor) 
reversed this in Camera Lucida by affirming a dazzling power of the image 
as such that occurs when photography becomes an art (Rancière 2009). 
For Rancière this is not noteworthy because of some interest in Barthes’s 
biography, but because it discloses art’s double relation to the image, a 
doubleness inherent not only in photography but also in the novel. For 
Rancière, the novel as art at once describes and images, and draws atten-
tion to (while also destroying) any simple notion that the image is sec-
ondary and effaces itself before that which it indexes. Rancière is not as 
indebted to the French avant-garde as Barthes, or Deleuze, for whom 
art is the release of affects and precepts beyond the lived, or Derrida, 
for whom literature is an absolute precariousness that has no referential 
outside other than that which it traces from itself. But there is a sense in 
Rancière’s notion of art as a release of image from anything other than 
its own dazzling materiality without reference or relation, of a surmount-
ing of a certain anthropocentrism of the aesthetic image. It as though a 
release from systems of human reference would somehow yield the shin-
ing of light in itself. 
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To this extent all art leading up to the avant-garde would be art and 
image only to the degree to which it was anti-mimetic, or other than any 
form of reference, as though art somehow were god-like, freed from any 
necessity to be anything at all, liberated from all constituting relations. 
This, for Rancière, is the two-sided nature of the image.
I would suggest that something like a third side of the image is prompted 
by the thought experiment of extinction. By referring to extinction as 
a thought experiment I want to move in two directions. If we think of 
the experimental passage to extinction as thought—if we imagine think-
ing as a variation that takes place from function but essentially risks all 
function—then thinking of life as mindful requires thinking of mind as 
intrinsically destructive. Thought occurs when relations between terms 
are destructive, when there is a not knowing or misprision. Life occurs 
not with ongoing self-sameness but with an experimental variation that 
could be construed as risk, except that risk implies betting, strategy or 
even the venturing of some being, whereas it is only after variation that 
one might refer ex post facto to a mutation that is interpreted as good for 
some being or some environmental fit. And this is also why environment 
(like climate in its narrow meteorological sense) is not such a helpful 
term, given the notion of surrounding or environing—as though beings 
varied to fit a world. Extinction—as thought experiment—destroys such 
notions; there is just variation that is not variation of any being. So if 
extinction is thought experiment, it is because the process of extinction 
is a variation without a given end determined in advance; thinking pos-
sesses an annihilating power. 
A certain thought of delimited extinction, the extinction of humans, 
opens up a variability or intrusion of a different side of the image. This 
is a geological, post-anthropocene or disembodied image, where there 
is some experimental grasping at a world that would not be the world 
for a body, nor the world as body. This mode of impersonal imaging dif-
fers from an avant-garde immanence of aesthetic matters or sensations, 
for such notions tend towards a god-like self-sufficiency. The avant-garde 
sought to think of the liberation of the image from man, but in doing so 
it created a heightened subjectivism where ‘we’ might liberate ourselves 
from function and become pure perception or pure becoming. In the era 
of extinction we can go beyond a self-willing self-annihilation in which 
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consciousness destroys itself to leave nothing but its own pure non-
being; we can begin to imagine imaging for other inhuman worlds. That 
is to say: rather than thinking of the posthuman, where we destroy all our 
own self-fixities and become pure process, we can look positively to the 
inhuman and other imaging or reading processes. 
What happens if one thinks of the vision of no one, of the human 
world without humans that is still there to be seen? What remains might 
still take the form of ‘a’ vision or referring eye—the scene of a human 
world as if viewed without any body. The positing of an anthropocene era 
(or the idea that the human species will have marked the planet to such a 
degree that we will be discernible as a geological strata) deploys the idea 
of human imaging—the way we have already read an inhuman past in the 
earth’s layers—but does this by imagining a world in which humans will 
be extinct. The anthropocene thought experiment also alters the modal-
ity of geological reading, not just to refer to the past as it is for us, but also 
to our present as it will be without us. We imagine a viewing or reading 
in the absence of viewers or readers, and we do this through images in 
the present that extinguish the dominance of the present. The figure of a 
frozen Sydney opera house, a London where Trafalgar Square is desolate, 
layers of rock distorted through a camera lens that is not the point of view 
of any body, an underwater Manhattan, or a sunlight so bright it would 
destroy the eye—all these experiments strive to image a world as image 
(as referential) but not referential for any body. These images cannot be 
sustained, and are unsustainable; they—like the thought of extinction 
itself—will always be for us, and are always co-opted by the narrative 
lures they fragment. They nevertheless indicate an era or epoch that has 
begun to sense, if not have a sense of, a world without bodies.
Notes
1. http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/05/07/478984/hug-the-monster-
why-so-many-climate-scientists-have-stopped-downplaying-the-climate-
threat/?mobile=nc
Chapter 1
Extinct Theory
Of the Earth, the present subject of our scenarios, we can 
presuppose a single thing: it doesn’t care about the questions 
we ask about it. What we call a catastrophe will be, for 
it, a contingency. Microbes will survive, as well as insects, 
whatever we let loose. In other words, it is only because of 
the global ecological transformations we can provoke, which 
are potentially capable of putting in question the regimes of 
terrestrial existence we depend on, that we can invoke the 
Earth as having been put in play by our histories. From the 
viewpoint of the long history of the Earth itself, this will be one 
more ‘contingent event’ in a long series. (Stengers 2000: 144)
To the shame of philosophy, it is not uncommonly alleged 
of such theory that whatever may be correct in it is in fact 
invalid in practice. We usually hear this said in an arrogant, 
disdainful tone, which comes of presuming to use experience 
to reform reason itself in the very attributes which do it most 
credit. Such illusory wisdom imagines it can see further and 
more clearly with its mole-like gaze fixed on experience than 
with the eyes which were bestowed on a being designed to 
stand upright to scan the heavens. (Kant 1991: 62-63)
If we were serious about considering what theory after theory might 
mean then perhaps we should push this notion to its limit: not simply 
theory after the 1980s indulgence or heyday of high theory—those days 
when we could afford to think of texts as such with (some say) little con-
cern for real political conditions—and not simply theory today when 
no one could be said to be anti-theory—both because theory has been 
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thoroughly assimilated and because what is left remains a toothless tiger, 
legitimating all sorts of positivisms and moralisms. (Evidence for assimi-
lation is everywhere: no monograph in literary studies appears without 
some cursory footnote to a theoretical concept; no undergraduate educa-
tion proceeds without some basic overview of ‘feminism,’ ‘post-colonial-
ism,’ and ‘post-structuralism’; and no graduate student would be advised 
to avoid theory altogether.) More often than not, being ‘after theory’ 
signals nothing more than that one is aware of some textual mediating 
condition: there is no sex in itself, race in itself, history in itself. This con-
temporary theoretical astuteness, consisting of acknowledging the pro-
visional status of one’s position, then allows for local attention to min-
ute particulars without any consideration of the problems, possibilities 
and impossibilities of reading as such. The new historicism that suppos-
edly emerged after theory allows for a mode of positivism justified by an 
avoidance of grand narratives (Gallagher and Greenblatt 2001: 6). Other 
modes of theory—queer theory, race studies, gender studies, disability 
studies, digital media studies—seem to be theoretical not so much by a 
distinct mode of reading but because of a choice of a marginal object. If 
anything ‘theory’ as it is now practiced—with its emphasis on the lived, 
bodies, multitudes, emotions, affects, the political, the ethical turn—is 
indeed practiced; it avoids the problem of theory—what we can say there 
is, or the limits of existence—by grounding itself in what one ought to 
do. Recently, and in line with the ebb and flow of critical trends, there has 
been an anti-anti-theory reaction, ranging from a general contestation of 
historical and cultural locatedness (or, in Felski’s words, ‘context stinks’) 
to a profound and wholesale rejection of the Kantian Copernican turn, 
or the idea that we can only know and legitimately theorize the world 
as it is given (Felski 2011; Bryant, Srnicek and Harman 2011). Quentin 
Meillassoux argues that it is the Kantian turn, or refusal to know that 
which cannot be experienced by us, that closes philosophy off from the 
truth of contingency—and crucial to that thought of contingency would 
be the imperative to think of the world not as it is given to us, includ-
ing geological statements about deep time and logico-philosophical 
claims about contingency (Meillassoux 2008). Increasingly the general 
claims of speculative realism—or the insistence to overcome the Kantian 
enclosure within the bounds of the subject—seem both to resonate and 
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jar with broader cultural imperatives. On the one hand, there is an efflo-
rescence of cultural production devoted to imagining a world without 
humans, beyond human viewing (broadly evidenced in post-apocalyptic 
film and literature); and on the other, and often from within philosophy 
or ‘theory after theory,’ there is a retrieval of the world only as it appears 
and only insofar as it is a lived world for some being (what one might 
refer to as the ‘naturalist’ turn [Petitot et. al. 1999]). The Kantian concep-
tion of theory and its project of self-limitation, despite recent refusals of 
Kantian finitude, help us make sense of this twin tendency to leap beyond 
human limits and yet remain restricted to the lived. Although Kant does 
insist that we can only have scientific knowledge about that which can be 
experienced as given this does allow for a mode of scientific realism, for 
it also encompasses that there are also—beyond the given—the forces 
from which the given is given to us. What has occurred, since Kant, is 
an increasing rejection of an ‘in itself ’ beyond the given, and yet such a 
gap should perhaps be thought today—not in order to repair or close the 
distance that separates us from the world, but to heighten both our non-
knowledge and the imperative to think (but not experience) that which 
cannot be known. 
Theory, if it is critical in the Kantian sense, would need to begin from 
Kant’s distinction between theoretical knowledge, concerning objects 
about which we can speak because they are given to us, and practice, 
which follows from the absence of knowledge about ourselves. Lacking 
anything objective or experienced that might give us a moral law we are 
left without foundation. It is because we only know what is given—even 
if ‘the given’ can go beyond the human eye to include all the appara-
tuses through which humans image and project a world—that a strong 
scientific realism also creates a unique gap between theory and prac-
tice (Langton 1998). Theory is an acceptance of a distinction between 
a strong sense of the inhuman (that which exists beyond, beyond all 
givennness and imaging, and beyond all relations) and an unfounded 
imperative that we must therefore give ourselves a law. We act in the 
absence of knowledge of the world beyond us, and yet knowing that there 
is a beyond means that practice cannot be reduced to what we know or 
feel; nothing we know can ground or determine our decisions. There is a 
direct passage from the gap of the undecidable (or that decisions are not 
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made for us because we do not and cannot know any ultimate ground) 
to the burden of having to make a decision. Human feeling, or ‘the lived,’ 
does not exhaust what there is. Theory follows from being exposed to a 
world that is not ourselves; theoretical knowledge is directed to some-
thing that is only given through relations but is also not exhausted by 
the relations through which it is given. In many respects theory, far from 
being an academic enterprise that we can no longer afford to indulge, is 
the condition and challenge of the twenty-first century or age of extinc-
tion: ‘we’ are finally sensing both our finitude as a world-forming and 
world-destroying species, and sensing that whatever we must do or think 
cannot be confined or dictated by our finitude. Theory reminds us both 
of the givenness of the world, or that what we know is given to us in some 
specific way, at the same time as this knowledge and relation exceed us. 
Theory is at once necessary and impossible, just as its ‘relation’ to prac-
tice is necessary and impossible. Theory, or distance from the real, is 
necessary: ‘we’ are faced with an existing world that, precisely because 
it exists, is not ourselves; without that ‘outside’ world there could be no 
inner subject, no ‘we,’ no agent of practice. But this existing world to 
which we are definitively bound is therefore impossible: the given world 
is given to us, never known absolutely. We are not paralyzed by this dis-
tance from the world, for it is the distance that provokes both knowledge 
and practice (Stengers 2011); but the distance nevertheless entails that 
practice cannot form the ground for our knowledge (‘do what works’) 
nor can knowledge ground practice (‘act according to your nature’). To 
avoid theory and pass directly to practice would require forgetting that 
the self of practice is only a self insofar as it is placed in a position of nec-
essary not-knowing. Recent forms of Kantianism that conclude from 
this separation that there is an inevitable ideal of humanity and human 
normativity (Korsgaard 2009; Korsgaard and Cohen 1996) focus all too 
easily on the practical side of reasoning—whereby the absence of knowl-
edge forces us to be self-governing—and forget too happily the theoreti-
cal problem. This self that gives the law to itself is necessarily exposed to 
a domain which it must theorize but can never grasp as such. To remain 
with the theoretical challenge, or accepting the distance from the world 
as it would be without us, is to face up to the formal problem of extinc-
tion. There was a time, and there will be a time, without humans: this 
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provides us with a challenge both to think beyond the world as it is for us, 
and yet remain mindful that the imagining of the inhuman world always 
proceeds from a positive human failure. There would be two senses in 
which theory would fail. The first sense of failure is necessary and criti-
cal: one must at one and the same time be placed in relation to an exis-
tence that is never given as such, and it is this world of necessarily given 
but distanced existence within which we act. (In an era of encroaching 
extinction this failing theoretical condition becomes a forceful practical 
problem precisely because we are obliged, practically, to think not only 
about the unknowable but also the unimaginable. The world we inhabit 
is becoming increasingly impossible to know and imagine.) The second 
sense in which theory fails occurs with its seeming triumph; today, if the-
ory has taken institutional hold it has done so by failing to be theoretical; 
in various modes of theory after theory, where we have returned to life, 
affect or ‘the lived,’ theory feels no qualms about the limits of imagina-
tion. Indeed, theory as imagination allows ‘us’ to affirm humanity, the 
lived, meaning, community, the future and life—precisely when the 
incoherence of these terms should block any easy praxis.
Symptomatic of this failure of theory (via institutionalization) is 
theory’s complete success, and this can be gauged by considering what 
is now no longer possible: anti-theory. In the early days of theory to be 
opposed to theory was to be opposed to textualism; it was to insist that 
‘everyone knows’ that for all intents and practical purposes texts mean 
what we want them to mean. Theory, by contrast, detached texts from 
a ‘wanting to mean.’ Such a distinction is evident in the grand debates 
of the 1980s, including Derrida’s skirmish with John Searle, the latter 
insisting that context would ground utterances (Derrida 1988). But that 
Searlean attention to context and practice—the position that was once 
anti-theory—is today the hallmark of theory, both the theory that still 
remains of historicism and the newer waves of anti-textualism that affirm 
life, things, history, intent and bodies. 
In 1982 Stephen Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels published ‘Against 
Theory’ in Critical Inquiry and posed the following thought experi-
ment. Imagine encountering the marks ‘a slumber did my spirit steal,’ 
drawn in the sand on the beach; the marks appear to be drawn (by, one 
assumes, a human) but then a subsequent wave flows and recedes and 
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leaves the rest of Wordsworth’s poem. This, the authors argue, at first 
seems to present intention-less meaning, but this is not so. Once we read 
we attribute intention; any of those supposedly detached, non-referen-
tial objects of theory—texts without context, readers or authors—are 
proven (Michaels and Knapp claim) to be impossible. If something can 
be read then it has meaning, and therefore intention. What such an insis-
tence precludes is that something might be read, and not be actively or 
meaningfully inscribed: a geologist ‘reading’ the earth’s layers would not 
be reading in Knapp and Michaels’s sense, and it follows that it would 
be a mistake to ‘read’ texts in the way that one might read scars on the 
earth’s surface or fMRI images. One would, supposedly, need to distin-
guish between reading—seeing the lines waves leave on the shore and 
discerning some pattern—and reading, where one posits someone 
who meant to leave marks in just this way in order to say something to 
someone. It seems such a distinction is easy, but is it? Imagine we find, 
some hundreds of years from now, remnants of a wall with spray-painted 
tagging left behind, and then next to the remnant tags would be some 
paint that fell onto the wall accidentally, and then next to that would be 
a city-funded community artist’s mural. Cities today are made up of such 
human-inhuman couplings, where graffiti mixes with staining, with ran-
domly posted notices as well as scars from wreckage, damage and animal 
and technical marking. Knapp and Michaels would claim that our capac-
ity to read marks such as a mural follows from author’s meaning: if there 
were not an author who had painted the work there would be nothing to 
be read. Other marks, like ‘tagging,’ one assumes, could also be read—as 
forms of signature. Random paint stains might indicate that someone or 
something had existed but—like the natural marks and wear on a wall—
could not be read. And yet it is just this hybrid assemblage of marks, 
stains, signs, tears, human-animal-technical inscriptions that comprises 
any archive: how does one look back and decide to read what was left by a 
hand, and not read or avoid reading what occurred through inhuman and 
random processes? For Knapp and Michaels one can distinguish clearly 
between the rogue methods of theory, that willfully detaches texts from 
intent-meaning, and reading that relies on texts having a sense which is 
what an author wanted to say, and what we must assume he or she wanted to 
say for that is what it is to read.
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Benn Michaels felt this point still had relevance in 2001 in his ‘The 
Shape of the Signifier,’ which was, again symptomatically, an appeal to the 
political. Reading and texts go together to yield intentions and contexts; 
there are not just signs as such, mere markers of ostensive identity, but 
historically sedimented and meaningful intentions. In a recent review 
in The London Review of Books Benn Michaels insists again that identity 
itself cannot bear significance; it makes no sense to say—for example—
that race means something or anything, for one reads such markers only 
because of socio-economic and historical semantic horizons. One would 
not ‘read’ a body as being of a certain identity, unless that body were 
located in a broader network of human and meaningful sense. The very 
markers that allow us to read identity presuppose some understanding 
of a common humanity that is unfairly differentiated (Benn Michaels 
2009). Whereas Knapp and Michaels could articulate this insistence 
on the necessarily contextual and political production of meaning as an 
argument ‘against’ theory in the 1980s, Benn Michaels’s position is now 
exemplary of what counts as theory. That is, theory is just this attention to 
the human, intentional and interested ground of the emergence of texts. 
This is what theory is and ought to be. What was once anti-theory—a 
reaction against the detachment of texts from any supposition of human-
ity or meaning—is now so mainstream, that the same argument can be 
rehearsed and become central to a defense of theory ‘after theory.’ 
Theory ‘today’ is not an acceptance—as it once was, or might have 
been—that we do not know the political or the practical and that what 
we are given as objects of theory are both inhuman and can be considered 
rigorously only with something like an extinction hypothesis. But theory, 
if it takes on the impossibility that is its twenty-first century potential, 
might be imagined as a radical de-contextualization. Let us not fall too 
readily into assuming the human, or assuming ‘our’ intentional presence 
behind texts; let us short-circuit ‘man’s’ continuing readability of himself 
in the context of texts and his reflexive mode of judgment whereby he 
sees marks drawn in the sand and immediately recognizes his own ines-
capable will. 
Theory after theory might take a more robust form whereby we con-
sider what it might be to think in the absence of theoria. What would be 
left without the distanced gaze that the thinking human animal directs 
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towards the world? An absence of the look or point of view of theory 
could take two forms, one of which (I would suggest) is dominant in 
whatever remains of theory today, and another that represses theory. The 
first mode was articulated by Hannah Arendt in The Promise of Politics. 
Politics—being in common, speaking in common, living as a multi-
tude—has always been repressed, Arendt argues, since Plato at least, and 
has been subjected to the ideal of bios theoritikos (Arendt 2005: 85). The 
contempt for labor and for the multitude has meant that political philos-
ophy has always been oriented towards contemplation rather than action, 
a privileging of theoria over praxis.
[S]ince Socrates, no man of action, that is, nobody whose 
original experience was political, as for instance Cicero’s was, 
could ever hope to be taken seriously by the philosophers 
[…] Political philosophy never recovered from this blow 
dealt by philosophy to politics at the very beginning of our 
tradition. The contempt for politics, the conviction that polit-
ical activity is a necessary evil, due partly to the necessities of 
life that force men to live as labourers or rule over slaves who 
provide for them, and partly to the evils that come from liv-
ing together itself, that is, to the fact that the multitude, which 
the Greeks called hoi polloi, threatens the security and even 
the existence of every individual person, runs like a thread 
throughout the centuries that separate Plato from the modern 
age. (Arendt 2005: 83-84)
Since Arendt that targeting of theoria for the sake of life and praxis has 
intensified, particularly in the work of those whose redemptive political 
theory has seemed to save theory from the cartoon characterizations that 
consigned the irresponsibly formalist and textualist modes of ‘French’ 
thought to a past that was not yet properly attuned to the politics of life. I 
will consider this retrieval or saving of theory later. For now I want to sug-
gest that there might be another, diametrically opposed, sense of theory 
after theory. This would not be a return of theory to life, and certainly not 
a return of theory to the body, to affects, to living systems, living labor 
or praxis. One could create an exhaustive and exhausting list of all the 
ways in which theory has been re-territorialized back onto the lived, all 
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the ways in which a radical consideration of force without center, without 
life, without intention or sense is continually relocated in practical life, in 
doing. One diagnostic point, for example, would concern the migration 
of certain terms, such as ‘performativity,’ or ‘difference,’ which harbor the 
potential to think an act without an actor, but which have actually oper-
ated to reinforce the practices of self-formation. Although Judith Butler 
insists on there being ‘no doer behind the deed’ in her theory of perfor-
mativity (Butler 1993: 142) one might observe that performance was 
nevertheless for Butler that which, ex post facto, produced a body who 
would recognize itself as human (Butler 2005). This aspect of human 
recognition, with a specific focus on the face, comes to the fore in her 
later work (2006). Whereas theory might be approached beginning from 
estrangement and distance, considering a world that is not ourselves and 
a force that cannot be returned to the human, theory is moving precisely 
in the opposite direction to being nothing more than the expression of 
praxis, nothing more than relations of recognition. Antonio Negri insists 
that ‘living labour’ and the self-producing body of ‘homo homo human-
ity squared’ opens up a world liberated both from the centralizing exploi-
tation of capitalism and freed from any position of knowledge and cogni-
tion outside the collective body, and he appeals to the master thinkers of 
theory (Derrida and Lacan) in order to generate this ‘genealogy of vital 
elements.’ How, we might ask, is a Lacan whose corpus was devoted to 
the necessarily alien and inhuman fact that there is system, and a Derrida 
who began by considering genesis as ‘anarchic,’ read as modes of vital liv-
ing expression?
[T]he living expressions of our culture are not born in the 
form of synthetic figures but, on the contrary, in the form of 
events; they are untimely. Their becoming is within a geneal-
ogy of vital elements that constitute a radical innovation and 
the very form of the lack of measure. Some contemporary phi-
losophers have set off in pursuit of this new expressive force 
of postmodernity, and they have attempted to characterize it. 
Already Lacan had pointed to the absence of measure in the 
new; for Derrida, the productivity of the margins as it seeks 
new orders as it disseminates; as for Nancy and Agamben, 
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we find them picking the flowers that grow in these extreme 
fields. (Negri 2008: 66-67)
This joyous affirmation of the living, of the multitude, of productivity, 
of the other, or of pure potentiality and futurity is but one way of read-
ing theory. But is this the best mode of thinking and reading when we 
are at a moment when there is no shortage of information about life and 
its temporality—no shortage of data bombarding us daily with the inevi-
table end of the human organism—and yet are all the more insistent that 
whatever else it is thinking and theory are primarily organic? Does not 
one of theory’s earliest gestures towards a force without production, or a 
potentiality without actuality or presence, at least suggest that one might 
consider relations beyond life and creation? How would theory confront 
the absence of theoria: ‘life’ without the human look? Life without praxis, 
life without meaningful action, life without production or labour: such 
would be theory after theory, or theory that opened itself to the thought 
of extinction. Hints of such a theory were articulated at theory’s very gen-
esis: not only explicitly in texts such as Derrida’s ‘No Apocalypse, Not 
Now: Seven Missiles, Seven Missives’ (1984) or Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s suggestion that one might need to think of the world beyond 
or before the gaze of the organism (‘becoming-imperceptible’), but 
also in theory’s most scandalously ‘apolitical’ moments, such as Paul De 
Man’s suggestion that theory begins when one reads a text as if there were 
no readers, no contextual life that would be its site of emergence, and no 
living horizon that might maintain or animate its sense (De Man 1972). 
More recently, hints of a surviving or nascent theory occur in extensions 
of Alain Badiou’s promising ‘theoretical antihumanism’ that push theory 
beyond Badiou’s own decision of the subject (Badiou 2001: 5). Ray 
Brassier (2008) takes up Badiou’s antihumanism, along with Quentin 
Meillassoux’s insistence that it is possible to think beyond human knowl-
edge (Meillassoux 2008), to move further into a world without cogni-
tion. Graham Harman has also taken up phenomenology, not to insist 
that the world as given is always given to some subject or body, but to 
demand that we think of relations of givenness beyond self-present think-
ing (Harman 2005). Despite the fact that Kantian philosophy defines 
‘theory’ as that which is given to a necessarily presupposed subject, we 
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might say that these gestures are theoretical insofar as they begin from 
what is not immediately present to a subject of action. 
One might want to go further than these suggestions from within phi-
losophy to consider what literary theory might offer to a present that is 
dominated by information calculating the end of time, alongside a range 
of cultural productions striving to witness such an end—however para-
doxical such an end might be. That is: how would theory approach the 
influx of data regarding irreversible threats to the human species—an 
onslaught of evidence that is met at one and the same time by increas-
ing climate change denial, a resurgence in ‘theories’ of human praxis, and 
a widespread cultural production that intimates the end of human life? 
How would a theory that was literary—or that considered the remnants 
of the letter—‘read’ the spate of films of the last decade or more that have 
been witnessing the possible end of all human life? Such films include, 
especially, redemption narratives where the potential extinction of the 
species is averted by a popular or ecological victory over techno-science: 
James Cameron’s Avatar (2009) would be the most recent example. But 
for all their redemptive and re-humanizing work, post-apocalyptic films 
and novels also open up the thought of literary theory, where the ‘literary’ 
would signal something like Benn and Michaels’s enigmatically inhuman 
traces. One can think here of texts as remaining, unread, dead objects 
without authors or audience. Would readers fifty or one hundred years 
from now who found random copies of Glamorama or Finnegans Wake be 
secure in attributing intent and meaning, or would not such texts be more 
likely encountered as marks or traces without animating hand? A literary 
theory would not assume that texts or letters were the work of a living 
body, and yet would be theoretical as well as literary in asking what sort 
of reading, viewing or look such texts or marks might open. Imagine a 
species, after humans, ‘reading’ our planet and its archive: if they encoun-
ter human texts (ranging from books, to machines to fossil records) how 
might new views or theories open up? Such a literary theory would not, 
as Derrida suggested concerning literature, be an opening to democracy 
insofar as literature is a right to ‘say anything’ (Derrida 1997: 58). Rather 
the ‘text’ would operate as an ‘anarchic genesis’ or ‘mal d’archive’: a force 
or disturbance not felt by the organism but witnessed after the event in 
its having always already occurred.
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Leaving those suggestions aside for now, I want to begin by address-
ing the question of why such a strong sense of theory after theory ought 
to be entertained. First: one might consider the current terrain of theory 
as a reaction formation. In response to a world in which ‘the political’ is 
increasingly divorced from meaningful practice (whatever that would be) 
theory has insisted in ever more shrill tones on the grounding of theo-
ria in meaningful, practical, productive and human-organic life. Second: 
our context or life is one in which a radical sense of ‘after theory’—the 
non-existence of thinking beings—is all too obvious, despite the fact 
that the one area theory has failed to address is what it might mean in 
this (literally posthuman, or after-human) sense to be ‘after theory.’ That 
is, one might ask why it is just as the world faces its annihilation, or at 
least the annihilation of something like the organic life that was capable 
of bios theoretikos, that ‘theory’ turns back towards productive embodied 
and affective life? Third: if popular culture is dominated by a genuinely 
post-theoretical meditation—by a constant, obsessive and fraught imagi-
nation of a life or non-life beyond the gaze of the organism, and by the 
literal image of extinction—why is this the one mode of post-theory that 
‘theory’ has failed to consider?
The twentieth century witnessed several waves of extinction threat or 
catastrophic risks coming in various modes with various temporal inten-
sities: the sudden nuclear annihilation of the cold war was perhaps the 
only potential extinction threat that has abated. Sudden nuclear catastro-
phe is perhaps the only event that would produce apocalyptic annihila-
tion; all other possible extinctions would be gradual, allowing for a mini-
mal ‘human’ presence to witness the slow and violent departure of the 
human. Indeed, two of the senses of post-apocalyptic lie in this indica-
tion that there will not be complete annihilation but a gradual witnessing 
of a slow end, and that we are already at that moment of witness, living 
on after the end. Indeed, this is what an ethics of extinction requires: not 
an apocalyptic thought of the ‘beyond the human’ as a radical break or 
dissolution, but a slow, dim, barely discerned and yet violently effective 
destruction. Since the cold war, other threats to human species survival 
have succeeded each other with the public imagination being turned 
now to one human extermination menace, now to another. It is almost as 
though there is a global and temporally myopic attention deficit disorder: 
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we can imagine as other and as ‘our’ end only one threat at a time. If post-
9/11 culture seemed gripped by the threat of terror, then more recent 
fears of systemic economic collapse have overtaken the focus on the war 
on terror. One might note that although the threat of AIDS—the initial 
figuration of which was highly apocalyptic—has hardly gone away, little 
mention was made of viral disaster once other concerns such as climate 
change began to attract attention. After 9/11 and the shift from a war 
on drugs to a war on terror, various viral disasters have deflected ‘atten-
tion’ from bio-weapons, nuclear arsenals and suicide bombers, ‘focusing’ 
instead on SARS, bird flu and the H1N1 virus. Interspersed among those 
surges of panic have been waves of other threats (including the threat of 
panic itself, for it may be the case that it is the fear and chaos of terrorism 
and viral pandemic that pushes the system into annihilating disorder). 
Before the financial meltdown of late 2008 the ‘era of cheap food’ came 
to an end (due partly to the shift in production towards bio-fuels), with 
food riots in Haiti presaging intense global aggression from the hungry. 
This was eclipsed by waves of lawlessness and violence that followed the 
stringencies caused by economic chaos, which in turn would lead to a 
fear of disorder that would be both precipitated by diminishing resources 
while also exacerbating the increasing fragility and incompetence of 
systems of social order that would suffer from widespread uncertainty 
and confusion. 
These terrors—viral, political, economic, climactic and affective—
have not failed to dent the cultural imaginary. In addition to quite explicit 
texts about viral disaster, from Outbreak (1995) to the more recent 
The Invasion (2007), 28 Days Later (2002), 28 Weeks Later (2007) and 
Contagion (2011), other disaster epics have focused on spectacular catas-
trophes prompted by global warming (including Danny Boyle’s Sunshine 
in which a space mission to reignite the dying sun is thwarted when 
the space travelers fail to resist the desire to stare directly at the source 
of the light that would have saved the earth, so drawn are they to light’s 
blinding intensity). Like The Invasion in which humans are infected by a 
virus that robs them of all affect and thus annuls their capacity for vio-
lence and emotion, fiction and documentary culture have repeatedly 
asked the question that theory has failed to ask: why should the human 
species wish for or justify its prolongation, and what would be worth 
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saving? (Exceptions to this investigation of species-worthiness would be 
David Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been (2006), Thomas Ligotti’s The 
Conspiracy Against the Human Race (2010), and Ray Brassier’s far more 
questioning Nihil Unbound (2009).) But beyond asking the worth of 
the species, we might ask why and how such questions are both possible 
(given that they are implied in so much contemporary fiction) and yet 
impossible, given that the human species seems to have defined itself as 
a will to survive? How might the human race imagine its non-existence, 
and how would we humans of the present adopt a relation to those whose 
miserable future will be ‘our’ legacy? (In The Day After Tomorrow (2004) 
survivors taking refuge in the frozen-over New York Public Library 
decide not to burn the works of Nietzsche, choosing an economics text 
book for some final warmth.) Other texts have passed judgment on a 
self-extinguishing humanity, with the recent remake of The Day the Earth 
Stood Still (2008) featuring a dead-pan Keanu Reeves informing human-
ity that it has no right to live given the waste and violence of its history. 
Such worlds are after theory in a quite banal and literal sense. There are 
no theorists. 
This era of theory after theory has been considered by ‘theory,’ if at 
all, either in the mode of mournful despair (by an Agamben who wishes 
to retrieve the political in the face of the hedonism of spectacle) or re-
humanizing emancipation, (by a Hardt and Negri who regard liberation 
from any external point of judgment as the consequence of living labor 
no longer subjected to spatial fragmentation or material production). 
These new trends in theory are accompanied by a series of returns or 
relocations of the previous generation of thinkers to their less threaten-
ing philosophical fathers. Derrida is returned to Husserl in order to avoid 
the radically disembodied and inhuman forces of writing; Deleuze and 
Guattari are returned to Bergson in order to re-affirm the boundaries of 
the organism; the machinic potentials of digital media are located in the 
bodies of meaning-generating audiences (Hansen 2000; Hansen 2003; 
Hansen 2004). A Merleau-Ponty whose concept of ‘flesh’ bore the pos-
sibility of taking the body and even ‘life’ beyond the sense of the lived 
has, for theorists of biopolitics, become a way of positing vital norms 
(Esposito 2008) or, even more alarmingly, a re-grounding of thought on 
embodiment (Gallagher 2005). 
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More specifically still: if theory after theory has any meaning, should 
it not refer to a hyperbolic and minimal theoretical condition in which 
we consider not simply the formal absence of a population but an actual 
disappearance? Theory is constitutively distinct from practice precisely 
because theory relates to that which is not ourselves; theory is the consid-
eration of that which is given to us (while practice is the law one gives to 
oneself in the absence of knowledge). Hyperbolically, then, theory ought 
to relate to cultural production not in terms of bodies, affects, multitudes 
and identities, unless these too were also considered not as self-evidently 
familiar and living but as strangely dead to us. This would also give us a 
minimal approach to an ethics of extinction, which would also be a coun-
ter-ethics. We would not assume an ethos, a proper way of being, com-
munity, ‘we’ or humanity that would be the ground and value of literary 
or other objects. Just as Foucault’s counter-memory sought to consider 
all those forces that had some power in the present but were not present 
to living history (Foucault 1977), a counter-ethics would be theoretical 
in beginning from the condition of the present—looming extinction—
without assuming the ethos of the present. That is, one would—as the 
world after theory ought to compel us to do—consider what is worthy 
of concern or survival, what of the human, the multitude, or the living 
would enable an ethos that was not the ethos of the present. 
We can return again to the question of theory after theory, today, and 
ask why it has so focused on an empty tomorrow—a future of open 
creativity, and unbounded possibility—that it has not considered the 
tomorrow of its own non-existence. Given even the minimal assump-
tion that reading theoretically requires some necessary distance from 
any actual audience, and given the now-literal threat of the absence of 
the human species, why has theory survived, after theory, in a mode of 
increasing humanization and organicism? Why, when events and time-
lines would seem to demand just the contrary, does theory takes its cur-
rent self-englobing form? As an example of the ways in which theory 
has, just as Arendt suggested it ought to do, retrieved a politics of living 
in common (a polity of the multitude with no outside), we might con-
sider three dominants. First, a deconstruction that now mourns Derrida 
does so precisely by insisting on a dimension of deconstruction oriented 
towards hospitality (Royle 2009: 137), and towards a future whose 
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radical openness defies all calculation (saving justice and democracy to 
come) (Naas 2008: 67-68). Such a mode of deconstruction would sur-
vive at the expense of a Derrida who suggested an ‘untamed genesis’ that 
would be neither living nor dead, neither before nor after the human but 
nevertheless disruptive of any mode of good conscience. Second, a turn 
to life or naturalism insists that the world is always the world for this or 
that living system, always embedded in a milieu given as a range of affor-
dances: this ranges from the retrieval of phenomenology and the embed-
ding of mind in life (Petito, Varela, Pachoud and Roy 1999) against an 
anti-organicism or textualism that would draw attention to forces beyond 
the lived, to the celebration of bio-political production and the multitude 
against a bio-power that is seen as extrinsic and opposed to life (Hardt 
and Negri 2000). Finally, one might cite a return to the aesthetic, whether 
that be an aesthetics of language that separates man as a speaking being 
who gives himself his world from animality (Agamben 2004), to a re-
affirmation of literature ( Joughin and Malpas 2003; Attridge 2004) or art 
in general as grounded in the human organism’s sense-making capacities 
of its world. It would be far too obvious to add to this list the affirmations 
of identity politics or, worse, subjectivity, that would posit a self that is 
nothing more than the negation of a world in itself (knowable, measur-
able and presentable) precisely because the subject is that which gives a 
world, law and norm to itself. 
Theory might have both interest and worth—if we accept the thorough 
contingency of such worth—only if it is as destructive of the imagination 
as our milieu of possible extinction allows. We might need to abandon 
the grounding of ecology on nature (Morton 2007) or consider modes 
of deconstruction in which the future were not radically open, hospita-
ble and affirmative (Clark 2010). There is no shortage of data regarding 
the possible or inevitable absence of humans: terror threats are calcu-
lated meticulously by government think tanks; climate change protocols 
and negotiations require detailed prediction and scenario plotting, and 
popular news is dominated by economic, climactic, viral and political 
‘updates’ regarding a range of intruding violences (Grusin 2010). Such 
information, far from indicating the location of texts in a polity, suggests 
just the sort of approach deemed to be horrifically absurd in Knapp and 
Benn Michaels’s miserable summation of theory. Let us imagine texts as 
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lines drawn without any preceding or ideal community. Let us also, more 
importantly, be aware (insofar as we can) that the text of the current ‘mul-
titude’ includes information regarding climate change, terror, destruc-
tion and extinction expressed in a vocabulary of mitigation, adaptation, 
viability policy and sustainability, none of which can figure the non-exis-
tence of the human. If theory were to operate as it might then it would be 
destructive of such an imaginary; it would be theory after theory. 
Chapter 2
The Sustainability of Concepts: 
Knowledge and Human Interests
Climate change studies—a burgeoning field prompted by govern-
ment research initiatives and academic opportunism as much as by the 
impending crises associated with global warming and resource deple-
tion—is, in general, formed by combining the ‘hard’ sciences (geogra-
phy, geology, physics, biochemistry, biology and genetics) with the social 
sciences (geography again, psychology, political science, demographics, 
sociology and economics). As a consequence of most major research 
institutions having produced some type of climate change research net-
work the humanities, too, are beginning to contribute to understandings 
of the problems presented by climate change. Before considering why 
any simple inclusion of the humanities in climate change studies needs to 
be questioned, I would like to open a series of considerations. 
First, the combinations of the hard sciences and human sciences that 
make up climate change studies—even though interdisciplinary research 
networks bring these sciences together—keep the disciplinary borders 
of various fields in place. There are, of course, some sciences—geogra-
phy, psychology—that are in part both hard and social sciences, but even 
this division within the subject presupposes something like the idea of a 
human science. That disciplinary distinction, as Michel Foucault argued in 
The Order of Things, is not simply a division of labour that takes a single 
subject such as nineteenth-century natural history and then divides the 
same practices of gathering information into different disciplines: what 
counts as true or false alters dramatically, with the very idea of a distinc-
tion between hard science and social or human science creating ‘man’ 
as a distinct object of knowledge (Foucault 1970). Foucault argues, for 
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example, that we cannot see natural history as simply preceding biology 
or the science of life. Nor can we read Adam Smith’s theory of wealth as 
leading seamlessly to economics; nor can we see theories of grammar as 
similar in type to the social science of linguistics. 
To understand how these new disciplinary distinctions create a curious 
new object of knowledge—man—we can take our lead from the pres-
ent. Even popular economic theories, such as Freakanomics (Levitt and 
Dubner 2005), or the Chicago school theories that directly influence 
government policy (Overtveldt 2007) presuppose a certain concept of 
man. Either—as Freakanomics theories posit—we constantly miscalcu-
late the effects that our ‘choices’ will have on our well-being (by being 
lured into paying more for our daily coffee if only we can be seduced by a 
special offer that will create a habit); or, we are naturally competitive and 
self-interested animals who, if left to themselves, will allow the most effi-
cient players to rise to the top while the muddling remainder of the pop-
ulation can benefit from economic prosperity in general. What econom-
ics as a social science assumes is a ‘subject of interests’ (Montag 2009): 
it is not sufficient just to look at relations among goods and prices but 
also to have some notion of human behavior, especially if the operations 
of human behavior are not immediately apparent to humans themselves. 
Questioning the extent to which capitalism presupposes normative 
concepts of the self is hardly new. C.B. Macpherson’s 1962 classic theory 
of possessive individualism is perhaps now widely accepted, with the 
concepts of the free individual or the level playing field now recognized 
as being barely veiled assertions of liberal market norms. What is slightly 
more nuanced, and not so widely acknowledged, is not the critique of lib-
eral normativity but the shift from the normative to the normal. If behav-
ior is based not so much on (even implicit) regulatory ideals regarding 
the proper life that one ought to live, but more on some preceding and 
determining life, then the mode of decision or axiology shifts from self-
determination to alignment—bringing human existence into accord with 
the life of which it is an expression. We tend to explain human actions 
by appealing to some prior logic of life from which they emerge. There 
is a shift from assessing human action according to its manifest sense to 
regarding ‘man’ as a strangely doubled animal who is the outcome of a 
longer history of life processes that he can only dimly discern. And yet 
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man is also able to read and interpret the life of which he is an effect. In 
this respect certain historical theses—ranging from MacPherson’s claim 
that the supposed neutral individual of capitalism is in fact the outcome 
of a specific politico-economic historical period, or Louis Dumont’s 
argument that modern homo economicus needs to be explained anthro-
pologically—rely on some ultimate horizon (history, anthropology) that 
would gather and explain human positivity. Foucault (1970) agued that 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations of 1776 explained how human interac-
tion produced commodities, how these could be exchanged, and how a 
system of circulating goods produced an overall stability and system that 
benefited all concerned (Smith 1976). When Karl Marx forms a theory 
of labor the life or species being of the human animal is added to the way 
questions are posed: why, we might ask, do human beings labor and enter 
into exchange? For Marx the answer presupposed man’s species being: 
we must labor, collectively and with the help of technology, in order to 
meet our needs. This, in turn, explains the existence of ideology for there 
are forces that determine the relations we establish to each other—forces 
of production that place some bodies in greater servitude to production 
than others. The very concept of ideology in its Marxist sense—not what 
we believe but belief as grounded in a preceding and hidden life—relies 
upon situating the human species in a collective history that originates 
from an initially life-serving aim. These initial forces determine our social 
being, even if they are not directly experienced, and are capable of being 
interpreted only after the fact. Marx’s theory of ideology, in a manner 
shared by social or human sciences more generally, relies upon interpret-
ing the way in which we live our social relations: what we experience as 
natural—that I go to work for an employer who pays me for my time—
needs to be understood as the outcome of a historical process whereby 
those in command of the means of production that will ultimately reduce 
human effort (factory owners, for example) are capable of buying the 
labor of other individuals from whom they profit (Foucault 1970, 257). 
The human sciences, such as economics, do not just chart the circulation 
of goods (as did Adam Smith’s theory of wealth) they presuppose some-
thing like human interests that can explain systems of exchange. 
Second, this production of ‘man’ in the human sciences would also yield 
the possibility of the humanities. Not only would we have social sciences 
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looking at the mechanisms of ‘life, labour and language’ (Foucault 1970, 
345) through which social systems are effected, we can also have human-
ities disciplines that would be interpretive in their examination of human 
cultural production, and would also presuppose ‘man’ as an historical, 
social and productive animal. Anyone working in a literature depart-
ment today may well recognize that Foucault’s notion of literature—a 
mode of human production not grounded in purposiveness or a theory of 
human function—has well and truly been overtaken by logics grounded 
on a normalizing theory of man, whether that be a theory of literature 
as ideology (allowing for smooth social functioning and the reproduc-
tion of capitalist social relations) or a theory of narrative and story-telling 
as a human survival mechanism (or so literary Darwinism would claim). 
Foucault, referring to the knowledge practices of his own day, was critical 
of some of the key discourses that made up the humanities, such as phe-
nomenology, structuralism and psychoanalysis (Foucault 1970, 355). 
These approaches would examine cultural production while presuppos-
ing what Foucault referred to as man as an ‘empirical-transcendental’ 
double. Man is empirical—a being whose language, social relations and 
bodily habits are determined by the material relations he must take up 
in relation to his environment and others; but man is also a being who 
can analyze those material forces and thereby ‘read’ the ways in which 
he has come to be the specific social being that he is. Psychoanalysis, for 
example, will argue that we can only exist and live if our desires take on 
some acceptable, socially-sanctioned form; we can, however, always read 
these socialized forms to discern something like desire as such. (Other 
less humanizing or organic forms of psychoanalysis would not ground 
desire in the function of man as a social animal, but Foucault’s target was 
a psychological form of psychoanalysis, one grounded on a desire that 
would be explicable according to the human animal as a self-furthering 
and survival-oriented being). Phenomenology, also, insists that we exist 
only insofar as we make sense of ourselves and our world; we need to see 
all that we do—from daily habits to great artworks—as a mode of world-
production. Structuralism, too, regards language, culture and social rela-
tions as a product of a transcendental need for ordering: the specific 
forms of social ordering are empirical (or to do with how this or that 
social formation comes into existence); but the requirement that there be 
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some mode of ordering is necessary or transcendental—characterizing 
any and every culture. 
We can pause and look at how these first two considerations—both 
involving normalizing theories of man—open up questions for climate 
change studies. For it is not just that we address questions of climate 
on the basis of certain values, including assumptions regarding market 
viability and social fairness; it is also the case that we adopt normaliz-
ing forms of reasoning and calculation, both assuming that individuals 
may act more benevolently towards the climate (and future others) if 
narratives can be formed that are sympathetic and coherent, and that the 
values of survival and the future are shared by all humans here and now. 
There is also division of labor between the predictive hard sciences con-
cerned with climate change research and data, and the interpretive proj-
ects of the humanities. 
How does the distinction between the physical sciences and moral sci-
ences not only alter the way we approach climate change (as something 
with a physical base that may affect different humans differently) but 
produce the very concepts through which we think about ways of tack-
ling climate change? First, as long as we assume something like the pos-
sibility of a social science, in its distinction from hard sciences, we will 
not only have a bifurcation between data (such as the evidence yielded 
by the earth sciences for global warming) and social impact (such as the 
work done by social geographers who gauge how gender, class and race 
produce disproportionate and unequal impacts of climate change); we 
also presuppose a subject of interests. That is, it is assumed that there is 
a physical world of material forces and constraints and that this physical 
world is the milieu, environment or climate within which we are located. 
The concept of climate may be the most telling of all, deriving from con-
cepts of surface and habitation, when in fact what ‘climate change’ indi-
cates is that there is not a distinct milieu that we can observe and man-
age but a mesh of overlapping, divergent, interconnected and dispersed 
systems with certain factors such as clouds and even human hope itself, 
operating in two directions at once: too much hope and we don’t act, 
not enough hope and we don’t act; clouds may both increase and lessen 
global warming, trapping or deflecting. But rather than consider the dis-
persed, diverging, multiple and incongruent forces of multiple planes 
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(where economics, politics, technology, knowledge and industry operate 
by divergent timelines and logics) the concept of climate reinforces the 
sense of ‘a’ milieu or habitus. Climate change would therefore refer to a 
material and physical locale that may be treated as material resource for 
goods and data (by the physical sciences) or as a restraining and deter-
mining condition that will alter how we produce our world and our pol-
ity (by the human sciences). The word ‘climate’ originally refers to a spe-
cific region, indicating different modes of human life, but once we refer to 
‘climate change’ and have something like the climate, we also generate the 
concept of something like humanity in general. That is, if we now have 
something that is not a specific ‘clime’ or territory but a single condition 
for all living beings then there is also something like a general concept of 
life that comes to be threatened. 
Second, this leads to the specific possibility of the humanities. This 
possibility might seem, at first glance, to produce something quite dis-
tinct from either the physical being of the hard sciences or the social 
systems of the human sciences. If political theory, economics and soci-
ology can examine the impacts of climate change and climate change 
policy on different nations, social groups, ethnicities and gender—and 
if these social sciences can also explain non-physical aspects of climate 
change, such as the needs of developing nations and peoples to maxi-
mize production without being able to afford strategies of mitigation—
what they cannot do is examine the meaning of climate change: how it 
is lived by ‘us’ and what modes of understanding and cultural produc-
tion led to climate catastrophe and disdain for the environment upon 
which we depend and which also produces us as the beings that we 
are. This is where the humanities may, and has, entered climate change 
studies. One might even argue that the humanities has always taken the 
form of climate change studies: has always asked what humanity or ‘the 
human’ is such that it may have come to treat its own milieu as so much 
raw material for profit, consumption and energy maximization and not 
as a body worthy of care. The humanities, we might say, has always con-
sidered the earth as climate or environment—the home of our being, or 
our unavoidable terrain and surround—and never as mere stuff, matter 
or potential energy. The humanities originates both in a unified sense of 
the human, and in a commitment to the cultural, historical and textual 
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variability of humanity across time and space. In a humanizing mission, 
reacting to the disenchantment of the world by the supposed ‘hard’ sci-
ences, the humanities open a space for human variability. This human-
izing motif occurs as early as the first formulations of English Studies in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, concerned to develop a 
moral framework in an increasingly secularized and disenchanted world, 
and is reiterated—today—in various calls for the humanities to be led by 
life and praxis against the mechanizations of globalization and capitalism 
(Baldick 1983; Bérubé and Nelson 1995). By the time the humanities 
explicitly take up these concerns of eco-criticism or environmental phi-
losophy it has a wealth of material to draw upon that would demonstrate 
that we are, primarily, ecological beings. The humanities could not do 
without the ecological motif, or the commitment to historical cultural 
variation across a comparative and meaningful plane. By the time univer-
sities form explicit networks for climate change studies there is already 
a demarcated niche for the humanities: neither assuming the brute facts 
of the world, nor dealing with humans statistically in the manner of the 
human sciences, the humanities nevertheless presupposes a ground of 
life that expresses itself in human self-creation. 
On the one hand environmental philosophy—even though general-
izing this area covers over many complexities—reacts critically to the 
fundamental concepts that are deemed to constitute Western metaphys-
ics. The idea that we are self-determining ‘subjects’ whose relation to 
the world is one of representation (knowledge) or use (with the world 
as mere raw material) needs to be supplanted by a relation of care, con-
cern or respect. The humanism and anthropocentrism that have marked 
Western thought need to give way to a new relation to the environ-
ment. This would not be a shift in the value we attribute to the planet 
and atmosphere that is our home; it would not be a question of valuing 
the environment more, or of granting it greater worth, importance or signifi-
cance. We would require what Nietzsche referred to as a transvaluation 
of values (Nietzsche 1968). Rather than generating values on the basis 
of instrumental reason or utility—rather, that is, than assuming that 
the worth of an object or action is gauged by how much it furthers our 
own purposes—we would criticize means/ends rationality. We would 
not assume that all valid means are justified if they serve to maintain 
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humanity in its current mode. We would, at the very least, consider val-
ues as if from a point of view different from that of ‘man.’ This would occur if, 
for example, we granted non-humans (animals, trees, ecosystems) rights, 
or if we questioned the concepts of rights and entitlement and instead 
developed values of mutual care, concern and deep ecological connect-
edness. On the other hand, while insisting upon the need to alter the 
very structure of our thought away from instrumental (or use-oriented) 
and cognitive relations to the world in which we live, eco-criticism has 
already uncovered an implicit and long-running awareness of a complex 
relation to nature that might be unearthed in canonical literature (Bate 
1991; Bate 2000). Despite a manifest assumption that humans are given 
the world as so much available property, eco-critical readings can show 
the ways in which there has always been an awareness that the earth is 
not mere matter, but an environing and meaningful place that is as much 
constitutive of our sense of self as we are of the significance it has for us. 
Again, like environmental philosophy, eco-criticism cannot be reduced 
to a common set of principles. What can unify both these ways in which 
the humanities disciplines have anticipated current attempts to approach 
our climate differently is both their target and some of their key concepts. 
What is targeted is the notion of human beings as self-sufficient and pri-
marily rational agents whose relation to the world is ideally one of dis-
interested or disenchanted knowledge; the use of key concepts, ranging 
from environment and ecology, to the privileging of place over space, 
along with concepts of care, concern, indebtedness and most importantly 
life also serve to move from a philosophy based on individuals and mat-
ter to a mode of thought that is more relational, more sympathetic and 
ultimately more concerned with meaning. That is to say, there is never a 
world as such, in itself, that we then have to manage and quantify, for ‘we’ 
exist and have a sense of ourselves only insofar as we have a specific place 
that is always embedded in, and generative of, an entire world of possible 
futures (which involve other timelines and potentials beyond ourselves). 
Perhaps the strongest mode of this critical relation to Western knowl-
edge takes the form of James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, where he insists 
that not only is it not a question of taking up a different attitude to nature, 
it is also imperative that ‘nature’ no longer be seen as a distinct object that 
would be more worthy of our care. On the contrary, the Gaia hypothesis 
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presents the world as a single organism, so that human life would not 
be placed within the world, or in relation to the world, for human life 
would be just one aspect of an intricate, complex, dynamic, interacting 
and homeostatic system (Lovelock 1979). The Gaia hypothesis was for-
mulated to challenge conventional ways of thinking about humans and 
their relation to the environment. It suggests that any adequate response 
to climate change would require a radical reassessment of our concep-
tual terrain. 
We might, then, consider some of the key terms that orient climate 
change policy, ranging from ‘cap and trade,’ adaptation and mitigation to 
sustainability and viability. These terms remain managerial and instru-
mental. Cap and trade is, of course, an explicit adoption of a calculative 
framework. Policy and negotiations focus on a single variable (carbon 
emissions) despite the volatility and complexity of factors that the physi-
cal sciences have consistently demonstrated to make up the problems of 
climate change. The very notion of trading carbon emissions—that as 
long as a payoff is made somewhere or by someone then further destruc-
tion can be sanctioned—not only (again) places human response in the 
mode of homo economicus, it also precludes any genuine thought of the 
future. If carbon emissions can be managed, traded, and held at ‘accept-
able’ levels then we fail to confront the scientific evidence that indicates 
that even a halt in current carbon emissions would leave a tailing effect 
that would continue to wreak havoc; continued trade in emissions pre-
supposes that the future will be different in degree, or a continuation of 
the present, and not different in kind. There is something anaesthetizing 
in the idea of trading carbon emissions and allowances: as though some-
thing like an economy were at work, an enclosed system of more and 
less, and not—as is becoming apparent—a future that will be unmanage-
able and have entirely different terms. One might make a similar remark 
about the concepts of sustainability, adaptation, mitigation and viability. 
Sustainability assumes the value of continuity: if one changes it is only 
insofar as is required in order for human life to continue, an implica-
tion that is less subtly contained in the strategy of mitigation. Not only 
do all these terms accept that humanity exists as something that has the 
right to continue, and that it must do so now only in the mode of damage 
limitation; they also have a primarily calculative conceptual base (where 
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the calculations are arithmetical, concerning more and less, rather than 
differential). Climate change is perceived as a problem of disturbance, 
precluding us from continuing life in the same manner; and it is only 
for that reason that changes need to be made. Such changes will not be 
global in the full sense of the word; they will not alter the fundamental or 
entire system within which we are imbricated. They will rather occur as 
responses to a predicament. Life may have continued unperturbed—had 
we been wiser and more cautious, perhaps less profligate and wasteful—
but unfortunately we plundered nature excessively and with short-term 
thinking. Our response is therefore to extend our calculative approach to 
the future to include not only our maximal efficiency here and now but 
our ongoing existence, our sustained existence. 
All these terms are aligned with what Gilles Deleuze referred to as 
extensive multiplicities: certain multiples have their units determined 
in advance, and are composed of equivalents (Deleuze 1994). In gen-
eral we might say that the very possibility of the social sciences is built 
on calculations of extensive multiplicities: in relation to climate change 
studies one can look at how different members of populations respond 
to, or are affected by, policies or climatic disasters. More importantly, the 
timelines take the mode of more or less: what practices do we need to 
adopt to live longer? How might ‘we’ adapt? Can we use less? Can we 
be more like developing nations? How much suffering and sacrifice will 
be demanded from our future generations? All such questions assume 
that the future would be a continuing time of more or less. Such exten-
sive calculations also presuppose a general underlying substrate—human 
life—that may vary culturally and historically, that may have to adapt, 
but will have nevertheless have some mode of continuity. Rather, then, 
than continue a late Romantic project of re-enchanting the world, follow-
ing a science of calculation that disenchanted the world, I would suggest 
that what is required is a more intensified disenchantment and evacua-
tion of meaning, or what Timothy Morton has referred to as an ecology 
without nature. As long as we regard the world as our lived world, as an 
organic and meaningful whole that is the milieu of our being then our 
approach to the future will be bifurcated: split between an increasingly 
multiple and intensive mode of scientific calculation, concerned with 
positive and negative feedback loops and multiple timelines, and an 
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englobing environment. In intensive quantities it is not a question of 
equivalent units of more or less, but of speeds and thresholds that have 
the capacity to produce differences in kind. Climate change calculations, 
models and scenarios have long been characterized by quantities that are 
not those of a single unit (beneficial or detrimental) but will alter in kind 
and relation depending on speed and quantity; not only are there tipping 
points (or thresholds where one more degree of heat will alter the entire 
system) there are also unpredictable feedback effects and incalculable 
productions of disequilibrium. Had the social sciences taken on a simi-
lar complexity they would have to consider the possibility that the units 
with which they work—humans, societies—would alter in kind, beyond 
recognition, at certain speeds and thresholds. This could be seen posi-
tively, whereby one might say that climate change will not simply disturb 
human life, requiring it to sustain itself in a more viable manner, but will 
alter the very unit of ‘the human.’ 
Here, one would have to rethink the very being of ‘man’ that was pro-
duced by the division between hard and social sciences: there could no 
longer be this animal blessed with language and history, who produces 
himself socially and technologically, but who can also study and read 
himself as an object of historical and cultural production. For there would 
no longer be man (historically and socially determined and determining) 
but a species tied to rhythms that were geological and beyond the histori-
cal and familial imagination. This would require us to consider that the 
question of the humanities and the human is not something that might 
be added to the problem of climate change, as though the environmen-
tal and policy problems could benefit from an examination of some con-
cepts. Here is where we might return to how theories of ecology, envi-
ronment and—of course—climate as terrain or habitation have already 
been considered by the humanities. For perhaps what may need to be 
rethought is the very concept of the human as it subtends the humanities. 
Returning to Foucault’s genealogy of the emergence of the human 
sciences in modernity, we can recall that ‘man’ becomes possible as an 
object of knowledge only with the strict distinction between the hard 
sciences of matter, and the social sciences that chart man as a socio-his-
torical cultural production. If we accept that construction of man that is 
coterminous with a normalizing ground of life, splitting the world into 
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the hard sciences of matter, and then the temporal-cultural expression 
of man in the social sciences, then it follows that the discipline of the 
humanities forms both an enabling condition and presupposed axiol-
ogy: for discipline is both a set of conditions of knowledge and an art 
of formation. In the disciplines of the humanities ‘man’ not only studies 
himself as determined, in part, by his climate, for he can also reconfig-
ure his intellectual climate, rewrite his concepts and vocabularies. He can 
alter himself from within his own history, sustaining himself, and render-
ing himself more viable by becoming more attuned, more sympathetic, 
less instrumental in relation to what will always be his climate and his 
environment. Indeed, in theories such as the Gaia hypothesis, man can 
project his organic being onto life as a whole. No longer would he be frag-
mented from a climate that is unfortunately not bending to his will and 
knowledge; he would, rather, be part of a living form that in its dynami-
cally self-sustaining manner would guide him away from self-seeking 
politics to a naturally forming politics of the whole. Ethics and politics—
what ‘we’ ought to do—would follow directly from the natural and vital 
norms of the one living earth. Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, like any theory 
that assumes a natural or proper connectedness (however occluded), 
reinforces what Foucault referred to as the specifically modern nature of 
bio-power (Foucault 1978), and maintains an extensive and bourgeois 
approach to values. That is, despite the recognitions of ecology, environ-
ment, climate and biosphere, it is man who will read the conditions of 
this system, discern its proper order, break free from merely instrumental 
attitudes and arrive at a proper mode of self-regulation. 
The alternative to this privileging of climate, environment, ecology and 
biosphere as continuations of self-sustaining life was already prefigured 
when Foucault spoke about the possible erasure of man. Here, one would 
not assume that the future would only need to be altered in degree in 
order for life to continue: one would ask whether the future would be one 
of life. That is, would all those disciplinary norms, including a distinction 
among hard sciences of data, human sciences of self-management, and 
the humanities as self-interpretive, not be fragmented following their dis-
solution and failure in the face of impending catastrophe? If we did not 
assume that life (as it is) were self-evidently worth sustaining, if life were 
not viable, could not be adapted, then we would no longer be reading and 
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managing the human, via the humanities, but would be asking how we 
might think in the absence of sustained human life. This would lead, in 
turn, to thinking climate intensively—and this, in turn, would require 
not only adjusting concepts but creating new concepts, or even thinking 
beyond concepts. At its simplest, climate change ‘policy’ would have to 
shift from being political—the coming together of bodies in common via 
a common language of sustaining and adapting—to become impolitic. 
What ways of speaking would fragment, disturb and destroy the logics of 
self-maintenance that have always sustained humanity as an animal that 
cannot question its existence? (Humanity has, of course, always ques-
tioned the essence of its existence—who is man?—but it has rarely ques-
tioned the actuality of its existence: that it may not be.) To consider the 
future intensively we would at least begin with the possibility that an event 
might occur to ‘us’ that would create a mutation of such a force that ‘we’ 
would no longer exist. What we have known as human life, supposedly 
marked by instrumental reason, self-maintenance, risk-assessment, man-
agement of resources and exchange with a view to relatively short-term 
futures, would give way to a being that does not have a future.
As long as we calculate the future as one of sustaining, maintaining, 
adapting and rendering ourselves viable, the future will differ only in 
degree; this would mean of course that there would be no future for us 
other than an eventual, barely lived petering out. If, however, we enter-
tained the erasure of the human (especially as defined through the dis-
cipline of the humanities, whereby humanity is that fragment of a self-
maintaining nature that can sustain itself through reading itself) then 
there might be a future. This would not be a future of the climate, of a 
terrain or habitation, and certainly not of an environment—as that which 
environs or encloses. For if the experience of climate change were to be 
experienced it would disclose that there is no climate, biosphere or envi-
ronment. There is not ‘a’ world, existing in the manner of an organism, 
that maintains and sustains itself. 
Chapter 3
A Globe of One’s Own:  
In Praise of the Flat Earth
Questions, today, of climate and climate ethics—and even concerns 
regarding the sustainability and viability of this life of ours on earth—
appear to present a new imaginary for political questions. One might say 
that it was only in the late twentieth century, with events such as the pic-
turing of the earth from space, the possibility of nuclear annihilation of 
earthly life or the increasing speeds of new media allowing for the pos-
sibility of global audiences (such as the entire world viewing 9/11), that 
something like the problem of a global ethos would emerge. If there had 
always been a silent presupposed ‘we’1 in any ethical theory, then this 
virtual universalism would always struggle alongside moral valorizations 
of specified communities.2 How do we, from the particular world we 
inhabit, begin to think of life as such? It is the present sense of the planet 
as a whole, as a fragile bounded globe that might present us, finally, with 
the opportunity and imperative to think a genuine ethos. Now that we 
have a notion of climate that seems to break with the etymology of this 
specific inclination or latitude of the earth , and does so by gesturing to 
something like a sense of the earth as a region or inclination in itself, this 
might open a new imaginary of the globe. We might think of ethos as no 
longer bound to a territory within the planet; instead there might be the 
ethos of this globe of our own, that has no other region against which 
we might define ourselves or towards which we might direct our fanta-
sies of another future. If there is something like climate change, perhaps 
it takes this form: not only a mutation of this climate (warming, deplet-
ing, becoming more volatile) but an alteration of what we take climate to 
be. One might want to suggest that as long as we think of climate in its 
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traditional sense—as our specific milieu—we will perhaps lose sight of 
climate change, or the degree to which human life is now implicated in 
timelines and rhythms beyond that of its own borders.
The figure of the globe appears to offer two ethical trajectories: on the 
one hand an attention to global interconnections and networks would 
expand responsibility and awareness beyond the figure of the isolated 
moral subject. Ethics may have to be considered beyond discursive, 
human and political modes (especially if one defines politics as the prac-
tice of a polity). On the other hand, the figure of the globe—consid-
ered as a figure—is intertwined with a tropology of interconnectedness, 
renewal, cyclic causality and organicism.   This traditionally theological 
series of motifs, with the globe’s circularity reflecting a divine intentional-
ity, is maintained today in many of the most profound and seemingly sec-
ular ecological theses, including the Gaia hypothesis and the global brain.  
It is the possibility of extinction or the end of human time that forces 
us to confront a new sense of the globe: far from being an unfortunate 
event that accidentally befalls the earth and humanity, the thought of the 
end of the anthropocene era is both at the heart of all the motifs of eco-
logical ethics and the one idea that cannot be thought as long as the globe 
is considered in terms of its traditional and anthropocentric metaphors.
The word ‘globalism’ along with the word ‘biopolitics’ suffers from a 
curious double valence. As a descriptive term globalism can refer to the 
lost autonomy and destroyed difference among worlds: the formation of 
global media, markets and communications eliminated what was once a 
panorama of difference. Once upon a time the globe enjoyed divergent 
timelines and worldviews. Even if it was central to the colonialist imagi-
nation to romanticize the extent to which ‘other’ worlds were exoti-
cally untranslatable, mystical and embedded in a non-linear time, there 
is nevertheless a very real sense in which globalism has created an earth 
of a single time, single market and single polity. Globalism would be a 
mode of homogenization, disenchantment or rendering quantifiable that 
one could lament as having displaced an earlier world of distinct places 
for the sake of one quantifiable space. This reduction of distinction has 
significant material consequences; today, any particular country’s envi-
ronmental or wage policies will directly alter the day to day life of bod-
ies elsewhere on the globe. But global inclusion and simultaneity also 
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trigger a series of imaginary ramifications. In positive terms this has been 
described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in terms of a new multi-
tude. Liberated from nation states and physical locales there can now be a 
humanity as such, a self-creating living labor that has no body other than 
that which it gives itself through its own immaterial productive powers 
(Hardt and Negri 2004). 
Thought less optimistically, one might say that the physical ability to 
occupy converging and synchronized worlds and times is coupled with 
a cognitive paralysis to think of any future that would not be one more 
chapter in a familiar collective narrative. This is evident in the terms that 
are used to describe the predicament of the globe. It is not only the case 
that events are materially and systemically linked, so that the volatile 
economies of even the smallest countries may precipitate global crises; it 
is also typical today to see all of financial history as similarly continuous 
and interconnected. This occurs both in short-term and long-term think-
ing; recent events have prompted the publication of a series of histories 
and genealogies, including the histories of debt, of money, of corpora-
tions, bonds and markets: all suggesting that the present is an expression 
and extension of a single history of something like ‘the’ globe (Ferguson 
2008; Cashill 2010; Graeber 2011; Coggan 2012; Bakan 2005). 
Economic events are considered in relation to a past that we have been 
unable to think as anything other than differing by degree. Despite the 
new global conditions and linkages the 2008 cascade of economic crises 
were gauged to be either as bad as or worse than the great depression, 
while terms such as ‘recovery,’ ‘recession,’ ‘depression,’ and ‘crisis’ place 
the current state of play as a continuation of a past, a past that varies and 
recovers always in terms of one easily comprehended cycle. The lexicon 
deployed to assess and gauge the environment is similarly comforting in 
terms of its linear temporality and delimitation: Australia still refers to its 
condition as one of ‘drought,’ even when the period of insufficient rain 
and increasing desertification exceeds a decade; climate change policy 
refers to ‘mitigation,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘sustainability’ and ‘viability’—all of 
which enable one to think of management (however difficult) rather than 
cessation, rupture or incomprehension. One might say that the imagi-
nary is, indeed, global. A literal globalism—the stark reality of there being 
no escape, no outside, nowhere else to flee now that the earth has been 
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forced to yield ever more to the human desire for life—is coupled with 
an incompatible global figuration. Things will cycle back to recovery. The 
globe can be taken and assessed as an object and managed, saved, revived 
or given the respect and care that it deserves. If where we are is a globe, 
then it can be imagined as delimited, bounded, organically self-referring 
and unified. 
Perhaps—given the advent of globalism as a concrete event where 
there can now be no time, place or body that can live outside a certain 
destructive force field of events (such as the possibility of viral, political, 
economic and climactic terrors)—now is the time to think non-glob-
ally. The usual figures of the bounded earth, the ideally-self-balancing 
cosmos, the interconnectedness of this great organic home of ‘ours’ are 
modes of narrative self-enclosure that have shielded us from confronting 
the forces of the present. It is not surprising that ‘globalism’ is at once a 
term of mourning, signaling a world economy and politics that has taken 
every space and timeline into its calculative, cynical and rigid systematic 
maw at the same time as it signals a redemptive potential. We are, so vari-
ous environmental and ecological imperatives remind us, always inter-
connected across and through this one living globe, this living world that 
environs us. The maxim, ‘act locally, think globally,’ should be reversed: 
there can be no encompassing global thought, for insofar as we think we 
are fragmented by various locales, figures, lexicons, disciplines and desire, 
but we nevertheless are caught up in a globe of action where no intent or 
prediction will be enough to secure or predict the outcome of any action.
It was the great contribution of Lacanian psychoanalysis to point out 
that the visual figural unity of the human body—the bounded organism 
we see in the mirror—serves as a captivating lure that precludes us from 
confronting that ex-centric predicament of the speaking subject whose 
desire is never given in a living present but is articulated and dispersed 
in a time that is never that of a self-comprehending and self-affecting 
whole. Just as the spatial unity of the human body covers over the tem-
poral dispersion of the speaking and desiring subject, so the delimited 
material object of the planet enables a misrecognition of the multiple 
systems, forces, timelines, planes and feedback loops that traverse what 
we imagine to be the single object of the globe. The advent of global-
ism—or the intensification of the world’s various modes of systemic 
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interconnectedness and hyper-volatility—should, if anything, have 
prompted a destruction of the figure of the globe. And yet the opposite 
appears to be the case: even in the genre that is apparently most devoted 
to global catastrophe—the disaster movie—the globe is strangely rein-
forced and consolidated. A typical instance is Independence Day of 1996, 
in which an invasion of earth is initially viewed from the contained space 
of a US government control room, as though we will be able to have 
advance vision of ‘our’ end and limit from the point of view of a single 
screen and panel of experts.
Perhaps today we might note that it is the physical image of the globe 
that serves as a reaction formation, precluding a thought of the conse-
quences of globalism (if globalism remains the correct term for the 
increasingly evident and non-human complexities that are precluding 
any possibility of a global or comprehensive vision). If capitalism could 
once have been thought of as ‘a’ power imposed upon the globe then this 
is no longer the case. As the recent economic crises demonstrated capi-
talism is not a system, cannot be attributed to a body of interests, and is 
less a transcendent structure imposed upon organic life than it is just one 
of the many ways in which local, ill-considered, barely intentional forces 
of consumption and acquisition exceed the comprehension of any body 
(be that a physical, political, national or economic body). 
Marxist theory’s attempt to locate capitalism within history and within 
a theory of interests can be compared to a whole series of localizations 
and narrative therapies. Popular culture has for decades been giving a 
face and/or body to a series of diffuse and essentially ‘unglobable’ threats. 
Despite a series of calls for thinking in terms of distributed, de-centered 
and dispersed cognition, where we acknowledge that institutions, cul-
tures and even organisms are not governed by a central organizing brain, 
the political imaginary remains wedded to organic figures. Popular cul-
ture has presented viral invasion more often than not in terms of an isol-
able and intruding body: conquering such threats can then be placed in a 
standard narrative of good and evil, self and other. Terrorism, too, is given 
a specific face in media culture (either the named Osama Bin Laden or 
an ethnically specified other). But it is not only popular culture that has 
been unable to confront a temporality and politics that is no longer that 
of contesting agents waging a war for the sake of a determined end. 
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Lamenting the fall of modernity into a bio-politics that manages pop-
ulations according to a general and quantifiable ‘life,’ Giorgio Agamben 
argues that it will be possible to arrive again at a genuine politics only by 
considering what Foucault failed to confront: the problem of sovereignty 
in modernity (Agamben 1998). That is, whereas Foucault was critical of 
the sovereign model of power, or power as an external and imposed body, 
Agamben’s critical concept of bio-politics wants to resist a modernity 
of diffused or capillary power, focusing again on how power establishes 
itself as a body. Agamben refuses the notion of the political and the polity 
as a universal or a given; the polity is constituted in and through human 
potentiality’s realization that it lacks any determined end. For Agamben, 
what needs to be recalled is the genesis or emergence of the political 
fold, the opening of something like a political space that then enables a 
distinction between that which is interior and that which is exterior to 
the polity. What counts as political is, for Agamben, itself not a politi-
cal decision, and this is because ‘the polity’ or the opening of a space of 
what will become ‘our’ concern is an event, and one to which genuine 
thinking ought to (constantly) return. Today’s losses of commonality, or 
the absence of something like a global community, should prompt us to 
address that the global community or horizon is neither given nor guar-
anteed, but is nevertheless urgently required if we are not to lose sight 
altogether of our potentiality to be political, to open a political space. What 
bio-politics and its terrors force us to acknowledge is that our defining 
potentiality—for speaking together and opening up a political space—
discloses itself most fully when it is not actualized. For bio-politics, too, 
bears the same double valence as globalism. It is precisely in the era of 
the bio-political, when all decisions regarding what we ought to do are 
grounded on maximizations of life that the passage from life to polity, and 
the political constitution of what counts as political life is forgotten. It is 
Auschwitz, modern hedonism, and the bio-political absence of a genuine 
political space of speech and decision that evidences the true nature of 
politics. Politics occurs not when bodies located in a world then decide 
to speak together, for politics is—through the event of speaking—the 
opening out of a world. Here, then, in this confrontation with a mod-
ern bio-politics that is criticized and lamented for being insufficiently 
political—insufficiently oriented to the opening and manifestation of a 
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political space—Agamben gives the contemporary term ‘bio-politics’ a 
force that relates directly to the imaginary hyper-investment in the globe. 
Agamben, unlike the Foucault whom he criticizes for not confronting 
the relation between bare life and sovereignty, regards bio-politics in its 
various forms—both totalitarian managements of populations and dem-
ocratic aims to increase a society’s happiness—as a loss of the political. 
As long as politics is focused on bare life, or the calculation of a living 
substance we will have retreated from the question of the potentiality of 
the political: man is not born as a political animal but becomes one, and 
he does so by creating a political space through speaking, opening up a 
world that is always his world. 
The Greek distinction between bios (or a life that is formed, bounded 
and oriented to what man might make of himself) and zoe (or mere 
bare life that, in modernity, becomes so much disposable waste and that 
increasingly becomes the subject of politics) is, for Agamben a difference 
that needs to be re-thought and re-inscribed. It is bios—created, formed, 
bounded, delimited life—that has been lost and that entails a loss of the 
political. How does this relate to globalism? Both Agamben’s critique of 
biopolitics and the reaction against globalism express a traditional and 
theological mourning for a loss of form. Globalism’s evils follow from its 
ravaging disrespect for limits and difference, its tendency to consume all 
previously distinct and specified nations and cultures into one vast calcu-
lative system without definition or limit. Not surprisingly the response to 
both globalism (seen as an inhuman, mindless and unbounded system) 
and to biopolitics (seen as a loss of the self-defining polity) has been the 
reaffirmation of the figure of the globe or bounded form. Agamben, for 
example, posits a series of positive manoeuvres that would ameliorate the 
biopolitical ravaging of the man of poiesis; these include a return to the 
active creation of man as a political living form as bios rather than zoe, as 
a being whose political nature has little or nothing to do with his mere 
life but requires creation. Not surprisingly, then, Agamben also wishes 
to retrieve a more authentic aesthetic encounter, where art is not passive 
spectatorship of an artist’s private invention but an opening out or disclo-
sure of a created world. Here, art as poiesis or putting into distinct form 
would not be disengaged from collective praxis. 
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Hardt and Negri, reacting more explicitly to a globalism that has pre-
cluded any active and intentional formation of a polity, call for the cre-
ation of a single, self-producing, self-aware and self-referring open whole 
of humanity: a single, continually re-productive body of man: 
In addition to envisioning revolution in ethical and political 
terms, we also conceive of it in terms of deep anthropologi-
cal modification: of metissage and continuous hybridization 
of populations, of biopolitical metamorphosis. The first ter-
rain of struggle is, from this point of view, the universal right 
to move, work and learn over the entire surface of the globe. 
Thus revolution, as we see it, is not only within Empire but 
also through Empire. It is not something which is fought 
against some implausible Winter Palace, but something which 
extends against all the central and peripheral structures of 
power, in order to empty them and subtract the capacity of 
production from capital. (Negri, Hardt and Zolo 27)
We can pause here to note that what underpins Agamben’s call for a 
new politics and Hardt and Negri’s manifesto for a self-productive multi-
tude is a figural globalism that is a variant of a traditional and theological 
organicism. That is, the figure of the globe—the ideally bounded sphere 
in which each point is in accord with the whole, and in which the whole 
is a dynamic and self-maintaining unity—harbours an axiology that priv-
ileges bios over zoe. What must be asserted as dominant and proper is a 
whole or bounded form that has no external or transcendent principle, 
no ordering that is given from without or that would elevate one point or 
term above another. 
Literal globalism, perceived as humanity’s alienation from itself and its 
earth through dead technical systems (such as the market, mechaniza-
tion, computerization and speculation), is to be cured by figural global-
ism. Life as zoe, the mere life that lives on without a sense of itself, with-
out a world and without form, is to be combated by life as bios: a properly 
political life of self-formation and speaking in common. Politics ought to 
be of, by and for the polity: thus, the call to immanence, whereby a body 
is not deflected by any power other than that of its own making is yet one 
more refusal to consider the predicament of a palpably non-sovereign 
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power. Recall that for Agamben Foucault failed to consider the relation-
ship between biopolitics and sovereign power, between power as insti-
tuted law that creates the border between law and non-law, or between 
governable life and the merely living. For Agamben the problem with 
biopolitics is that it is insufficiently directed towards bios: both totalitar-
ian governments and democracies focus on well-being and happiness 
rather than confronting the problem that mere life does not proceed 
without some sort of gap or decision towards its proper world and end. 
If one were to recall the Greek attention to bios, or formed life, one might 
be able to retrieve something of the proper political potentiality that is 
covered over in modernity. 
Foucault, however, suggests an opposite path. The problem with bio-
politics is not its inattention to bios or self-making but, rather, its mainte-
nance of organic—or what I will refer to here as ‘global’—thinking. One 
could be misled by reading Foucault’s corpus backwards, concluding that 
his final thoughts on Greek and Hellenistic arts of the self would be the 
natural consequence of a theorization of biopolitics, leading to a retrieval 
of a poetics of the subject. But there are other possibilities indicated in his 
earliest criticisms of the concept of life. The problem with this concept, 
or more accurately this problem, is that its manner of folding an inside 
from an outside, or of producing a relation through which something like 
knowledge is possible, is—to use a Deleuzian term—its reactive reter-
ritorializing quality. It is the concept of life as such, the life from which 
bounded beings emerge and against which they maintain themselves, 
that leads to a certain structure of ethics. Man becomes that being who 
is nothing more than a reflective structure, a being whose only law is that 
of giving a law to himself. The three concepts analyzed by Foucault that 
constitute the modern empirical-transcendental episteme are life, labour 
and language. It is because there is something in general called ‘life’ as 
a process of striving, self-production and self-maintenance that language 
and labor become the means through which man creates himself as an 
historical being. 
On the one hand Foucault suggests that this is in quite a specific sense 
the consequence of a refigured globe: the pre-modern space of knowl-
edge had distributed beings in relations of analogy, such that the universal 
order of things was reflected in each living being. In classicism this book 
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of nature, or experience of the earth as possessing its own sense that could 
be unfolded in various ways in each living form, gives way to an order that 
appears in representation and tabulation. Man, in classical thought, is not 
yet that being produced through the act of speech and labour that forms 
him in relation to a life in general that is only known after the event of 
its formation. In modernity the globe is no longer the book of nature or 
scene of readable order, becoming a site of ‘life’ that is now known as the 
enigmatic progression through which organisms and systems emerge: 
life is a process that can be read after the event of its ongoing acts of for-
mation. Critically, then, this would suggest that with the politics of life 
itself something of the globe is lost or occluded. And this, indeed, is how 
ecological and anti-globalist theory understands both biopolitics and 
globalism more generally. What is lost is any sense of the earth as a living 
whole, as bearing a life and temporality of its own, within which human 
beings are located and towards which they ought to pay due respect and 
care. Yet despite the sense that globalism as a political event has erased all 
traditional and enchanted senses of the globe as a living whole that har-
bors its own order, the appeals to the figure and normativity of englobed 
life have become more intense than ever. If Agamben seeks to retrieve a 
sense of the world as that which man gives himself through speaking in 
common, and if Hardt and Negri aim to catalyze the self-expressing mul-
titude, then they do so in thorough accord with a tradition and spirit of 
the self-evident beauty and worth of the organic globe. 
First, we can note the theological nature of this figure of the self-refer-
ring, self-creating living form that has no end or determination outside 
its own existence.3 Not only is this how the Christian God of mono-
theism was defined (as a potentiality that has no essence other being in 
pure act, never deflected from pure self-forming), it is also the case that 
theological poetics used the figure of the bounded sphere to express a 
divine intentionality of perfect accord, balance and (most importantly) 
self-reference. Such a form has its own temporality which is at once lin-
ear, organic and circular; it is a time of increasing creation and fruition, 
in which beings arrive at their proper form and in which the end con-
cludes and discloses the reason of the whole. As an example we can think 
of Milton’s frequent references to the pendant world or balanced globe, 
contrasted with the boundless, formless and time-deprived chaos. The 
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divine meets the human in John Donne’s frequent references to globes, 
circles, circumference and recovery, as though the earth’s form is that 
of the soul:
Then, soul, to thy first pitch work up again;
Know that all lines which circles do contain.
For once that they the centre touch, do touch
Twice the circumference, and be thou such
(Donne 2000, 229).
Second, this divine, organic and perfectly bounded form of immanent 
self reference can take the form of philosophy itself: that activity through 
which human reason refers back to, and redeems, itself by circling back 
and recognizing its own constitutive conditions. One could include here 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle, Hegel’s philosophy of absolute self-ref-
erence, and more recent and supposedly scientific claims for ‘human’ 
understanding, such as Robert Wright’s recent claim that the monothe-
istic figure of God will, organically, evolve to become nothing more than 
that of human nature understanding itself as the origin of all the figures to 
which it was once enslaved (2010).
Third, and finally, when current ecological theorists continue to refer 
to the environment—as that which environs or encloses—or call for a 
due reverence to an earth that bears its own balance and self-ordering, it 
is once again a figure of bounded form or bios that is maintained against a 
life that would be a force without sense of itself, a time without disclosure 
of fruition.
The problem with this anti-globalization global tropology is twofold. 
First, it is inefficacious when one considers the nature of modern power. 
The twenty-first century is marked by an intensification of diffuse and 
destructive forces. The cold war and its threat of nuclear annihilation 
had already troubled the motif of life as a war of interests among bod-
ies, for it was clearly possible that the trajectory of man for survival and 
dominance was the same path that would lead to his disappearance. The 
subsequent wave of annihilation threats, from the AIDS awareness of 
the 1980s, followed by increasing anxieties about global warming, food 
shortages, viral panics (SARS, bird flu, swine flu), terrorist organizations 
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that no longer concerned themselves with a worldly survival, and then 
economic crises that exposed an absence of any centered or commanding 
viewpoint: all these serve to show that the image of the globe, of an inter-
connected whole, is a lure and an alibi. We have perhaps always lived in 
a time of divergent, disrupted and diffuse systems of forces, in which the 
role of human decisions and perceptions is a contributing factor at best. 
Far from being resolved by returning to the figure of the bounded globe 
or subject of bios rather than zoe, all those features that one might wish 
to criticize in the bio-political global era can only be confronted by a non-
global temporality and counter-ethics. 
Second, it follows that far from being an ecological figure that will save 
us from the ravages of globalism, subjectivism and bio-politics, it is the 
image of the globe that lies at the center of an anthropocentric imagi-
nary that is intrinsically suicidal. Of course, extinction and annihilation 
lie at the heart of all life. But accelerated and self-witnessing extinction 
can only be achieved by a global animal, a ‘man’ whose desire for survival 
and mastery is so frenzied that he consumes his own milieu. And he does 
so because his milieu is a globe. If, as recent ‘returns’ to phenomenol-
ogy insist, the thinking and living being always has a world, and if that 
world is always a world of meaning—defined in terms of potentialities 
and the organism’s timeline—then we are truly global. We are bounded 
by our own living form, with a world of our own folded around our sen-
sory-motor apparatus (Thomson 2007). But does not the phenomenon 
of a violent, life-annihilating and globe-destroying globalism present us 
with another possibility? Perhaps what we need is a zoopolitics: not a 
lament for the ways in which politics has taken hold of human popula-
tions as mere life, but a critique of the ways in which political thinking 
remains human all too human—repressing the utter contingency of life 
by insisting on the meaning and form of bios. Rather than criticize bio-
political modernity for rendering mere life as formless, calculative, and 
void of meaning and mindful creativity, we should cast both bios and zoe 
on the side of figural lures, and strive to think beyond all forms of life. 
Neither the mere life of animality nor the formed life of political man, 
our attention would be better directed to a multiple and divergent net-
work of times and matters. That is, bio-politics ought to be criticized not 
for seizing upon bare or mere life—not for forgetting the human forming 
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power that enables politics, not for regarding man as bios rather than 
zoe. Rather, the biopolitics that is hysterically and morally regarded as 
destructive of well-bounded life would still be captured by bios, by the 
good form of self-producing man and would be better directed towards 
forces beyond the human, beyond the organism and beyond the globe. 
The globe or earth as the planet that was blessed with the contingency 
of life, including the human species whose global imagination has done 
so much to create destructive systems beyond its own power and com-
prehension, cannot be saved. Insofar as it is imagined as a globe or living 
whole with its own order and proper potentiality that might be restored, 
the earth will continue to be sacrificed to the blindness of an organic 
thinking that can only insist upon its own self-evident value. 
One final feature of globalism that needs to be noted, and that might 
suggest a new counter-global temporality is that of information. There 
is no public sphere, no bordered polis in which circulating data may 
be reflected upon, and incorporated; there is no transcendental and 
procedural ideal of consensus that would emerge as an aspect of an all 
encompassing life-world. According to Habermas, and other theorists of 
discourse theory, insofar as one speaks or even insofar as one claims to 
know, an intersubjective claim is presupposed (Habermas 1991, 378); it 
would be a performative contradiction to say something that one did not 
also claim to be true (Apel 2001, 47). Insofar as one speaks one is already 
with an ideal domain of recognition that is procedurally, if not actu-
ally, intersubjective and global. But the actual fact of globalism destroys 
global inclusion, consensus and recognition. There is a glut of speech and 
a deficit of both recognition and the demand for recognition. The more 
global citizens seek and demand inclusion the less attention and media 
space becomes available: every tweet, blog, Facebook post and text mes-
sage places more and more pressure on the bloated domain of available 
consumable information. Individual speech acts are not fragments of one 
grand communicating globe; rather, the excess of production is utterly 
destructive of any possibility of (even ideal) reception. Indeed, it is the 
surfeit of information, especially information regarding the limits of the 
globe (such as data about global warming, resource depletion, new speeds 
of viral mutation, terrorist cells without traceable command centers) that 
requires a micro-politics (if that term could be freed from the notion of a 
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polis) and demands some mode of schizo-analysis. The latter would refer 
to a tracking of splits in forces, of divergent systems and incongruous 
fields. One may never free oneself from the figure of the globe, or even 
the globe as the notion of figure—the notion that ‘we’ give a world to our-
selves through our own recuperating imagination. But if the present has 
the capacity to teach us anything it may be this: only a shattering of the 
globe, with an attention to forces that resist recuperation, incorporation 
and comprehension—forces that operate beyond intentionality and syn-
thesis—only this radical destruction can save us from ourselves.
Notes
1.  In his commentary on Husserl’s vision of the task of phenomenology, Derrida 
notes that any consideration of universal truth, or truth in general, must 
presuppose a subjectivity that would transcend any specific or determined 
cultural norm; this would yield humanity as a horizon within which located 
norms would function, a ‘silent presupposed we.’ Derrida notes, though, 
that this freeing of humanity from any determined and concrete image of 
‘man’ occurs with Husserl’s modernity and the vision of phenomenology 
as uncovering the transcendental presuppositions of Western thought 
(Derrida 1978, 61). 
2.  Michel Foucault argues that in modernity only ethics is possible, only a 
negotiation of the forms of arguments, and that morality—or the practical 
judgment of specific forms of life—is no longer possible (Foucault 2002, 357).
3.  ‘…this amounts to thinking time and movement on the basis of the telos of the 
gramme that is completed, in act, fully present, that keeps its tracing close to 
itself, that is, erases its tracing in a circle.’ (Derrida 1982, 60).
Chapter 4
Earth Felt the Wound:  
The Affective Divide
We are suffering, today—here and now—from hyper-hypo-affective dis-
order. We appear to be consuming nothing other than affects; even the 
supposed material needs of life—food, sex, sociality—are now marketed 
affectively. Branding relies on irrational attachments or ‘lovemarks,’1 while 
politics trades in terror and resentment. Affects themselves are marketed: 
one can purchase games of horror or disgust, and even the purchase of a 
cup of coffee is perhaps undertaken less for the sake of the caffeine stimu-
lant and more for the Starbucks affect.2 This is what led Michael Hardt 
to theorize a new era of affective labor.3 But this over-consumption and 
boom of marketable affects is accompanied by affect fatigue, as though 
there were an inverse relation between the wider and wider extension of 
affective influx and the ever-diminishing intensity of affect. It is not sur-
prising then that cultural diagnoses of the present observe two seem-
ingly incompatible catastrophic tendencies: a loss of cognitive or analytic 
apparatuses in the face of a culture of affective immediacy, and yet a cer-
tain deadening of the human organism (ranging from Walter Benjamin’s 
observation of an absence of experience in an information age to Fredric 
Jameson’s claim for a ‘waning of affect’ in a world of over-stimulation, in 
which there is no longer a distinction between experiencing subject and 
external object, no other person, for whom one might feel empathy4 ). 
On the one hand there is a widespread consensus and diagnosis that 
the human sensory motor apparatus has departed from an informational-
cognitive or even image-based mode of immaterial consumption to one 
of affect. (Such a turn to affect has been both lamented and celebrated, 
seen either as a retreat from judgment or as a liberation from overly 
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calculative modes of reason.) N. Katherine Hayles has referred to a shift 
from deep attention to hyper attention (2007). Bernard Stiegler, working 
critically from Hayles, has diagnosed a widespread cultural attention defi-
cit disorder. He rejects Hayles’s suggestion that this shift or loss might be 
ameliorated by different pedagogic strategies; more is required than—as 
Hayles proposes—simply intertwining Faulkner with computer games. 
Stiegler places the turn to mere stimulus within a broader fault or poten-
tial deficit of the human brain, which has always required (and yet been 
threatened by) inscriptive technologies that extend its range beyond 
its organic boundaries. For Stiegler, the loss of deep attention is also an 
atrophy of trans-individual networks: the script technologies that had 
always supplemented the brain’s power and had also always threatened 
to weaken that power through externalization and alienation reach new 
levels of risk. Without extended circuits connecting the reading-writing 
brain to logics not its own we face the perils of a new infantilism (Stiegler 
2009). Techne, for Stiegler, no longer opens the brain onto broader cir-
cuits but produces short-circuits. Flickering screens now leave the eye-
brain within itself. In a more popular mode, closer to the more panicked 
tones of Nicholas Carr’s In the Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to 
Our Brains (2010), Susan Greenfield (2008) argues that we are no lon-
ger developing the neural networks or habits that allow us to read with 
a connecting grammar. We are more oriented to the flashing stimuli of 
detached intensities, not so much meaning as sensation. In a contrasting 
celebratory mode Mark Hansen, whose signature maneuver has been one 
of returning texts to lived bodies (‘correcting’ Deleuze by way of Bergson, 
‘correcting’ Stiegler by way of Husserl), argues that digital media’s simula-
tion of faces has the direct affect of re-engaging the viewer—consumer’s 
emotive responses thereby redeeming art history and ‘high theory’ from 
the errors of its inhuman ways:
 Insofar as the confrontation with the DFI functions by trig-
gering affectivity as, precisely, a faculty of embodied hetero-
genesis, it operates a transfer of affective power from the image 
to the body. Instead of a static dimension or element intrinsic 
to the image, affectivity thereby becomes the very medium 
of interface with the image. What this means is that affectiv-
ity actualizes the potential of the image at the same time as it 
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virtualizes the body: the crucial element is neither image nor 
body alone, but the dynamical interaction between them. As 
the digital artworks discussed at the end of this article pro-
pose, if we can allow the computer to impact our embodied 
affectivity directly, our communication and our coevolution 
with the computer—and along with it visual culture more 
generally—will enter a truly new, ‘post-imagistic’ phase.5 
Before we launch into too simplistic a notion of a historical break or 
fall into a myopic culture of affect we need to note that there has always 
been an affective component of cultural production, and that this has 
always been acknowledged and theorized (going back to the ‘doctrine of 
affects’ [Lenneberg 1958]). It would be more accurate to say that we are 
witnessing a shift in the cultural dominant. Just as the affective compo-
nent of cultural production has always been present, so has a suspicion 
or denigration of the merely felt. The anxiety regarding a dominance of 
the merely affective or visually captivating in the face of a weakening of 
cognition has often been tied to a concern regarding the externality of 
technological and mnemonic devices that supposedly deflect the brain 
from its proper potentiality. There have always been fears regarding the 
capacity for technology to weaken cognition, reducing the brain to mere 
automaton of stimulus interface. This is why Stiegler’s reading of the 
history of techne as pharmacological is so important: he neither simply 
adopts Derrida’s history of metaphysics in which writing technologies 
have always been unjustifiably purged as parasitic, nor celebrates a post-
human digital culture in which illusions of the brain’s autonomy would 
have been overcome. For Stiegler, any brain-extending system, includ-
ing the brain’s own mnemic networks, at once enables more complex 
relations and precludes the brain from ever having a law or propriety 
of its own. What Stiegler laments is not alienation, technology and loss 
of internal integrity per se, but the historical loss of individuation where 
systems would not be general and mechanistic but would enable ‘a’ sin-
gular time to be read for all time. It is not technology’s takeover Stiegler 
laments so much as its reduction to localized stimuli at the expense of 
broader and more complex circuits, not so much the liberation or tyr-
anny of digital culture as its over-simplification. To read Plato’s dialogues, 
Stiegler argues, requires a highly sophisticated writing-reading system 
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that enables a sense to be intuited that is not that of my present world, 
and that also allows something like ‘a’ Plato to be reactivated by future 
generations (generations who can nevertheless read a past time for the 
present). What the present threatens to do is break those very individuat-
ing modes of reading that have created the circuits that have taken indi-
viduals beyond the range of their own isolated psyches. This is why, per-
haps, Stiegler attributes an individuating potential to social networking 
sites, such as Facebook (Stiegler 2010, 134). Here, the screen I encounter 
is not a simply stimulating prompt for rule-bound response but an open-
ing to other speeds and networks. 
So while it would be too simplistic to create a pure divide between cog-
nition and affect, and similarly inadequate to posit a straightforward his-
torical break between an early era of slow reading and a present of imme-
diate reactions, it is possible to notice within any artwork two tendencies 
or temporal economies: the connective delays of cognition versus the 
immediacy of affective stimulus. There is nevertheless, today, a contrac-
tion or weakening of grammars and syntaxes of cognition in the face of 
the instant gratification of affects. Computer games, and the cinematic 
and tele-visual cultural products that are inflected by game culture may 
have narrative and teleological components, but the dominant experience 
is that of intensities. A culture of shock and awe allows us to sit before a 
screen and enjoy the affects of horror, terror, mourning, desire, disgust, 
fear and excitement without sense. This has been one of the long running 
criticisms of the visual temporality of pornography, in which bodies and 
movements are displayed without any narrative framing, and certainly 
without the individuating temporal circuits of care that Stiegler regards 
as crucial for modes of becoming that would not weaken the human psy-
chic apparatus. The distinction between cognitive-semantic and affec-
tive-stimulant aesthetic modes is not purely historical and operates in 
any recognition of an artwork as art or any text as true. Approaching a 
text as art requires that it become detached from its functional or com-
municational mode, at the very least allowed to survive in part as some 
sort of material monument. The Prelude, while perfectly capable of being 
translated can nevertheless never be fully translated without remainder. 
By contrast, a formal equation if true can be true only if its sense can be 
circulated regardless of its mode of inscription or articulation. If a text 
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were to offer itself as ‘pure’ truth then its affective dimension, though pos-
sibly present, would (or should) be immaterial; by contrast, if one grants 
an object the status of art then one attributes some monumental quality 
to its materiality, some sense of an affective component that is that of the 
art object itself. 
This dependence of artworks on an autonomous materiality that is 
essential to the work (whereas pure cognition or logic would aim to be 
‘substrate neutral’) would still apply to digital or mass-produced media, 
for it is digital culture that manages to create an infinitely divisible mat-
ter. The digital codes that enable the continual repetition of a materiality, 
such as a sound, color or text generated by codes, may be purely formal 
and substrate neutral, but the outcome of digitalization is the capacity to 
reproduce matters without any loss or division of the original. It is the 
clarity of color, sound or resolution that gives digital culture its force, 
intensifying the capacity to experience sensible qualities in the way that 
it was once able to transfer semantic content alone. Digital culture could 
therefore be either purely formal and cognitive, with the manipulation of 
digits and empty variables, or predominantly affective with digital tech-
nologies enabling the simulation of stimulating matters. What is signifi-
cant is digital culture’s tendency towards a far more strict retraction to 
the digit or the circulating unit: even when visual culture is not digital in 
the sense of being digitally rendered into codes for computer replication, 
there can be a restriction of attention to the already established digits or 
units of communication. If one laments the waning of a culture of reading 
and the loss of deep attention in favor of hyper-attention then this may 
also count as a mourning for analog modes of reading, whereby there 
was not a direct passage or translation between stimulus and response 
but a delay in assessing what counted as a unit of information or input. 
The very history and possibility of reading relies on a complex relation 
between digital and analog. All reading operates by way of digitalization, 
or—as Bergson noted—a capacity to reduce differential complexity to 
already established units of recognition; without that reduction of differ-
ential complexity perception would be paralyzed precisely because the 
influx of intensity would be too complex to master or recognize (Bergson 
1912). Concepts enable generality and reduce the experienced world 
to recognizable form to enable action: the simpler the digit, the higher 
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the speed, and therefore the greater the efficiency. What appears to be 
operating today is a high degree of digital distinction and accuracy, pre-
cluding the need for interpretive delays. Digital culture would include 
not only computer digitalization in the narrow sense, but a culture of 
speeds whereby stimulus circulates without translation or transfer, where 
there is a single circuit of relay. This would begin to explain why attention 
deficit is actually the need for more stimulus—precisely because there 
is increasingly less delay or depth that requires decoding. We are at one 
and the same time constantly bombarded with new intensities, and yet 
the simplicity of the codings enables quick consumption, and then the 
demand for more. 
The various diagnoses of attention deficit, which descry an over-con-
sumption of affect, often rely upon a historical narrative regarding the 
dialectic between cognition (or reading as) and affective pleasure (or 
stimulant vision). The eye-brain is abandoning or self-extinguishing one 
of its evolved powers, and one sees this exhaustion of the power of sense 
and the hypertrophy of sensation not just in the proliferation of new 
media but in the invasion of new media speeds into traditional media.
Non-digital forms of production are altered, now, by digital speeds; 
‘high-brow’ novels (such as David Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas) are composed 
from bite-sized chunks assembled to yield multiple and dispersed view-
points. Even seemingly slow and manifestly human-centered cultural 
productions, such as the unstructured reality television events of Big 
Brother or Jersey Shore, rely not on plotting and character development 
so much as the capacity to pick up or leave the screen at any point. Such 
works are unsigned or devoid of sense precisely insofar as they are less 
events of production, created to stand alone or possess a certain force, as 
events of consumptive immediacy: the camera simply takes up whatever 
is there to be passed on and viewed. It would be too easy and inaccurate 
to align cinema and television with immediacy and stimulus, and reading 
with grammar and deep attention. Cinema and visual culture can be both 
narrative-semantic and stimulant-affective, just as literary forms can start 
to emphasize episodic affects rather than narrative coherence. Perhaps 
the success of Fifty Shades of Grey lies both in its claim to be erotica, 
offering sexual stimulus, and in its repetitive and episodic form—small 
chapters that repeat phrases and described affects. (There is, of course a 
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distinction between stimulus and affect: the former is neutral and pre-
semantic, and could either be read as information or merely felt. But 
affect is often associated with the merely, solely or simply felt as though it 
were only stimulus; this conflation is at the heart of hyper-hypo affective 
disorder. For if affect could be distinguished from cognition and yet still 
have a non-informational or non-semantic sense then one might find a 
way of overcoming the deep mourning for a culture of meaning and deep 
attention without celebrating the brain’s self-extinction. That is, there 
might be something like affect that would not be feeling, and that would 
not be reducible to the organism’s stimulation. Something of this isola-
tion of affect is being sought, I would suggest, in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1994) idea of art as the production of affects that stand alone.) 
Any historical divide or paradigm break can be intuited only by dis-
tinguishing tendencies within mixtures; there are no hard and fast lines, 
but there are dominants and distinct inflections. The capacity to reflect 
upon the relation between felt stimulus and conceptual order was long 
ago placed within the artwork in Kant’s aesthetic: one feels the influx of 
sensation but not as bodily pathos. Rather, it is because the sensations 
are not yet conceptualized, and yet conducive to conceptualization or 
thinking, that the subject feels her own forming power. This feeling is 
not pathological—not a bodily sensation, and not emotion—but the 
feeling of the relation between the world that is given in sensations, and 
the subject’s capacity to synthesize sensations. Lyotard, writing on Kant, 
referred to this process as tautegorical: it is not the imposition of the sub-
ject’s categories, but the subject feeling itself feeling: ‘Tautegorical: this 
is judged absolutely great because the thought that judges this feels itself 
to be great absolutely’ (Lyotard 1994, 81). The feeling is not individual, 
but individuating, for it gives me a sense of myself as a forming power, 
as capable of being a subject. The experience of beauty is the experience 
of that which ought to find its way to some communicable sense, not 
the sense of what this object is, but a sense of how this sensation would 
feel—sensus communis. The Kantian concept of sensus communis antici-
pates what Stiegler (following Simondon) refers to as trans-individua-
tion: technologies create networks that allow the reading-viewing brain 
to be invaded and constituted by signatures and speeds not its own. For 
Stiegler selves develop through the memory systems that at once expand 
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circuits of thought beyond any individual brain and body, even though 
those very same technologies that inscribe a supra-individual circuit of 
thinking and reflecting may—as in the case of modern media technolo-
gies—become short-circuited, reducing the cognitive and affective range 
of the embodied brain. What is important in Stiegler’s critique of current 
media technologies is that he regards media in all its sense not so much 
as mediation, or the means through which thought is communicated, but 
as constitution: selves thing, live, feel and remember through the inscrip-
tive and affective networks of their time and milieu. For Stiegler affec-
tive force and range is diminished the more bodies are turned back and 
inward upon sensation and stimulus.
Closer to the Kantian legacy there has been an art-critical tradition 
of considering affect not as bodily feeling but as the sense of a work, 
where sense is an orientation prompted by perceived relations. What this 
implies is that viewed objects, or relations of viewing, have distinct prom-
issory temporalities: reflective judgment, enabled by art, offers the sense 
of a feeling of humanity in general, what ‘one’ would feel. It is in this tra-
dition that Deleuze draws upon Worringer’s (1953) art-historical work 
to place the relation between cognition and affect within art history: 
early art is geometrically abstract, giving order to the world; but this is 
superseded by empathy or the depiction of organic forms that one might 
perceive and feel. Deleuze then places this historical problem within the 
work of Francis Bacon: how can one paint the body not as an organism 
one feels but as a figure emerging from forces not its own? Deleuze and 
Guattari also write a pre-history of the reading eye that is directly politi-
cal: the eye moves from being a collective organ, feeling the pain as it sees 
knife enter flesh, to being a privatized reading machine, viewing the cut 
of the knife as a sign of a punishment for a transgression committed and 
a retribution to be paid. The eye becomes organized as a reading and 
memory machine:
the voice no longer sings but dictates, decrees; the graphy no 
longer dances, it ceases to animate bodies, but is set into writ-
ing on tablets, stones, and books; the eye sets itself to read-
ing. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 223) 
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This formation of the reading eye occurs also as the organization of the 
body, which becomes an organism in which seeing, hearing, speaking 
and touching all fold in on the private body who can now view the world 
as a single matter determined from ‘a’ point of order. (This organization is 
an event of deterritorialization, for a term outside the system of relations 
now determines relations from some privileged point). 
With that Deleuzo-Guattarian work in the background it is not sur-
prising that there has been a celebration of affect, as though affect would 
release us from the ‘despotism of the signifier’ (or, more broadly, the tyr-
anny of Cartesian and computational paradigms). And yet it is the event 
of privatization, with forces or pure predicates being referred back to 
the single organizing living body that is celebrated by the ‘affective turn.’ 
Much of what passes as Deleuzian inflected theory champions precisely 
what Deleuze and Guattari’s projected future would go beyond. While 
Deleuze and Guattari chart the genesis of the organized body from 
affects, and then describe the organization of those affects (now as lived) 
by way of the unified organism of the man of reason, this does not imply 
that they want to return to the site of genesis, return to the embodied 
lived affect that has been alienated by the axiomatics of the single sys-
tem of capital. On the contrary, the problem of affect—the truth of 
affect, which would be something like force as such—cannot be retrieved 
by a return to the body. Rather, for Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism is 
not axiomatic enough, not inhuman enough. It suffers from an anthro-
pomorphism that can also be tied to contemporary hyper-hypo-affective 
disorder. Capitalism, if pushed to its maximum potential or ‘nth’ power, 
would open the relations among forces to produce multiple differential 
quantities. As long as everything is organized according to consumption 
and production (in terms of the digits of the private organism) the poten-
tial for forces to be produced—such as affects—will always be grounded 
upon affections. The visual production of the affect of horror or terror 
will be oriented to horrifying or terrorizing (as in many horror films or 
political campaigns). As long as affects are confused with affections, or 
feelings of the lived body, then nothing will ever be felt; the body will 
only re-live itself. 
An element that has always been present in any work—the degree 
of lived bodily stimulus—has now become the focus not only of 
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consumption and production but also of criticism and ‘theory.’ The ‘affec-
tive turn’ accounts for the emergence of language, music, morality and art 
in general by referring to the lived body’s desire for self-maintenance. (In 
a similar manner the ethical turn was also a turn back to social relations, 
feelings and duties: and we might ask why this turn back occurs just as 
humanity is facing a world where there may be an un-lived?) Deleuze 
and Guattari offer a complex history of the relation between brain, 
body, intellect and affect, and follow Bergson in arguing for a history of 
thought’s different powers, with technologies of concepts and artistic 
methods allowing at once for organic unity (the sensory motor apparatus 
that reduced all to efficiency) and for another tendency to think time as 
such or difference as such. Concepts, for example, reduce complex dif-
ferences to generalities so that thinking can proceed efficiently, in the 
service of action. But there could also be concepts that destroyed expe-
diency and action—such as the concepts of justice, democracy, human-
ity—but that opened thinking to a future. What might justice be? The 
same might be said of affects: it would only be by destroying affections—
the ready and easy responses craved by our habituated bodies—that one 
might enable affects. If Deleuze’s work has seemed to license a return to 
lived and bodily affections this should alert us to the constant tendency 
for relapse and re-territorialization in the brain’s relation to its world. 
Deleuze and Guattari were critical of a historical tendency of paranoid 
capitalism: the tendency to read all events through the scheme of the 
individual set over and against of world of differences that can be felt and 
lived as his own. Any supposed private affection, they argued—includ-
ing parental love—opens up to all of history, and ultimately the ‘intense 
germinal influx.’ We need to turn back from organized units and feelings, 
not to the lived body, but to the quantities and relations of forces from 
which identifiable bodies and sentiments emerge. The mother arrives as 
already organized, racialized and historicized, and (similarly) the love 
between any couple carries all of history and politics with it. In the begin-
ning, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is not the body and its affections, but 
the affect. There is the force of knife and flesh, or the dazzling light of the 
screen; bodies become organisms through the affections composed from 
these potentialities. 
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So what can we say about both the ‘affective turn’ in theory, and the 
addiction to affections at the expense of affect, especially if we do not 
want to fall too easily into a joyful historical break or mournful nostalgia?
It is not new to diagnose an epoch. Freud placed modernity at the 
neurotic end of the spectrum, suggesting that an over-fixation on symp-
tomatic displacements needed some release. Our desires, he suggested, 
did require some form of social organization for the sake of civilization, 
but with the stringent requirement to love all of humanity it would not 
be surprising if aggression would then be unleashed in the form of total 
war. For Freud, culture had become overly neurotic, investing unreason-
ably in what (for Freud at least) was a dispassionate (inhuman or overly 
ideal) figure of humanity. Today, we might think the pathology of collec-
tive desire differently. Perhaps we have swung towards psychosis—not so 
much tied to libidinal containment and repression as lacking all sense of 
order, generality, universality or transcendence. If Deleuze and Guattari 
appealed to schizophrenia they did so against what they saw as the para-
noia of modern capitalism—the over-attachment to a single system in 
which any event or affect would be the sign of one single system of life, 
a life that becomes nothing other than the interaction and exchange of 
quantifiable force (a simple digitalism of a single axiomatic). Deleuze and 
Guattari’s schizoanalysis would split or de-synthesize forces, not reduc-
ing all flows to a single system of exchange. And this splitting would 
give force a ‘stand-alone’ quantity, creating it neither as felt-stimulus nor 
recognized generality. It would short-circuit hyper-hypo affective dis-
order: the over-stimulated appetite for consuming affects alongside the 
hypertrophy of the capacity to think affectively. Whereas affect-empathy 
and abstraction-cognition have been noted as opposing historical and 
formal tendencies, the present’s diagnosed retreat into affect-sensation 
evidences not a tipping into one of these modes or the other but their 
indistinction; it is as though there can be no abstract conceptual thinking 
that is not confused by ’feelings,’ and no experiencing of affects that is not 
already generalized or pre-marketed and ’branded.’ So we need to note 
first that there is a growing market in pre-packaged, already-consumed-
consumable affections. And yet it is for this reason that there is no affect. 
We need, I would suggest, a far more nuanced understanding of affect 
that distinguishes it from affections. If art and art theory have always had 
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some orientation or sense of affect this was never that of a simple bodily 
response or lived feeling; what was attended to was not an affection but a 
force that would yield an affection. Affects would be ‘stand alone’ powers, 
possessing a certain autonomy. One would need to distinguish affect—
such as the terror of tragedy—from the affection of being terrified, and 
these tendencies would have different temporalities. Affect would have 
to do with the artwork’s capacity to create circuits of force beyond the 
viewer’s own organic networks. 
The notion of the autonomy of affect—or affect being corporeal but 
non-cognitive—was theorized by Brian Massumi, who argued for a 
range of bodily responses that bypassed conceptual or emotional sense 
(Massumi 1995). Antonio Damasio (2000) also argues that there is, in 
addition to the feeling of what happens in the body, another dimension 
of the organism’s response that is not attended to. For Damasio this unat-
tended proto-self is the ground and condition for the more conscious self, 
while for Massumi this non-cognitive dimension has a political force that 
needs to be considered today precisely because it is barely registered. But 
we might, given the contradictory celebratory turn to affect, alongside 
the mourning of the human loss of more sophisticated responses, want 
to ask about the contemporary specificity of this range of the non-cogni-
tive affective body. If we are suffering from hyper-affective disorder this is 
because a potentiality of the body for undergoing stimulus but without 
conceptuality and attention is now no longer a background condition but 
accounts for the desiring structures of contemporary culture tout court. 
The social and political organization of bodies does not occur by way of 
ideas or beliefs—the imposition of semantic content or structure—but 
by way of affective addiction, either to the diverting stimuli of personal 
screens and headphones, or to the bodily stimulants of caffeine, sugar, 
tobacco or other widely ingested and publicly legitimated substances. If 
the constitutive human condition was once deemed to be Angst—a sense 
that there might be some event, without any fleshing out of just what that 
event would be—or if the dominant mode of politico-economic affect 
was once that of speculation (a paranoid control of all events into a single 
system [Colebrook 2012B]), then we can observe a new and possibly 
posthuman affective order. Rather than Angst, or the channeling of atten-
tion and investment into an overly mapped and determined future, we 
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have perhaps become psychotically detached from any object domain, 
‘experiencing’ the immediacy of affects without any sense that we are 
being affected by a world of which sensations would be signs. We may 
well be in an era of a new self-enclosed narcissism, each ‘individual’ being 
nothing more than a privatized bubble of instantaneous intensities. 
Or, more accurately, rather than lamenting a narcissistic enclosure, 
what might be wanting would be narcissism: we are no longer entranced 
or motivated by a better image of ourselves. There is an absence of self-
image, a supposed liberation from the figure of myself as a beautiful or 
worthy ‘member of humanity;’ yet it is just such an image that would 
release me from being driven by the immediacy of sensations. (Is not the 
popular refusal of stereotypes, along with a certain academic critique of 
normativity as repressively normalizing, indicative of a refusal of any-
thing other than the self as pure performance, an affirmation of active 
immediacy and a horror of any element that would not be included in 
the dynamism of life that is always already the self ’s own?) Many of the 
celebrations of affect today, directed as they are against the linguistic 
paradigm or intellectualist or Cartesian accounts of the self, valorize a 
model of life in which the self is not really a self at all. There is not an 
enclosed individual who then represents the world; in the beginning is 
the relation or affect, from which some relatively stable responsive center 
emerges. Jeremy Rivkin argues not only that we are presently driven by 
affect and that affective bonds precede the formation of individuals and 
competitive aggression but that empathy is the human civilizing drive 
tout court (2009). Antonio Damasio, along with Joseph LeDoux (1996) 
and Maturana and Varela (1987)—and many supposed Deleuzians con-
tinuing their emphasis on embodiment and living systems—have turned 
theory and analysis away from the cognitive, conceptual or reflective 
dimensions of experience towards embodied, distributed and autopoi-
etic selves. Damasio argues that the background self is largely unnoticed, 
and that ’Descartes’ error’ consisted in taking the fragment of the respon-
sive self that came to attention as some sort of center or representing 
‘theatre.’ Maturana and Varela, insisting on the embodied nature of the 
mind, reject the notion of ‘a’ world that would then be pictured or known 
by a distinct self. There is no world in general, no subject in itself; the 
world is always given for this or that living system and as this domain or 
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horizon of possible affects to which bodies would respond. The Cartesian 
subject is not only a philosophical error; it is embedded in a tradition of 
Western individualism in which minds are set over against a world that 
they quantify and master. A more mindful tradition, closer to Buddhist 
models of selflessness, would not only be more correct, but may help us 
in domains as diverse as artificial intelligence and management studies 
(Flanagan 2007). 
All these turns in theory are, I would suggest, both expressive of and 
reactions against hyper-hypo affective disorder. That is, it is precisely at 
the point at which we have become glutted with affect—so consuming 
of affects in a blind and frenzied manner—that theory insists upon the 
intelligence and profundity of affect. This complex reaction formation is 
similar to the three sides of the obesity epidemic: we stuff ourselves full 
of food at indiscriminate speeds, cannot taste or discern anything outside 
its pre-branding (for we have to be alerted to a food being ’chicken-fla-
vored’) and yet all this is accompanied by a new genre of food porn: mas-
ter chef competitions, the spectacle of celebrity chefs, restaurant menus 
that require literary criticism and the migration of artful food depictions 
from the genre of still life to advertising. Similarly, we gorge on affections 
yet cannot get the sense of any affect, and all the while live in an age of 
theory that wallows in the autonomy of affect. Whether we regard the 
predominantly affective self as a loss of a subject whose identity would 
yield greater social responsibility and awareness (mourning cognition 
and grammar in the widespread loss of attention), or whether we see the 
Cartesian tradition as something better left behind, there seems to be 
agreement that there has been some affective turn (Gregg and Seigworth 
2010; Clough and Halley 2007). This occurs not only at the level of the-
ory, where we recognize the error of the linguistic paradigm or the cogni-
tive or computational models of the self; it also occurs in a widespread 
shift in perceptual mechanisms and relations. 
It is possible to say that that we are indulging in affective over-con-
sumption and that cinematic and marketing devices have responded 
by remaining constantly innovative: the genre of ‘torture porn’ both 
reflects and reflects upon this hyper-affective addiction trend. On the 
other hand, if it is possible to note a deterioration of the traditionally 
bounded and individuated subject, alongside an atrophy of the narrative 
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or novelistic imagination of a life lived as a trajectory towards wholeness, 
recognition and social meaning—whereby I consider myself from the 
point of view of the better self I would like others to see me as being—it 
is also possible to note a contrary tendency towards waning of affect. I 
would, though, want to give this notion of affective hypertrophy a differ-
ent inflection from Fredric Jameson’s criticism of a postmodern subject 
who, deprived of historical connectedness and any broad political sense, 
becomes nothing more than a schizoid field of intensities, caring little 
about social trajectories or class consciousness ( Jameson 1991). In many 
respects hypo-affective disorder occurs alongside a strongly informa-
tional, if not narrative, attentiveness. There is no shortage of information 
about the dire threats posed not only to the future of the human species, 
but also to the current financial, ecological, political and bureaucratic sys-
tems upon which present generations rely in order to survive. Predictions 
regarding catastrophic economic disorder, imminent resource deple-
tion, viral devastation, chemical warfare, bio-terrorism, rogue states in 
possession of nuclear weapons or unforeseen disasters brought about 
by various genetic technologies seem to have had little effect on behav-
ior and decision making despite their widespread narration and imagina-
tive rehearsal. In addition to explicit thought experiments such as Alan 
Weisman’s World Without Us or the television series Life Without Humans, 
or one-off documentaries such as Aftermath, cinema of the last decade 
has intensified and multiplied a long-standing tradition of disaster epics 
entertaining the possibility of the annihilation of the species. Whereas 
these were once imagined as exogenous events (usually the invasion of 
alien species), climate change and viral threats now dominate the cine-
matic imaginary. Novels such as McCarthy’s The Road or Atwood’s Oryx 
and Crake begin in a world in which devastation has occurred; just what 
event led to such a situation can quite easily remain unstated precisely 
because the idea of a near-posthuman world is today utterly plausible. To 
call such novels or films post-apocalyptic misses their significance, for 
there is not only no apocalyptic revelation or dramatic disclosure, there 
is also no real sense that there need be a radical intrusion or disturbance 
for such worlds of depletion and posthumanity to appear. Yet, despite all 
this information and narrative entertainment regarding humanity’s prob-
able end, there is neither panic nor any apparent affective comportment 
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that would indicate that anyone really feels or fears the sense of the end. 
Climate change denial is one thing, and possibly more rational than cli-
mate change awareness coupled with minor delusory negotiations (such 
as cap and trade, mitigation, adaptation or any of the other bargaining 
strategies). 
The affective turn is not then a solely academic or theoretical cor-
rection to the supposed linguistic paradigm of high theory; it is also a 
pathology of the populace (which is certainly not a polity, for it has noth-
ing to do with bodies assembling to speak, deliberate and communicate 
in common). There is a passion for affective consumption that is exten-
sive—more affective input please!!!—but inversely devoid of intensity. 
There is nothing effective or affective about affections; and this includes 
the fact that we constantly remind ourselves of the primacy of the affec-
tive and insist that in the beginning is the emotive attachment, and then 
proceed to act as if the same old cognitive rules applied. We recognize 
our affective core, repair our theory and then proceed with argument 
as usual. Our response tends to be pharmaceutical rather than pharma-
kological: that is, just as we deal with ADD by providing the brain with 
chemical stimulus (because ADD sufferers fail to focus because nothing 
is stimulating enough) so we have dealt with our affective hypertrophy 
(our inability to sense) by over-consuming and over-producing affects.
How then might we assess the seeming dominance of or addiction 
to the intensities of affect—including the direct marketing of affects in 
‘feel good’ experiences or the horrors of torture porn—alongside the no 
less apparent atrophy of affective response to an overload of information 
regarding genuine threats to organic life? Perhaps the way in which affect 
itself has been theorized might indicate a peculiar structure that would go 
some way to accounting for this divide. 
What if the concept of affect were potentially a formation that would 
shatter the organism’s emotive enclosure? 
It is possible to see affect as a concept in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense: 
it would not be extensive—referring to an already lived and actualized 
set of phenomena—but would be intensive, creating new relations and 
lines of thought, opening different mappings or potentials among what 
is, what is lived, and what might be thought. Affect can be thought of not 
as the influx of sensation that prompts response or engagement, for it 
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is in the not acting, or in the receptivity without responsiveness or rela-
tion that affect occurs. Affect becomes a genuine concept when it poses 
the possibility of thinking the delay or interval between the organism as 
a sensory-motor apparatus and the world that is (at least intellectually) 
mapped according to its own measure. If we do tend to conflate affect 
with emotion—if we do not mark a distinction between the feeling of 
what happens and a whole domain of pulsations and fluxes beyond the 
perceptions of the organism—then this is symptomatic of the tendency 
to reduce the force of concepts to the lived. And is it surprising that the 
concept of affect with its potential for thinking of forces detached from 
the lived, from the organism’s responses, from feeling and from emo-
tion would be reduced to an association with thoroughly humanized 
notions of meaning?
Such problems are particularly important today when the distinction 
between affect and emotion may go some way to allowing us to envis-
age life beyond the organism. For it is life beyond the organism—both 
an actual world in which organic life has been extinguished and a virtual 
world of potentialities that are not lived—that has become increasingly 
unthinkable. Such a world may exist (dimly) at the level of affect but not 
at the level of feeling and the lived. On the contrary, what is presented as 
potential affect (a world without us) is reduced to affections—feelings of 
horror that are resolved ultimately as redemption narratives. That is, there 
is an industry today built on the affective lure of humanity’s and possibly 
life’s non-existence: this would include high culture installation pieces 
that feature machines, mechanized robotic humanoids, lost objects and 
automated sound productions (something like Thomas Mann’s camera 
without person at the end of Death in Venice) to popular visions of a life 
without humans, such as the sublime opening scene of Danny Boyle’s 28 
Days Later of 2002 (or the conclusion of Matt Reeve’s Cloverfield (2008) 
(where a supposed department of defense filming of the last humans to 
have suffered from a violent viral intrusion plays out to the film’s end). 
There is a widespread circulation of the image of life without life, of wit-
nessing without vision. Or, at least, one might begin to note that there 
is a disjunction between affect and the lived and that what might at first 
appear to be differences in degree—such that affect would be a response 
in the body’s systems that would only partly be lived or felt—might 
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eventually become a difference in kind, such that there would be affects 
that ‘stand alone.’ Now might be the time to begin considering affect not 
as the base or ground from which cognition has been abstracted, nor as 
a primarily embodied and barely lived near phenomenon, differing in 
its intensity from fully fledged and conceptualized experience, but as a 
power or force with a tendency to persist or endure.
When Brian Massumi wrote about the autonomy of affect he was refer-
ring to somatic responses that not only exceeded the cognitive but also 
the level of feeling and emotion. (His examples included a melting snow-
man and President Reagan. Images of both produced bodily responses 
that could not be mapped onto cognitive values of affirmation or nega-
tion, and were not felt as emotions that would then prompt action or 
belief. In the case of the melting snowman, the children who reported on 
their felt responses were at odds with their bodily responses; what they 
described as memorable and pleasant was—when measured physiologi-
cally by heart-rate and galvanic skin activity—of a certain intensity rather 
than to do with content).
[T]he primacy of the affective is marked by a gap between 
content and effect: it would appear that the strength or dura-
tion of an image’s effect is not logically connected to the con-
tent in any straightforward way. This is not to say that there 
is no connection and no logic. What is meant here by the 
content of the image is its indexing to conventional meanings 
in an intersubjective context, its socio-linguistic qualifica-
tion. This indexing fixes the quality of the image; the strength 
or duration of the image’s effect could be called its intensity. 
What comes out here is that there is no correspondence or 
conformity between quality and intensity. If there is a rela-
tion, it is of another nature. (Massumi 1995, 84-85)
The disjunction between quality and intensity may, in the case I would 
like to conclude by considering, be one of disjunction or reaction forma-
tion. That is, the higher the degree of threat to the organism, the more the 
quality of affect is that of terror or sublime annihilation, the more disen-
gaged the intensity appears to be. ‘We’ late near-extinction humans appear 
to be addicted to witnessing annihilation, to the feeling of near-death or 
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posthuman existence, and yet have no intensity: it does not prompt us 
either to action or to any sense of what a posthuman world would be. 
On the contrary, the more evidence, imagery, feeling and ‘experience’ of 
a world without humans is displayed, the less affect or intensity occurs. 
In fact, both theory and experience become increasingly organic: with 
thinkers ranging from Maturana and Varela, to philosophers such as 
Evan Thompson and Andy Clark insisting that the world we are given is 
exhausted by the world as felt or lived (Clark 2003; Thompson 2007). 
‘We’ are now living a world of popular, academic and ‘high’ culture in 
which scenes of human and organic annihilation are repeatedly and 
obsessively lived, and yet at the cognitive level we continue to affirm the 
primacy of the world for the embodied, emotional and living organism. 
Man is no longer homo economicus or homo faber, defined by enterpris-
ing activity or production, but by feeling. What is occluded is the unlived, 
that which occurs both at the level of somatic responses that fail to be 
registered (other than by their negation at the level of reaction formation, 
with the shrill affirmation of emotion). What is also occluded is what 
Deleuze and Guattari theorized in What is Philosophy? as the definitive 
capacity of art—an art that occurs outside the human and beyond the 
organism: affects stand alone, exist in themselves and cannot be reduced 
to the lived. 
On the one hand this appears to be an example of a privilege accorded 
to high modernist aesthetics, in the assumption of an art object that 
breaks with the bourgeois banalities of consumption and enjoyment. On 
the other hand, though, there is a sense in which Deleuze and Guattari’s 
distinction among art, philosophy and science—and, in turn, their gen-
eses of these potentialities outside the organism—also breaks with the 
high modernist aesthetic of art as cultural revivification. That is, if mod-
ernism separated the art object from feeling and emotion in order to 
break with social codes and conventions of consumption, it neverthe-
less re-humanized or re-vitalized affect: that is, art restored thinking to 
life and returned life to thinking. There was a sense that critical art might 
return thinking to the sense of its own emergence. A debased form of this 
aesthetic occurs today with many of the wars on the banality of images 
(including the myriad of denunciations of the internet or mass media as 
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dehumanizing—for such denunciations seek to restore individual per-
ception, autonomy and feeling). 
What Deleuze and Guattari suggest in all three of their potentialities 
for thinking—creation of concepts in philosophy, of functions in sci-
ence, and affects and percepts in art—is a locus of production outside the 
organism and outside the lived. Brian Massumi, separating intensity from 
quality, nevertheless located affect entirely within the living system:
Both levels, qualification and intensity, are immediately 
embodied. Intensity is embodied in purely autonomic reac-
tions most directly manifested in the skin-at the surface of 
the body, at its interface with things. Depth reactions belong 
more to the form/content (qualification) level, even though 
they also involve autonomic functions such as heartbeat and 
breathing. The reason may be that they are associated with 
expectation, which depends on consciously positioning one-
self in a line of narrative continuity.’ (Massumi 1995, 85)
For Massumi affect occurs as the event or disruption into social coding of 
the newness of a (not-yet narrated or linear) disturbance. 
Deleuze and Guattari, in their chapter on affects and percepts, give a 
relatively clear instance of the autonomy of percepts—prior not only to 
human, but also to animal life. They describe the stagemaker bird, orga-
nizing coloured leaves to assemble a territory. The bird is only able to 
move and self-organize because there are expressive matters that enable 
processes of assembling: in the beginning is neither the doer nor the 
deed but the matters to be dealt with (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 184). 
The coloured matters precede and are followed by the bird, with the bird 
becoming a functional and defined organism through this assemblage of 
autonomous sensory qualities. When art captures sensations that stand 
alone—as though the perceptions of organisms would only be possible 
because of these autonomous potentialities of percepts—then this is rel-
atively easy to understand, as though a Mondrian or Cezanne drew upon, 
rather than produced, the vibrations of colour. But how could we say the 
same of affects, render them autonomous, inhuman and inorganic, in a 
way that would render them distinct from affections? 
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There is some indication in Deleuze’s book on Francis Bacon of how 
art might capture affect in its autonomy—not simply its distinction from 
symbolic orders and cognition (as in Massumi) but in its inorganic or 
incorporeal moment. Deleuze refers to Bacon’s painting of the scream—
not the feeling of horror, felt by the body, but a depiction through the 
body of the forces that seize it:. Unlike a viewing of A Nightmare on Elm 
Street, the viewer is not horrified—the work does not cause horror—but 
we are capable, supposedly, of witnessing affect, not as felt or lived but as 
force beyond the organism and its meaningful responsiveness: 
If we scream, it is always as victims of invisible and insensible 
forces that scramble every spectacle, and that even lie beyond 
pain and feeling. … Bacon creates the painting of the scream 
because he establishes a relationship between the visibility of 
the scream (the open mouth as a shadowy abyss) and invis-
ible forces, which are nothing other than the forces of the 
future (Deleuze 2005: 43)
But are these forces really affects, or the forces from which affects are 
composed? And is their depiction by Bacon, via the screaming body, 
really akin to the pure sensory qualities that we can think of in the use 
of colours or expressive matters? Some provocation is given by Deleuze’s 
phrase, ‘forces of the future,’ for it is here that we might think affects 
beyond the era of humanity, both in traditional modes of literary expres-
sion and in recent genre shifts. How are affects created by art if they are 
not expressions of some artist’s or character’s psycho-physical organism? 
How could affects possess that stand-alone inhuman inorganic quality 
that percepts seem to do when they provide potentials for assemblages 
(rather than being derived from them)? There would be no easy answers 
to this problem; it should not be easy to distinguish between art that 
makes us feel joyous—tapping into our sensory motor apparatus—and 
art that is joyous, that intimates a joy outside humanity and organisms. 
(What, for example, is trance music: a drugging sound that detaches us 
from meaning and the traditional temporal lines of chord progression 
and development, or a physical pulsation that operates directly at the 
level of sensory motor response rather than thought?) 
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Canonical literature gives us some indication of an autonomy of cre-
ated affects that are not those of the organism, as though art could give 
body to that which exceeds the lived. Adjectives such as Kafka-esque, 
Dickensian or Lawrentian and Orwellian refer to affective assemblages 
that are not those of characters. Nor do such affective complexes prompt 
us to feel absurd bureaucratic torpor, oppressive urban paternalism, 
phallic atavistic passion or nightmarish social surveillance: it as though 
these worlds offered affects as such, there to be lived, as if they existed 
as potentialities for all time, even if captured through the depiction of 
a certain time. Such expressions pass into common parlance and refer 
not to a style of writing so much as the potentiality of that writing to 
seize on forces that it manages to assemble. If we travel through middle 
America we might view certain scenes as if captured by a David Lynch or 
Raymond Carver. Beyond canonized art there are today many attempts 
to capture affects beyond the lived and humanity: books (and televi-
sion series) such as Alan Weisman’s The World Without Us or cinematic 
scenes such as the opening of 28 Days Later, along with a vast range of 
unremarkable nature documentaries do not only depict worlds and life 
beyond humans, but can also suggest (perhaps) a melancholy or joy of 
a world without living witness. It would be telling, then, in the face of 
this tendency to imagine or contemplate joys, depressions, horrors and 
screams outside the lived—and right at the moment of possible human 
self-annihilation—if theory were unable to think affects beyond the lived 
world of the bounded organism.
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Chapter 5
Destroying Cosmopolitanism 
for the Sake of the Cosmos
What would the value of cosmopolitanism as a concept be? How might 
it work and what problems might it resolve or transform? Today the term 
intersects with globalism, offering itself as a mode of connection or col-
lective resistance that would enable a thought of some political totality or 
‘open whole’ irreducible to the forces of the market. The problem appears 
to be posed, from Kant to the present, as a way of thinking beyond human 
to human conflict—seeking a higher order beyond interests of individu-
als and polities. 
Cosmopolitanism appears to be a self-evident good: is not the very 
concept of the good oriented towards that which would be or could be a 
good for all? Insofar as we rationally will anything at all we seem not only 
to be claiming something for ourselves as particular persons, but also to 
be appealing to some ideal or idea as such that could be agreed to by any 
subject whatever. Cosmopolitanism is at once in line with a purely formal 
or procedural liberalism, but also has the benefit of appealing not only to 
that which ‘we’ here and now agree to be good, but beyond that to some 
virtual humanity not yet present: ‘Cosmopolitanism … starts with what 
is human in humanity’ (Appiah 2006,134). If cosmopolitanism is a uni-
versalism that is also not the assertion of one’s actual goals as the goals 
of all, but indicates an ideal of maximal inclusion and self-critique, who 
would assert the contrary? And what would the contrary thesis be? That 
we are all, inevitably, bound up with local attachments incapable of truly 
transcending the particular? No, even that suggestion is already incorpo-
rated in a good cosmopolitanism. We are all culturally embedded, and 
cosmopolitanism cannot be a naïve or violent assertion of a single and 
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uniform humanity. Cosmopolitanism is not the reduction of all differ-
ence to a single model of citizenship; it is, rather, an Idea of a polity—
a gathering of bodies for discussion, decision and determination—that 
would not be that of this or that nation but of the cosmos. We might say 
that the cosmos is an Idea in the Kantian sense: we require the notion 
of the cosmos in order to think the relations among different localities, 
and this Idea generates a task for future thinking, but such an Idea can 
never be fully actualized or presented. Perhaps, today, this cosmopolitan 
idea is more urgent and more possible than ever. Surely it is the advent of 
(increasingly evident) threats to this cosmos—resource depletion, rising 
sea levels, global heating, desertification, species extinction, viral apoca-
lypse, violent fundamentalisms, bio-weapons—that impel us to free the 
polis from the nation state and imagine a greater cosmos. 
For is it possible to say any more that politics occurs at the level of the 
state or nation? If decisions are made in the name of national polities, 
such as recent decisions to put environmental policy on hold in the face 
of economic imperatives, or of the compromise of claims for rights to life 
and universal health care because of a need to sustain fiscal responsibility 
and corporate structures, then what one appears to lose is not only the 
space of the cosmos but also a certain modality of the future. Decisions 
based on polities of the nation state are enslaved to a temporality of com-
peting interests, whether that be the political terms of opposed parties 
or—if one is dealing with nation to nation negotiations—calculations 
regarding markets, future flows of capital and investment and Realpolitik. 
A cosmopolitical imperative would not only expand horizons spatially—
to think beyond the geographical boundaries that create political, cul-
tural and imaginary borders—it would also necessarily alter temporal 
limits. Globalism as an economic phenomenon in which territories once 
external to the nation state are included in ever-expanding and mutating 
markets would need to be supplemented or transcended by a cosmo-
politanism1 that imagined modes of sympathy, recognition and respect 
beyond the terms of the market.2 If cosmopolitanism were truly to distin-
guish itself from globalism then it must not do so merely in a spatial and 
extensive manner (being more inclusive) but would need to differ inten-
sively.3 The cosmos would differ from the globe only if it were not simply 
the spatial unit of this planet earth with its already identified resources, 
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organizations and geographical borders (all included in the systems and 
networks of globalism); the cosmos would, in its new mode, include a 
virtuality. 
Traditionally the cosmos signifies an orderliness, suggesting that the 
actual globe as material entity is placed within, or expressive of, a broader 
harmony (a cosmos of the planets and heavens). In contemporary forms 
of cosmopolitanism such appeals to divine or eternal harmony give way 
to an imaginative supplement: whatever the world is here and now, with 
all its global networks, markets and power structures, there can also be 
the figuration of ethical territories. Above and beyond physical and politi-
cal borders there might be affective or immaterial communities, such as 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s redemptive positing of a humanity 
united by ties of immaterial labor (Hardt and Negri 2000). 
The political times and the mode of production have changed. 
We have to construct the figure of a new David, the multitude 
as champion of asymmetrical combat, immaterial workers 
who become a new kind of combatants, cosmopolitan brico-
leurs of resistance and cooperation. These are the ones who 
can throw the surplus of their knowledge’s and skills into the 
construction of a common struggle against imperial power. 
This is the real patriotism, the patriotism of those with no 
nation. (Hardt and Negri 2005, 69)
These territories would not be extensively spatial (a portion of the globe) 
but intensive—a space of infinite hospitality without limit, a city of refuge 
that occupies a virtual space, a community that is not grounded upon a 
common soil or even a normative notion of the citizen (Derrida 2001, 8). 
Such a virtual or spiritual humanity (that could no longer be reduced to 
man as an organism) was already imagined by Bergson in his Two Sources 
of Morality and Religion. Bergson’s work on the distinction between 
morality and religion was part of a broader project that aimed to intuit, 
from the actual world’s present state of complex phenomena, the tenden-
cies that had enabled the emergence of the current state of things and that 
would indicate possible futures. If we have, today, a complex mixture of 
morality and spiritualism—of closed self-interest and open altruism—
this is because there are two tendencies or speeds that produce opposing 
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(yet coupled) forces in the groupings of human bodies. Morality is an 
extension of the organic and material need for survival; it makes sense at 
the level of our merely biological or instinctual existence to gather into 
localized units, establish basic order, defend ourselves from others and 
imagine others to be rather like ourselves. If instinct is the tendency that 
enables organisms to act for the sake of their own preservation, then basic 
morality is instinctual. If intellect is another tendency—this time allow-
ing for generalization and abstraction beyond individual survival—then 
this, too, would account for more complex social groupings—such as the 
nation state, or even ‘man’: such groupings would be based on a calcula-
tion of the present for the sake of a future that is akin to the present. I 
might die for my country, my children, or even act somewhat selflessly by 
consuming fewer resources for the sake of future generations that I imag-
ine to be an extension of the present. Morality, Bergson argued, would 
proceed from social groupings and recognition: the intellect would not 
be limited to animal self-interest and immediate gratification of needs 
but would imagine a life beyond the present, and bear sympathy towards 
individuals beyond itself and immediate family. Morality sacrifices the 
demands of present pleasure for the sake of future security and the for-
mation of a public good. But Bergson posited another tendency that was 
also a different mode of temporality: spirit, unlike intellect, was not gen-
eralizing and extensive (creating categories that would reduce minor dif-
ferences for the sake of inclusiveness and efficiency). Spirit would slow 
down the speedy and manageable reduction of complexity and instead 
begin to intuit differences, rhythms and perceptions beyond its own pur-
view—beyond the range of ready-made concepts. Religion is different in 
kind, not degree, from morality. It would be a mistake to see something 
like Pauline universalism as the extension of sympathy to include all of 
mankind, creating a ‘family of man.’ It would similarly be mistaken to 
see an evolution of monotheism as a movement of increasing abstraction 
and universality (Wright 2009). It is Bergson’s claim that a truly spiritual 
religion is not more and more inclusive, but moves beyond inclusiveness 
and single groupings of ‘man’ and instead imagines that one might act and 
feel for what is not yet present, represented or imagined. For Bergson the 
spirit of religion has an annihilating rather than self-preserving or self-
furthering quality. One may form moral frameworks for the sake of man, 
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for the sake of those other organisms that I imagine to be like myself and 
towards whom I feel some (however distant) sympathy. Bergson’s exam-
ples of Christ and Socrates, by contrast, do not extend sympathy to yield 
a greater inclusiveness or broader definition of the human. Their actions 
and teachings are not directed to some normative or general figure of 
the human. The intellect that will sacrifice the present of pleasures for 
the sake of long-term gain, efficiency and stability is surpassed by a spirit 
that can liberate the temporalizing and creative power from any body. 
Whereas the intellect uses the imagination of a future to calculate more 
efficient self-interests, expending more energy in the present for the sake 
of a greater deferred good, spirit can embark upon deferred action as such. 
This would not be for the sake of any already imagined, figured or felt 
good—it would be a saintly, Christ-like, Socratic and dynamic spiritual-
ism that did not rest with any object. 
Bergson is explicit that for the most part the forces of matter tend 
towards inertia: the intellect may break with immediate organic self-
interest but will then be seduced by the moral image of man or human-
ity as a stable object with properties. It takes an anti-social and anti-moral 
impulse to break with norms, pleasures and habits of communication: 
‘Shaken to its depths by the current which is about to sweep it forward, 
the soul ceases to revolve around itself and escapes for a moment from 
the law which demand that the species and the individual should condi-
tion one another’ (Bergson 1977, 230). Nature (by way of moral obli-
gation) builds ‘man’ for stable and closed societies—akin to the ant in 
the ant-hill—but there is another impulse that is distinct from man’s 
organic being and distinct from moral humanity. This creative dynamism 
is destructive of the closed figures of man, tearing the intellect from its 
forms and figures; spirit bears a supra-rational force, especially if we think 
of moving beyond rationality as the surpassing of any single ratio. There 
is something essentially malevolent in Bergson’s passage beyond moral 
humanity. Bergson notes that such an individual reaction against collec-
tive moralism not only tends to close back on its own figures and myths; 
the creative impulse always works in conflict with the tendency towards 
inertia. There must have been a time, Bergson suggests, when there was 
not a split between an explosive tendency and matter exploded, when 
differential force occurred as such, without resistance. But those days are 
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over, and moral man—global man with all his delusions of existing as a 
being with a closed nature—can never be fully surpassed by the dyna-
mism of spirit. All one can aim for practically is some ever-expanding and 
ever-creative figure of humanity that would be relatively open. 
Bergson’s thought therefore anticipates the current predicament of 
cosmopolitical desire in an age of globalism. On the one hand political 
relations, geographical distributions, market forces and the residues of 
imperialism already include and anticipate all human organisms as a uni-
fied whole. On the other hand, a new cosmopolitics would allow every 
event of inclusion to have a destructive force on the very humanity that 
appropriates all others in its name. Bergson makes a distinction between 
static and dynamic religions, the former creating stabilizing myths and 
figures, projecting its own organic image of itself onto life as a whole; the 
latter draw upon already given figures but do so in order to recreate and 
open the image of what counts as ethical life. The former tend towards 
self-satisfaction and the rewards of pleasure, the latter towards a selfless 
and mystical joy. Both are results of the creative or differential force of 
life, which works against the closed and fixed forms of matter—destroy-
ing the actual for the sake of a not-yet present end. Following Bergson, 
though, we can mark a difference in kind, and not just degree, between 
globalism and cosmopolitanism. The former tends towards measuring its 
own movements according to the actual world: striving to achieve greater 
profits or even human rights for more individuals, improved conditions 
for more individuals, inclusion of more individuals (all the while main-
taining the standard figure of the moral individual as rational consumer 
blessed with rights and moral judgment). Cosmopolitanism, by contrast 
would be oriented to the virtual: hospitable (as Derrida suggests) to an 
other who is totally other, who does not answer to or accord with already 
given notions of human dignity and whose possibility (rather than pres-
ence) is destructive of any supposed good conscience (Derrida 2001).
We are left, then, with a politics of the virtual that seems remarkably 
similar to a politics of the Idea. Kant had also, in one of the key texts on 
cosmopolitanism, argued that as a being of nature man could only regard 
himself as bound up with physical causes and passions. But natural being 
does not exhaust man’s nature. The human species, though seemingly act-
ing in a lawful manner when considered historically, is neither governed 
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by pure animal instinct nor a rational law. Kant assumes that if we could 
separate man as he is in himself from the manner in which he appears then 
humanity would follow a prearranged plan in the manner of ‘rational cos-
mopolitans’ (Kant 1991, 41). Why would the ‘rational cosmopolitan’ be 
the figure that Kant opposes both to an animal nature that is instinctual 
and man as he appears historically? A preliminary answer would draw 
upon what Kant says elsewhere about the pure forms of moral law that 
we are capable of thinking but not knowing. If I were to act as if I were a 
rational cosmopolitan then my individual and worldly being (with all its 
pleasures, calculated interests, possible pay-offs from good actions and 
other motivations) would be surpassed by the imagination of myself as 
a member of humanity in general. I would not be a specific historically 
located and culturally defined self, but a pure will who could act as if my 
actions and desires were those of all wills for all time. Cosmopolitanism, 
then, is for Kant an idea that we cannot avoid; it is the duty to think 
of how one might act for all and for all time. If we can think such a will 
(despite the impossibility of knowing or actually becoming a ‘rational 
cosmopolitan’) then we ought to act in accord with such a possibility: 
‘Nature only requires that we should approximate to this idea’ (Kant 
1991, 46-7). The first manoeuvre of Kant’s essay is, then, to place cosmo-
politanism out of this world. It is an Idea, something that we can not see 
evidenced in history other than afterwards, via reflection, when we can 
look back on collective past actions that seem to tend towards increasing 
order. Because we only know human actions, and ourselves, in terms of 
natural consequences of cause and effect, and within a nature of physical 
laws, any seeming ‘rational cosmopolitan’ may, for all we know, be acting 
from local interests. As in personal morality, one never knows whether 
one has acted from duty. One can know that one has acted according to 
duty. Similarly at a global level, one can never witness benevolent human-
ity as such—one is presented with antagonisms, violent usurpations, 
wars, disputes over honor and recognition—and this because man is a 
divided being. Unable to remain in a state of animal inertia and security 
he struggles to conquer those others without whom he would not receive 
recognition but with whom he cannot live peacefully. Even so, something 
like cosmopolitanism will emerge: not through material and empirical 
calculation (which can only be a question of more or less sophisticated 
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brutish self-interest) but through a nature that we assume, on reflection, 
after the event, opens to a human concord beyond that of our merely ani-
mal natures. Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism is not the result of calcula-
tion within this world, but intimates another ordering power liberated 
from the finite point of view of man whose world is only known as it is 
given to him, not as it is in itself:
Wars, tense and unremitting military preparations, and the 
resultant distress which every state must eventually feel 
within itself, even in the midst of peace—these are the means 
by which nature drives nations to make imperfect attempts, 
but finally, after many devastations, upheavals and even com-
plete inner exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which 
reason could have suggested to them even without so many 
sad experiences—that of abandoning a lawless state of sav-
agery and entering a federation of peoples in which every 
state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security 
and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgement, 
but solely from this great federation (Foedus Amphictyonum), 
from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a 
united will. (Kant 1991, 47)
Where Bergson’s dynamic religious or mystical impulse differs from 
Kant is in its suggestion of the positive power of the virtual, and this may 
well mark its distinction from anything cosmopolitical. That is to say: Kant, 
like contemporary cosmopolitical approaches, distinguishes between a 
calculative, conflict-based, self-interested and antagonistic global warfare 
(even if that global war is one of market competition and political expe-
diency) and the idea, beyond that, of a humanity that can imagine itself 
beyond any of the natural figures that have grounded its specific commu-
nities. The problem—despite the distinction in kind between a manage-
rial globalism and an open ethical cosmopolitanism—is whether one can 
ever do more than think this potentiality as a negation of the actual. 
This, indeed, seems to be the issue that exercises writing on cosmopoli-
tanism: is not the aim for a plural world inclusiveness just one more way 
in which one reduces the world’s differences to one’s own ideas of human-
ness? Acting in accordance with duty is not the same as acting dutifully. 
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I may appear to have effaced self-interest, nationalism, global capitalist 
assimilation and predation and yet who knows whether this benevolent 
outcome is not the consequence of a will oriented to particular calcu-
lations? For Kant, one cannot know such a thing, but that is beside the 
point. We can, at least, aim to act as if we were rational cosmopolitans; 
we can imagine what such willed maxims would be. Whether any of the 
actual decisions we make would actually be executed solely with the view 
of ‘humanity in general’ (liberated from any determination of locality or 
history) would not alter our attitude towards how we think about what a 
good principle would be. Cosmopolitanism of this nature—as an Idea or 
infinitely receding horizon—characterizes the post-Kantian tradition that 
ranges, however diversely, from Habermas’s ideals of ongoing critique to 
Derrida’s infinite hospitality (even though Derrida distinguishes his city 
of refuge from Kantian Ideas precisely in its lack of a human normative 
dimension and its orientation to the wholly other). Positive approaches 
tend to locate the cosmopolitan intention not in a necessarily impossible 
‘beyond’ but in the real, in the bringing into actuality of an already given 
potentiality. In the case of Hardt and Negri’s Empire, it is humanity itself, 
in its laboring activity that yields a multitude that is no longer delimited 
by a normative image of humanity but creates from itself, for itself, noth-
ing other than its own collective being. But it is just the language used by 
Hardt and Negri—‘homohomo humanity squared,’ the Christian love of 
St Francis or agape (therefore not confined to bourgeois normality)—
that ought to give us pause (Hardt and Negri 2000, 204). Such an appeal 
to immanent potentiality avoids the crippling effects of what Deleuze 
(1994) referred to as the ‘thermodynamic’ nature of bourgeois ideology, 
whereby one recognizes the force of a moral ideal and yet also resigns 
oneself to knowing it only in its diminished and finite mode. One recog-
nizes a call for justice, democracy, hospitality and cosmopolitanism but 
always in the deferred form of a ‘not yet.’ On the one hand I know that 
cosmopolitanism requires the surpassing of any given or particular norm, 
and yet I know that such an ideal will always be marked by a particularity 
from which it emerges. Life is deemed to be nothing more than the com-
promised actuality that we are already given. 
Can cosmopolitanism find a way beyond standard balancing acts 
between feelings of liberal guilt and liberal self-satisfaction? Hardt and 
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Negri discern a potentiality not just for more justice, or even the intru-
sion of an Idea of justice, but of a revolutionary rupture from the pres-
ent and within the present. The conditions of the present, such as imma-
terial labor and the networks of globalism, are precisely those that can 
inaugurate a new commonwealth that transcends localities, nations and 
state forms. Hardt and Negri’s debt to Deleuze is by no means direct, 
nor straightforward. One of the clearest distinctions between Hardt and 
Negri’s approach and some of the philosophical sources upon whom they 
draw is their sustained commitment to figures of humanity. Their call for 
an immanent politics remains wedded to the anthropomorphic tenden-
cies of global, commonwealth or cosmopolitical figures and the residual 
archaisms of man that such figures bring in train. First, for Hardt and 
Negri the bringing into actuality of the new commonwealth is liberated 
from static and transcendent ideas of the state that would impose order 
and justice from without; but the image of a man who makes himself from 
himself and who exists, not as an isolated being, but as a creative com-
ponent of a multitude that has no being other than its ongoing dynamic 
creativity transposes theological axiology into a supposed secular imma-
nence. It is now not God who expresses his being through a creation 
capable of returning and recognizing itself in its divine and immanent 
origin; it is the human creative spirit. This much, also, was suggested in 
Bergson’s dynamic religion that, like Hardt and Negri’s multitude, tended 
to figure the future in Christian terms. Bergson defines mysticism as the 
creative spirit liberated from practical affairs and inertia, and it is because 
of its mystical component that Christianity had the potential to remain 
active, not simply resting with a negation of the world but proceeding to 
bring forth a new world of life’s own creativity, a creativity feeling itself in 
its own creative joy. For Bergson such a power of creative life partaking in 
its own creativity—no longer stalled by meeting the needs and pleasures 
of the organism or society—found its end in man, and especially in the 
Christian man of dynamic religion: 
the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a con-
tact, consequently of partial coincidence, with the creative 
effort which life itself manifests. The great mystic is to be 
conceived as an individual being, capable of transcending 
the limitations imposed on the species by its material nature, 
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thus continuing and extending the divine action. (Bergson 
1977, 220-221)
So, here, we arrive at a problem that is not at all extrinsic to cosmo-
politanism. How do we conceive the virtual or futural domain that is irre-
ducible to the ties of global capital and interest? Must it take the form of 
humanity imagining itself, of a city of refuge, of the divine? Bergson, via a 
thought of the divine, at least raises the idea of a life that cannot be iden-
tified with the organic or global, even if he then falls back upon an already 
given notion of the divine. As long as we think the surpassing of com-
peting self-interests and organic expediency as being transcended by the 
cosmopolitical we still remain at the level of difference in degree. First, 
the cosmos, even if it is not a spiritually ordered or harmonious whole is 
nevertheless distinguished (by Kant) from the wars of competing social 
bodies or (by Hardt and Negri) from the globalism of merely material 
forces that do not yet bring to full potential the immaterial lines of affec-
tion, labor and communication. Kant will argue that the cosmopolitical 
order is the result of a reflective equilibrium: we do not positively engi-
neer political harmony but can discern the tendency towards cosmopo-
litical peace after the event. This discloses a certain reason in nature, sug-
gesting that human discord, war and aggression ultimately tend towards 
a higher stability above and beyond human-to-human conflict. This is 
truly, then, a cosmopolitics: human historical life takes on a cosmologi-
cal dimension irreducible to the forces of the polity. This cosmpolitical 
reason does not emerge from political relations directly, but opens out 
onto another plane. 
Even so, while distinct in order, Kant—like those after him—never-
theless sees the potential for a passage from polity to cosmopolitanism. 
The former achieves order among bodies (as a polity) but is then placed 
in warring relations with other bodies. The cosmopolitical is therefore a 
version of the polity—equilibrium achieved among bodies—that lay-
ers over the political: no longer sympathy, affinity and legitimation at 
the political level, but the same concord from discord manoeuvre taken 
one level higher. Order from disorder, equilibrium from disequilibrium, 
increasing generality: all this occurs at the point where the cosmopoliti-
cal other is not a distinct other (with traits different from mine) but is 
wholly other—human in general. Second, the increasing generality of 
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abstraction of the cosmopolitical order becomes a way of extending the 
forces of globalism: either one argues that global economic, marketing 
and communicative lines can yield to a new commonwealth by being 
freed from strictly economic codes (Hardt and Negri) or one posits a 
critical cosmopolitanism where the economic violence of globalism is 
reflected upon by a cosmopolitical perspective that never frees itself 
from, but is also irreducible to, the economic. 
Despite Bergson’s reliance upon (Christian) humanity as the means 
through which the creative force of life might create a new potentiality of 
dynamic spirit, he nevertheless suggests a different way of approaching 
the cosmopolitical problem. Consider, first, how the problem is posed, 
invariably passing from relative order to greater order: man as an animal 
creates polities—relations among similar bodies striving for ongoing sta-
bility of their kind or species—but these polities become warring bodies 
in turn. The problem is posed as one of passing from the political man to 
man in general, from the generalized and grouped to the higher group-
ings of a higher generality, from radical difference to increasing indif-
ference. And this passage to the indifferent is disclosed in the ultimate 
formulae of a new cosmopolitanism in which I need not recognize any 
traits in the other apart from pure and formal otherness. This is at once 
an extension and fulfillment of liberalism, from Kant’s imperative to act 
as a member of the kingdom of ends and Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’ to 
Derrida’s hospitality towards the wholly other and perhaps even notions 
of a ‘community without community’ that would signal the pure form 
of relation without being governed by any normative term. As long as 
the problem is posed as one of cosmopolitanism it seems that the passage 
towards greater abstraction, formalism or generalized humanity—Hardt 
and Negri’s ‘homohomo humanity squared’—would be the only option. 
But is cosmopolitanism a genuine concept of the future that might help 
us to think twenty-first century horizons? I would suggest that it is not, 
and this for several reasons. First, for all the laments today regarding the 
loss of ‘the political’ (supposedly vanquished by managerialism or bio-
political bureaucratic calculations of mere life), is the polity the best way 
to think about relations of force? Beyond the political—the gathering of 
bodies on common for the sake of decision and determination—now 
is the time to think non-anthropic relations, potentials and forces. The 
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cosmopolitical, after all, is an extrapolation of the polity: a mode of har-
mony, order, humanity or citizenship that transcends, extends or emerges 
as the pure (or purer) form of the polity. The problems we encounter 
today, ranging from a global financial system without center, accountabil-
ity, rationality or future to a planetary destructiveness that has resulted 
directly from the inflation of human sustainability at the expense of other 
rhythms cannot be achieved by granting a greater ideality and range to 
the political, and certainly not by positing a cosmic (or higher order) har-
mony that would supplement or override human conflict. 
Second, if we accept that the cosmopolitical imperatives of hospital-
ity, community, humanity or refuge occur as a passage from necessary 
conflict—what Kant refers to as ‘childish malice and destructiveness’ or 
what Bergson describes as the enclosure within the organism—towards 
a higher order equilibrium, then the cosmopolitical would always have 
as its basic terms the already formed and bounded units of the aggressive 
individual. Politics and order, even when stretched to its highest ideals, 
would be a question of negotiating the degree to which the forces of these 
individuals could be combined to form some higher order individual. 
In Kant war is defined as a consequence of the human species’ strange 
threshold condition: neither governed by animal instinct nor capable of 
intuiting the rational cosmopolitanism that would be their pure ideal, 
humans live with each other for the sake of recognition, yet cannot abide 
each other because of their competing desires. For Bergson, however, 
the situation is slightly different: there is a conflict or warring power in 
the impulse of life as such. Creativity is at once explosive—pulverizing 
inert and closed forms—and yet always coming up against its past cre-
ated forms. It is intellect, after all, that frees the human organism from the 
self-interests of animal instinct (by calculating on a more efficient expen-
diture of deferred energy), and yet this same intellect maps the future 
according to already determined units. Perhaps this is one way of under-
standing contemporary globalism, at once extending itself to all territo-
ries in an all inclusive manner but—in reaching the limits of its coher-
ence—failing to adjust its measurements of profit, efficiency, expansion 
and enterprise. One might say the same about any form of cosmopoli-
tanism that wanted to redeem globalism by reaching a greater or more 
open humanity; it would only be an extension by degree, not a difference 
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in kind. But if life itself in its creative dynamism is, on Bergson’s sugges-
tion, already at war with itself, creating the very obstacles to its own for-
ward movement, obstacles that in turn require a greater creative ‘thrust,’ 
is there another way to think the passage beyond global war? 
This leads to the third, and final, objection to cosmopolitanism already 
hinted at earlier. The very nature of the politics of cosmopolitanism is 
bourgeois and thermodynamic: calculating the relation among forces in 
terms of management of degrees, or more or less, and of compromise. 
Yes, we want an all inclusive humanity, but not one of the market. Yes we 
want equality, but not the reduction of all human cultures to one stan-
dard. Yes, we want multiculturalism but not the narcissism of small dif-
ferences. Yes, we want the rights and freedoms of the enlightenment but 
should be wary of universalizing specifically modern Western values. In 
criticizing bourgeois ideology as thermodynamic Deleuze was drawing 
attention to the crippling and self-important nature of notions of political 
compromise: on the one hand I maintain certain norms and values—this 
gives me the individual identity that allows me to be a moral individual. 
Yet, on the other hand I am aware that those values are provisional, cul-
turally and historically specific and never fully universalizable. 
Deleuze signals an alternative mode for thinking ‘political’ concepts 
(although it needs to be borne in mind that all his and Guattari’s politi-
cal terms—including micropolitical and schizoanalysis—decompose 
psyches and individuals into forces and relations). If one began, not from 
models of mediation, more and less, or greater and expanded models of 
hospitality, but from differential calculus then forces would not be forces 
of bodies and the cosmos would need to be considered beyond the polity. 
In the plateau of A Thousand Plateaus that deals, however fleetingly, 
with the cosmos, Deleuze and Guattari achieve two conceptual manoeu-
vres. Before one can think of the cosmos as a deterritorialization of the 
earth or territory, one also needs to see earth and territory as themselves 
assembled from forces of chaos (with their attendant autonomous quali-
ties): ‘The forces to be captured are no longer those of the earth, which 
still constitute a great expressive Form, but the forces of an immaterial, 
nonformal, and energetic Cosmos’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 342-
343). That is, any world, earth, territory or globe (including the globe of 
globalism) is assembled from powers that are not those of the organism. 
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On the contrary, it is from the assembling of expressive qualities that 
something like an individuated body can emerge. Deleuze and Guattari 
here (and in What is Philosophy?) cite the stagemaker bird, whose turn-
ing over of leaves to display their lighter side creates a territory of found 
qualities; it is this formation of assembled qualities that creates individu-
ation. There is a selection from chaos of materials that are not indifferent 
but that possess various potentials for relations and distinctions. Thus 
any earth or territory has already resulted from the assembling of quali-
ties. Today’s figure of the globe, for example, is not arbitrary and relies on 
the selection of qualities—such as the spherical planet, the generic image 
of the human being as a communicative, universalizing, enterprising and 
communal animal—from which something like the concept of global-
ism is formed. When these qualities are ‘deterritorialized’ or extended 
beyond their already actual form to consider virtual variations we get the 
cosmopolitical citizen: a man blessed with speech (but no language in 
particular), a sexually differentiated and culturally specified individual 
(but with no culture or gender in particular). We might look both at the 
ways in which a supposedly generic humanity draws upon a range of 
expressive qualities—from the figure of face and voice to the motifs of 
family, sexual difference and skin color—and at how the composed ‘fam-
ily of man’ then allows for extension (or deterritorialization) to a cosmos 
that is always cosmopolitical. That is, the cosmos is always an extension of 
the composed polity, an abstraction or idealization of man englobed in 
his world of human others. 
If the first feature of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the cosmos is 
that it is not cosmopolitical—for the cosmos can occur as the deterrito-
rialization of non-human forces—the second is that (at least in this pla-
teau) it bears a direct relation to music. But this is the case only if music 
is defined as the relations of qualities and differences, the power to form 
inflections and rhythms from which something like the human practice 
and culture of music emerged:
The T factor, the territorializing factor, must be sought else-
where: precisely in the becoming-expressive of rhythm or 
melody, in other words, in the emergence of proper qualities 
(color, odor, sound, silhouette…).
Destroying Cosmopolitanism for the Sake of the Cosmos 111
Can this becoming, this emergence, be called Art? That would 
make the territory the result of art. The artist: the first person 
to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark. Property, col-
lective or individual, is derived from that even when it is in 
the service of war and oppression. … The expressive is pri-
mary in relation to the possessive; expressive qualities, or 
matters of expression, are necessarily appropriative and con-
stitute a having more profound than being. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 316)
There is a pre-human and pre-organic music that is generated from 
the differential relations among expressive qualities: the beating out 
of a rhythm establishes a pulse or band of time from which something 
like a meter might be organized. There is an articulation of sounds into 
tonal inflections that provides the condition for something like a scale 
or melody (or phonemes). Before there is something like a language—
a repeatable and formalized set of relations—there must be the forma-
tion of qualities and the creation of differences. (One can think here 
of Freud’s example of his grandson establishing a pulsation of Fort-Da, 
opposing two sounds across space and time, securing a territory that then 
enables the forming of a body and its world.) And it is here that we can tie 
Deleuze and Guattari’s plateau on the refrain (where cosmos is conceptu-
alized) with Deleuze’s idea of a differential mode of thinking. Deleuze and 
Guattari insist that there is an autonomy or differential power in expres-
sive qualities. Relatively stable terms or beings are formed from pure 
predicates or qualities. One might say that ‘man’ as a rational animal who 
is defined through the speaking-seeing-eating figure of the face and voice 
has a political composition (for it determines relations among human 
bodies) but this occurs after the entering-into-relation of certain quali-
ties. Man is an animal assembled through the speaking-seeing face (itself 
composed racially of skin colors), the commanding voice (again enabled 
through the composition of a phonematic spectrum) and the organized 
body (effected by bringing the hand-eye-brain complex into relation.) 
There is, in this respect, nothing political about the cosmos as long as we 
take politics to be the relations of the polity. On the contrary, the most 
important events are micro-political: how did this figure of political man 
(with the eye of judgment, voice of reason and body of labor) come to 
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be composed from the forces of chaos? Such a determination would have 
been enabled by certain expressive qualities—the potentialities of sound 
in the voice, of light in the seeing eye, of conceptual configurations in the 
reasoning brain. Such qualities are synthesized and coordinated to pro-
duce the man of politics. To define the proper destiny of man to be that of 
a cosmo-political animal is to contain thinking within the already formed 
bounds of the organism. A differential politics, by contrast, approaches 
the cosmos as a radical deterritorialization, freeing expressive qualities 
from a human-all-too-human composition:
For there is no imagination outside of technique. The modern 
figure is not the child or the lunatic, still less the artist, but the 
cosmic artisan: a homemade atomic bomb—it’s very simple 
really, it’s been proven, it’s been done. To be an artisan and no 
longer an artist, creator, or founder, is the only way to become 
cosmic, to leave the milieus and the earth behind. The invo-
cation to the Cosmos does not at all operate as a metaphor; 
on the contrary, the operation is an effective one, from the 
moment the artist connects a material with forces of consis-
tency or consolidation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 345)
How might we think this meditation on the limits of cosmopolitanism 
in concrete terms? What would Deleuze and Guattari’s suggested cosmic 
release of matters mean, or—more accurately, since it is no longer a ques-
tion of meaning or symbols—how might such deterritorialization work? 
Consider one of the problems of the twenty-first century: water. At once 
crucial to life, water is also one of the elements whose relations to human 
organisms and polities exposes crucial fragilities, including water borne 
infections, floods, drought, rising sea levels and melting ice caps. Water 
has, of course, been politicized. In the 2008 documentary Trouble the 
Water Hurricane Katrina was an event that could not simply be referred 
to as a natural disaster but exposed political distributions: the absence 
of decisions, intentions, attention and sympathy that affected a certain 
geographical region of America that was also, of course, a racial and 
sexual region. More broadly, and also in 2008, Flow: For Love of Water 
charted the various ways in which corporations sold, channeled, mar-
keted, restricted and managed water sales and supplies—rendering this 
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most basic of human elements into a key political weapon and structuring 
cause. Such cinematic events gesture towards a traditional cosmopolitan-
ism, both in presenting the local plight of Katrina to a world audience 
as an indictment of America and in exposing certain globalizing markets 
(of water) to a population of general human concern. The response to 
such demonstrations of political mapping would be some form of cos-
mopolitical activism: such concerns would—as in twenty-first climate 
change rhetoric more generally—be those of viability, sustainability 
and the maintenance of humanity. How will we live on, into the future, 
if this most basic of elements becomes politicized, becomes a weapon 
or resource that is subject to plays of power among humans? Another 
politics of water is also possible, one that would be musical in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s sense (if music refers to the relations established among 
expressive qualities and their capacity to create forms, territories, identi-
ties and to open to the cosmos). We can begin by thinking about water’s 
elemental or musical qualities (its semi-autonomous power to enter into 
relations beyond human polities) through Roman Polanski’s Chinatown 
of 1974. Ostensibly a detective drama about the theft and re-channeling 
of water that is political in the most traditional of senses—to do with 
local contests and human interests—the film also allows water to become 
a visual quality. This is not when water is seen or made visible but when 
its absence or inhuman power takes over the screen: set in a heat-wave, 
the drama is shot through a heat haze in which the flows of human per-
spiration are matched with a barely discernible visual fluidity that takes 
the form of a slightly out of focus point of view. It is as though beyond 
the political plays of power something of the cosmic force of water—its 
resistance to human manipulation, its brutal and inhuman potentiality—
threatens the person-to-person drama of the plot. Chinatown is at once 
about a cosmopolitics of water—about the ways in which corporate pow-
ers can take over local management and resources—at the same time as 
it is counter-political in its presentation of water as expressive or sensu-
ous matter; water is not just represented as a human commodity but also 
takes over the formal elements of the screen, becoming an element from 
which the visual field is composed. A more specifically musical mode of 
cosmic deterritorialization occurs in the American composer Sebastian 
Currier’s Next Atlantis string quartet (Currier 2008).4 Here, sounds of 
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water (which have been electronically synthesized, becoming almost 
melodic) are interspersed with sounds from the string quartet, which 
take on the quality of ‘becoming-water.’ At once the most formed and 
mannered of genres, the string quartet enters into relation not with the 
forces of the earth as territory (where water, say, is a humanized, nation-
alized quality) but with the cosmic force of water—its capacity to enter 
into variation and bear a sonic power beyond that of the polity. One 
might refer to such uses of the sounds of the cosmos as deterritorializing 
in a higher sense: the form of the work—its relations of varying sounds in 
dialogue—is also its matter, the work is the synthesis and forming—de-
forming of the elemental sound of water. 
Why would such an opening to the cosmos be worth anything today? 
Is not the urgency of twenty-first century climate change a condition of 
such intensity that one must manage, now, as efficiently and bureaucrati-
cally as possible the sustainability of human life? Perhaps climate change 
calls for the most cosmopolitical of responses: the taking hold of the 
world’s resources away from nation states and local polities for the sake 
of the viability of ongoing life. Such an imperative would, though, be in 
the name of the sustaining of human life, and of human life as it is already 
formed, already politicized and already organized. If we were to think 
otherwise, and if the crises of the twenty-first century were to prompt us 
to think at all it may be in a cosmic and inhuman mode, asking—at least 
beginning to ask—what the elements of this earth are, what force they 
bear, how we are composed in relation to those forces. If climate change 
politics has taught us anything to date—if it has, and if there is an ‘us’ or 
‘we’ who might learn from, or be destroyed by, such events—it is that 
information and data directed to the maintenance of the polity has not 
yielded any affective response. Climate change skepticism is increasing, 
and this possibly because the cosmic force of destruction is now push-
ing beyond the political imagination, beyond our capacity to imagine 
ourselves and others like us in a future that will not be an extension of 
the present. Perhaps something other than a discursive politics among 
communicating individuals needs to open up to forces that are not our 
own, to consider the elemental and inhuman, so that it might be possible 
to think what life may be worthy of living on. Such an approach would 
require a thought of the cosmos—of life and its durations—that would 
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be destructive of the polity, that would not return all elements and forces 
into what they mean for ‘us.’
Notes
1.  Brennan (2001) argues that globalism is the economic ground upon which 
cosmopolitanism as a cultural and (putatively) critical phenomenon is based. 
He criticizes writers such as Mignolo (2000) who argue for a disjunction 
between a managerial cosmopolitanism that retraces market forces and an 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism that would be liberated from economic 
imperatives.
2.  Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that the economic conditions of immaterial 
labour in globalism allow for the creation of a commonwealth irreducible to 
any modes of connectivity and affect other than those of humanity’s own self-
constituting striving.
3.  On the nature of intensive versus extensive differences see De Landa 2002.
4. http://www.boosey.com/cr/music/Next-Atlantis/54870
Chapter 6
Time And Autopoiesis: The 
Organism has No Future
There was a critical scene that was narrated frequently in the theory-fren-
zied years of the 1980s, operating as an often-invoked tableau that would 
awaken us from our literalist slumbers. The child faces the mirror, jubi-
lantly rejoicing in the image of his unity :
The jubilant assumption of his secular image by the kind of 
being—still trapped in his motor impotence and nursling 
dependence—the little man is at the infans stage thus seems 
to me to manifest in an exemplary situation the symbolic 
matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, 
prior to being identified in the dialectic of identification with 
the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, 
its function as subject. (Lacan 1977, 76)
This scene captured the predicament of misrecognition: the self is not 
the naturally bounded organism (a thing within the world), but a site of 
desires, relations, drives, fantasies and projections that cannot possess 
the coherence of a body. There is a radical disjunction between the sub-
ject, who is nothing more than an effect of its relation to an other whom 
it cannot read, and the self, ego or individual that we imagine ourselves to 
be. It is the body as bounded organism, centerd on a looking face whose 
gaze can be returned by the mirror, that not only represses the chaoti-
cally dispersed and relational manner of our existence; it also operates 
as a figure of reading. We read other bodies as though they harboured 
a sense or interior meaning that might be disclosed through communi-
cation, and we read texts as though they operated like bodies—as well-
formed wholes possessing a systemic logic, the sense of which might 
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become apparent (Felman 1987). In this respect the Lacanian notion of 
Imaginary meconnaissance—where we live the decenterd and dispersed 
incoherence of the symbolic order as some illusory whole—repeats a 
criticism of the organism that goes back as far (at least) as Husserlian 
phenomenology. For Husserl it was quite natural to regard oneself as a 
thing among things, but that ‘natural attitude’ concealed the true nature 
of the subject: a subject who is not a thing but the condition through 
which things are given (Husserl 1965). Husserl, here, radicalized Kant’s 
distinction between subject and body. For Kant, I know and experience 
myself as a body within the world, but I can only do so only because 
of the transcendental subjectivity that is not itself spatial or temporal. 
Kantian ethics, and the liberal tradition that follows from it, relies on this 
distinction between the natural self, that may be an object of calculation 
and science, and the subject that can neither be known nor predicated. 
In the absence of any knowledge or experience of the subject, selves can 
be given only through the procedures and decisions that they inaugu-
rate. For Husserl, Kant did not go far enough in his distinction between 
subject and body, for it is not only the case that the subject in itself 
cannot be known or experienced as a thing within this world; the sub-
ject is the very origin of the world (Fink 1970). There can be no sense, 
givenness, time or being outside the event of transcendental synthesis. 
Although Heidegger would place more emphasis on Being’s disclosure, 
regarding the subject as a clearing for the event of revealing, he also was 
highly critical of mistaking Dasein (a disclosing relation) for das Man (a 
psycho-physical body) (Heidegger 1996). This, indeed, was Heidegger’s 
criticism of humanism. In a typically Heideggerian manner, Heidegger 
locates a moment of philosophical opacity and forgetting in a transition 
from Greek to Latin, from legein and logos or ‘speaking about’ to logic, 
or some preceding system through which the world would be ordered. 
Since the Roman understanding of humanitas, man has been understood 
as an organism with an additional capacity of reason (Heidegger 1998). 
The problem with humanism, for Heidegger, is not that it defines ‘man’ as 
a special or privileged being, but that it still defines man as a being. Man 
is not a being or thing, and he is certainly not a foundational being that 
would enable us to explain all other beings. A phenomenology of ‘social 
construction’ would, from a Heidegerian point of view at least, not be 
118 Chapter 6
phenomenology at all; for it would merely have placed one more being—
man—as the ground of all other beings, without asking how man him-
self appears. Taking up phenomenology in France, Sartre insisted on the 
radical transcendence of the ego: there is being on the one hand, which 
simply is ‘in itself,’ and then the relation of difference to that being which 
can never (authentically) be experienced or lived other than as nothing-
ness, as the negation of what simply is (Sartre 1957). Bergson, despite 
his difference from phenomenology, also criticized the ways in which the 
efficient intellect would reduce all its complex experiences into stable 
objects; this reifying process was perfectly appropriate for non-living 
beings but a disaster when turned back upon the human knower him-
self who then experienced himself as just one more thing among things 
(Bergson 1931). 
Whereas Husserl, Bergson, Sartre and Heidegger lamented (and 
aimed to correct) a history of philosophy that had mistaken the subject 
who was not a thing for the human body, psychoanalysis acknowledged 
that the condition of misrecognition is irreducible. There is a tendency 
towards ‘organic thinking’ captured in Lacan’s notion of the Imaginary; 
we are Oedipal insofar as we consider ourselves as self-bounded bodies 
lamentably subjected to condition of difference. We imagine a form of 
bodily integrity that has been subjected to some prohibiting system or 
law; what we fail to recognize is that the bounded unity of the body is a 
figural lure that precludes us from recognizing that we are nothing more 
than an ongoing, dispersed and ex-centric condition of speaking being 
that can neither be localized nor experienced beyond law and language. 
(Deleuze and Guattari will not challenge Lacan’s reading of the tendency 
of the human organism towards privatization, or to regarding the world 
of difference and relations as a nightmarish beyond. They will however 
write a genealogy of that lure of the bounded body, arguing that what 
Lacan deems to be transcendental is a historically specific condition of 
the modern speaking ‘subject.’) For Lacan, the yearning to retrieve the 
lost child who was once complete (before its submission to unreadable 
relations) follows from our organic dependence. The child appears to 
himself, in the mirror, as a unified whole—an identity. What that delight-
ful recognition of one’s bodily integrity covers over is the condition of 
subjection: that we speak and are, not through being our own self, but 
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as always situated within a system of symbolic relations of which we are 
only ever effects. These effects are never given as such, but always relayed 
through relations of enigma, misrecognition, anticipation, projection and 
unattainable desire (Butler 1997; Butler 2004; Butler 2005; Laplanche 
1999; Mitchell 1975; Wright 1984). In the beginning is the bodily image 
as lure or alibi that covers over temporal dispersion; from that initial 
imaginary unity we imagine that there must have been some other who 
robbed us of our pure plenitude, unboundedness and connectedness; we 
read this other as holding the key or power to our enjoyment. 
This notion of the subject as formed through relation to an unread-
able other has been reinforced recently by Judith Butler who has placed 
less emphasis on her earlier notion of the self as effected through perfor-
mance of social norms, and has turned instead towards Laplanche and 
his insistence that our ex-trinsic condition of existence is one in which 
we are always placed in a relation of reading an other who is essentially 
unreadable (Butler 2005). The reasons for returning to, while adapting, 
Lacan are manifold. The Lacanian ego is at once formed through body 
image, even though the imagined body does not exhaust the subject’s 
being; subjectivity is always other than itself, always split between the 
speaking/seeing self and the self spoken and viewed. Perhaps the most 
difficult aspect of this intertwining of subject and ego was the emphasis 
Lacan placed on the phallus, the body part that is not a body part. For 
Lacan it is the condition of subjection, prohibition and loss (the con-
dition of speaking through a system that is not one’s own) that creates 
the fantasy that there must once have been, or will be, mastery. There 
must be a phallic power of possession, even if it is one that I as a speak-
ing (subjected) being do not have. Laplanche was explicitly critical of 
Lacan’s centering of the Oedipal predicament on the phallus: yes, we are 
all constituted through a reading of the other, but we do not read that 
other as the one or other who possesses the phallic law, the power of 
castration. This liberation of the imaginary from the phallus would, at 
first glance, be an improvement: why should a body part be privileged 
when we think about the ways in which we fantasize our existence? For 
Laplanche there is a structural truth to the Oedipal complex, for every 
child lives its own world and history as if there had once been an integral 
unity that was then displaced by submission to an other, as though we 
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were once perfectly bounded organisms who underwent subjection to an 
alien order. Whereas Lacan figured alienation in linguistic-phallic terms, 
with the imposition of speech being fantasized as submission to the law 
of the father who holds the phallus, Laplanche’s ‘enigmatic signifier’ was 
not language in the symbolic sense but the look or gesture of the other 
who forces us to read their desire. 
Now it might seem, today, that it is Laplanche’s emphasis on the look 
of the other and each specific body’s relation to the law that might be a 
more fruitful understanding of our body’s relation to language and that 
this would accord, too, with Deleuze and Guattari’s criticism of the tyr-
anny of Oedipus and the ‘despotism’ of the signifier. But this is not so: 
for Deleuze and Guattari write a genealogy and diagnosis of the Oedipus 
complex and the privileging of the phallus. The virtue of the Lacanian 
critique is its ideality and inhumanity: before there is a human-human 
look or relation, something like the human organism has to be formed 
as an image. The body and its organs are historical and political phenom-
ena. The modern man of capital does indeed live the relation among his 
body parts as Oedipalized: he is the man of speech who must articulate 
his desires through language as a symbolic order, and who will also live 
in fear of the loss of that order. In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari 
maintain the importance of the virtual body part (Deleuze and Guattari 
1977). The body has been increasingly ‘privatized:’ no longer living its 
forces collectively or intensively. Instead of the phallus being a collective 
totem, capable of generating the powerful spectacle of a tribal body mov-
ing in rhythmic pulsations, ears all responding to the beating tempo, eyes 
all feeling the intensity of the common spectacle, flinching as knife meets 
skin in rituals of castration, the body has become folded in on itself. 
Modern man is a speaking animal, subject to no law other than that of 
articulating his desires in speech. The organs are now private: the eyes 
that look out on a world as so much calculable matter to be mastered by 
the hand that will labour to transform the world into exchangeable com-
modities. This privatization of the organs means that desire can only be 
experienced as secret and personal, lost in its passage through collective 
speech, and never capable of reaching that full masterful voice of the 
phallic master.
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Thinking about Deleuze’s philosophy in relation to the body requires 
stepping back from a too easy dismissal of Lacan and the virtual body 
part. A social machine occurs when flows of desire are given relative sta-
bility: all the dancing bodies of the tribe gazing wondrously on the phal-
lic symbol that allows for the creation of a territory. Body parts are always 
virtual before they are actual; the organized organism—where the eyes 
sees the same world heard by the ear and narrated by the voice—is the 
result of a history of co-ordinations and stabilized relations. Lacan was 
aware that the gaze of the infant was never a virgin glance: to look at a 
world of speaking subjects was to take on the history of the organism. For 
Deleuze and Guattari politics could only begin with this organized and 
Oedipal body, a body centered on the speaking voice submitted to the 
law of the signifier, always articulating a desire for a mastery and phallic 
dominance that is possessed by no-one. 
Only if one acknowledges the crucial role of the body in politics can 
one begin to think the body without organs. In this respect if one thinks 
of the body as, say, gendered, then one buys into the phallic order. If we 
see bodies as receiving their identity through the imposition of social 
norms, then we assume a body as a whole that is then given identity and 
selfhood through normativity. Deleuze and Guattari take up the Lacanian 
challenge and ask how this dispersed collection of organs—the eye, ear, 
voice, brain, skin—comes to be organized as a speaking animal. Should 
we not ask how bodies that once existed through collectively intense 
organs—all eyes gazing on the cut into flesh, all ears feeling the stamping 
of feet, all voices screaming with the cry of a totem animal—became this 
point in space submitted to the laws of normativity? This means stepping 
back from the body to think the composition of organic powers, powers 
of organs rather than parts of the organism. Is not this what philosophy 
aims to do: to free the brain from the sensory motor apparatus of survival 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994)? And is this not what visual arts aim to do: 
freeing the eye from reading, coding and recognition (Deleuze 2004)? 
Let us pause, then, and look back to the theorizations of ‘the body’ that 
reinforce our sense, today, that we have overcome 80s textualism and the-
ory and no longer assume the primacy of language. Judith Butler’s Bodies 
That Matter of 1993, Elizabeth Grosz’s Volatile Bodies in 1994 and then 
a series of ‘body’ readers and critical guides were not simple returns to 
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the organism before language, so much as a recognition that the linguis-
tic paradigm itself entailed at least some minimal image of embodiment. 
To say that the ‘I’ is an effect of language, an effect of the act or perfor-
mance of speech, implies that one will at least imagine or construct some 
image or figure of the speaking body. Even if the subject is deemed to be 
effected through language, language can still create a body as constructed 
through a series of norms and figures. It was the status of the body as 
image that perhaps allowed for a confidence that one was no longer deal-
ing with a literal pre-critical body; one could write about embodiment 
without appearing to be a vulgar materialist. Both in feminist criticism, 
and beyond, the body was primarily a literary and rhetorical problem. 
Although a great deal of literary and cultural criticism turned to ‘the 
body,’ this was always a consideration of how the body had been writ-
ten, figured, problematized or constructed through various discourses 
(Kirby 1997; Wilson 1998). Even fiction (such as Jeanette Winterson’s 
Written on the Body of 1993) responded to this trend of coupling writ-
ing and the body: to write or speak is to imagine oneself as a subject, but 
that imagined subject is always embodied, and the body is always con-
stituted through tropes. (This idea of the body as being a ‘lived schema’ 
through which the world is mediated is sustained today across a range 
of disciplines including neuropsychology, linguistics and political theory 
[Gallagher 2005; Gibbs 2006]).
However, it was just this sophisticated post-Butler attitude of thinking 
of the body as other than representation and yet constituted through repre-
sentation that precluded one from really thinking what the body might 
do. Butler published Bodies That Matter at least partly in response to the 
putative linguisticism of Gender Trouble. If we accept the argument of the 
massively influential Gender Trouble that the ‘sex’ that would supposedly 
be represented, mediated or imagined through cultural figures of gender 
is actually always figured as other than gender, then we also acknowledge 
that any appeal to ‘the’ body is a negative critical manoeuvre against 
received images and figures but is enabled only in its distance and differ-
ence from those figures. The body that matters, then, is not some brute 
‘in itself ’ that would precede cultural imagination, with cultural imagina-
tion in turn being some system that adds itself to a passive matter; for 
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matter is just that which appears in the splitting of a seemingly prior 
‘before’ from a no less illusory after: 
To ‘concede’ the undeniability of ‘sex’ or its ‘materiality’ is 
always to concede some version of ‘sex,’ some formation of 
‘materiality.’ Is the discourse in and through which that con-
cession occurs—and, yes, that concession invariably does 
occur—not itself formative of the very phenomenon that 
it concedes? 
[…] to refer naively or directly to such an extra-discursive 
object will always require the prior delimitation of the extra-
discursive. (Butler 1993, 10-11)
There ‘is’ no matter as such, no body as such, only a body that matters—
a body known only insofar as it is recognized—and only a matter that is 
given as there for this body in its potentiality. Matter is given only as lost, 
as having been there for the work of culture and speech. Temporality is 
at once that which gives matter; for matter is that which must have been. 
At the same time, temporality is that which is the other of matter: we live 
and endure as the same bodies through time only in the re-iteration of 
an identity; this iteration that produces the subject as the same through 
time is also that which, through failure, can disturb and disrupt identity. 
There is always, in the subjection to identity, that which remains other 
than the normative matrix that recognizes identity. Matter in itself would 
be imagined, mourned or figured as that strange non-identity beyond all 
relations of inside and outside, before and after. 
Grosz’s Volatile Bodies was avowedly less linguistically or—if we are not 
to have a narrow view of language—less performatively oriented. Butler 
took up the notion of the performative as the linguistic act that consti-
tutes its referent. But this is an act that is not grounded upon a static 
body: quoting Nietzsche, Butler insists that there is ‘no doer behind the 
deed.’ One should not imagine that there are speaking subjects who then 
come to make statements about material bodies. On the contrary, there 
is the act or event of speaking from which one is effected as a subject 
who speaks. The performative is an act that relies on and maintains rela-
tions among bodies, granting and sustaining each body in its force. I can 
be a body that matters, a body who matters, only if ‘I’ act in such a way 
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that something like an ‘I’ can be recognized. For Grosz, in contrast with 
Butler and a series of other approaches to embodiment that were even 
more constructivist than Butler’s careful negotiation of performance, the 
body was not achieved through the act of performance, even if that act 
was taken to be that which effected the ‘I,’ rather than being the act of 
some ‘I.’ Nor was Grosz simply turning back to the motility of the phe-
nomenological ‘lived’ body. (Recently there has been a widespread return 
and resurgence of interest in the lived body of phenomenology against 
the theories of language and cognition that paid too little attention to 
the organism’s relation to the world. Such a return is premised upon cor-
recting a supposedly disembodied subject that underpins Western rea-
son and cognition [Thompson 2007]. Grosz’s corporeality is neither the 
lived nor the constructed body; in fact, her body is closer to something 
like an inhuman embodiment that gives itself through humans, but is also 
expressed in animal bodies, and the bodies of things.) Recognizing that 
the very notion of the act, force, performance or utterance would require 
some minimal relation, Grosz’s volatile bodies were poised membranes 
or borders, ongoing productions of an interior in relation to an exterior. 
Drawing on (but also surpassing) the lived body of phenomenology—
insisting that one could only act or orient oneself in a world if there were 
some space that would always be the space for this body with its poten-
tialities—Grosz also noted that this underlying lived body that enabled 
spatiality would in turn have its prior and not necessarily bodily (and 
certainly not organic) conditions. These conditions were explained by 
Grosz through the frequently used example of a moebius band: the rela-
tion between interior and exterior, the establishment of a bounded body 
from which potentiality and motility might be thought, could not be 
taken for granted and was itself effected from a whole series of relations. 
The most important relation, both for Grosz at this stage and for 
many writers working on embodiment, was the image. It is with the look 
towards another bounded body, taken as the sign of an impossible inte-
rior, that I might also live my own skin and physique as similarly blessed 
with its interiority. To live my physical being and its potentialities both 
as mine, and as the ongoing subject of action, requires the experience of 
interior and exterior, the production of a bordered limit that would also 
be vulnerable to infraction and traumatic intrusion. What it means to be 
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a self has therefore always been intertwined with what it means to be a 
body, and both these terms—self and body—have, in turn, been defined 
through a capacity of trauma, where trauma is imagined as the rupture of 
a border. What I want to do in the pages that follow is consider a series 
of possibilities: is it possible to think beyond that image of the bounded 
body? Such a possibility would be salutary today precisely because all 
those seeming gains in theoretical maturity that were won by posing the 
question of the body after the linguistic turn appear to be threatened, 
and threatened precisely because we can only imagine threat, trauma and 
non-life as other than the bounded body. That is, once it was accepted 
that bodies were not passive matters to be inscribed by culture, it was 
also acknowledged that the body’s borders were the result of relations, 
encounters and—as Grosz so aptly demonstrated—morphologies: one 
can be a bounded body only with a sense, figure or image of one’s limits. 
But this raises a problem: is life necessarily bounded and embodied life, a 
body of inside and outside? If we accept systems theory, body theory and 
the once-dominant idea of the self as constituted in relation to an other, 
then the answer is ‘yes.’ 
There are, though, other forms of life beyond that of the organism, 
and beyond that of the autonomous living being. (Such a consideration 
can be read in Grosz’s more recent work on Darwin concerning itself 
with a force of sexual selection that cannot be grounded in a body’s or 
gene’s survival: although sexual selection has a visual field and power 
as its milieu, it is no longer a visuality of the bounded image of recogni-
tion [Grosz 2011].) The departure from the lived body would need to 
be at least twofold, considering life beyond bodies and bodies beyond 
life. First, one might question the decision to consider viruses as other 
than life, a decision that is based on the virus as parasitic and non-self-
maintaining (Ansell-Pearson 1997). Second, one might question the 
exclusion of techne from life: if one were to distinguish between life and 
techne, then a living organism would be bounded and self-maintaining 
and distinct from various inorganic or created supplements. But life pres-
ents us with a series of movements and mutations, such as computer 
viruses, technical evolutionary imperatives and the ways in which organs 
develop in response to machines that behove us to consider the imbrica-
tion of bodies and technology. Third, one might ask whether it is fruitful 
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at this point in human history to consider life primarily from the point of 
view of the organism: are we not being forced to encounter the ruptures 
of organic timelines as we become aware of the depletion of the cosmos 
and the decay of our milieu, even if such erosions are never experienced 
or lived as localisable events?
Before moving on I would like to look back at the classic meditation 
on the image of the bounded body, Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
where Freud posits that pleasure—the maintenance of a constant energy 
or equilibrium—may have some ‘beyond’ that would take the form of a 
dissipation of all energy (Freud 1975). The first principle of equilibrium 
and pleasure is still recognisable today in a series of post-Freudian obser-
vations regarding an organism’s relation to life. A completely closed body 
that had no world would be deprived of the means of ongoing life; an 
absolutely open body without borders would not be a body at all, would 
have no ongoing identity. What is required then is a border or membrane 
that enables communion with an outside, but an outside that is always an 
outside for this bounded body, and that is managed so as to produce only 
the alteration or perturbation required for ongoing self-maintenance. 
The now widely cited and philosophically consecrated systems theory 
of Maturana and Varela (1987) deploys a series of terms to describe 
this necessity: coupling (where a body’s autonomous or self-maintaining 
movements are established in relation to outside variables); autopoeisis 
(where the body does not interact mechanically with its outside but does 
so in a way to maintain its own balance and sameness); relative closure 
(so that a body at once maintains itself but also adapts to changing exter-
nal perturbations); and meaning (for the outside of a body is always its 
own outside or world, experienced or lived in terms of a range of possible 
responses rather than an objective representation). 
The ideal body must therefore balance two contrary requirements: 
completeness and self-sufficiency. A body detached from all that was 
other than itself would be hopelessly incomplete, divorced from the 
means of its own sustainability. A body must complete itself in order to 
maintain itself; it must not remain as some detached fragment but must 
be united or coupled with a world, open to what is not merely itself. (This 
requirement, as described by Freud, exposed the organism to contingency 
and the risk of loss and could lead to a destructive attack on the desired 
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object to which the organism is subjected [Freud 1961]. The erotic drive 
to connection and completion, depicted by Freud’s as two halves of a 
body seeking to be re-united, harboured an aggressive potential [Freud 
1975]. The organism desires a plenitude or non-separation that requires 
it to go beyond itself, abandoning its original and mythic self-enclosure 
of primary narcissism; but it is just this overcoming of the violent self-
containment of original closure that may in turn lead to a destructive 
drive to destroy the object that lures the organism from its quiescence. 
That destruction could even be turned back upon the self, after losing the 
object, if mourning is not completed in a life-serving manner). 
Many writing after Freud have not regarded the organism’s condition 
of coupling as anything other than benign, insisting on the originally 
world-oriented, meaning-making and other-directed dynamics of bodily 
life. The very logic of today’s insistence on the ‘embodied mind,’ the 
‘extended mind,’ the ‘synaptic self,’ the ‘global brain’ and even the ‘mind 
in life’ blithely sail over the deep and essential contradiction of the liv-
ing body (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991; LeDoux 2002; Bloom 
2000; Clark 2008). All the criticisms of the detached and disembodied 
Cartesian subject that insist upon the self ’s primary and dynamic con-
nectedness ignore what Freud and Lacan recognized as the imaginary 
lure of the body: for all the self ’s world-orientation and openness there 
is also a primary blindness and enclosure that is necessary for the very 
experience of oneself as embodied, bounded and located in a milieu. As 
alive the body must be oriented or related to what is not itself, must desire 
a completion. However, because such completion is always sought on the 
organism’s own terms, always for the sake of the organism, a body is nec-
essarily blind to those forces that lie beyond its range. The very desire for 
completeness that drives the organism to couple with its world will also 
preclude it from seeing the world in any terms other than its own. 
Whereas philosophers have happily celebrated this necessity of the 
world always being meaningful, or the world always being a world for 
me, we might suggest that such blissful enclosure in meaning precludes 
the very striving for completeness it is supposed to serve. The desire for 
completeness comes into conflict with self-sufficiency or the desire not 
to be exposed to contingency, risk or an influx of otherness so great that 
it would destroy all border and limit (and this would count as trauma). 
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One might say then that pleasure—today’s celebrated processes of equi-
librium, homeostasis and autopoeisis, or processes deemed to be synon-
ymous with the life of the organism—are necessarily destructive of life 
that cannot be experienced in terms of the bounded body. Freud’s sec-
ond principle of a ‘beyond’ to pleasure or self-maintenance would not 
be in opposition to life; it would not simply be the death of the organ-
ism. Nor would it be a force regarded as traumatic, as that which is ini-
tially unassimilable but that could, through working and representation, 
be brought to coherence and sense. A genuine beyond of pleasure and a 
genuine beyond of the organism and its closed world of meaning would 
also be beyond trauma, for it could not be regarded as an infraction of the 
body from outside. This is precisely why Deleuze and Guattari suggest 
that one moves beyond death as a model—death as defined in relation to 
the bounded organism—to the experience of death. 
The experience of death is the most common of occurrences 
in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for 
life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as pas-
sage or becoming. It is in the very nature of every intensity to 
invest within itself the zero intensity starting from which it is 
produced, in one moment, as that which grows or diminishes 
according to an infinity of degrees … insofar as death is what 
is felt in every feeling, what never ceases and never finishes 
happening in every becoming—in the becoming-another-sex, 
the becoming-god, the becoming-a-race, etc., forming zones 
of intensity on the body without organs. Every intensity con-
trols within its own life the experience of death and envelops 
it. (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, 330)
Such an experience would shatter the bounded body, and occur not as 
the body’s other or limit but as a pure predicate, potentiality or inten-
sity taken away from the coordinates of the organism. If we do not begin 
the question of life from the point of view of the bounded organism and 
its world, then we are compelled to think life beyond the opposition 
between pleasure and trauma, between boundary and infraction. Instead, 
one would note a necessarily self-destroying or suicidal trajectory imma-
nent in life. Is this not what timelines of the inhuman now compel us to 
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note, if not comprehend? A species can only survive by mutation and by 
not being itself; any species also—through that very survival—takes a 
toll on its milieu that might lead (as in the case of man) to the destruction 
of life in general. How could one define this dissolution as tragic or trau-
matic or, more simply, undesirable if one were not to assume already the 
primacy of bounded self-maintaining life? 
This raises two questions for the future of this body we recognize as 
human, a body that is facing—today—two possible traumas. Has this 
body so oriented itself to its own sustainability—seeing the world clearly 
only in terms of its own perturbation—that it has no sense of the distinct 
perceptions and souls that are destroying it from within, and no percep-
tion of the folds and series that are traumatizing the milieu itself? Is it 
possible to speak of, or object to, the dissolution of the organism that we 
know as human?
How might we use these two notions of life—one that is bounded, 
embodied and open to trauma, and another that is post-traumatic—to 
assess what we mean by theory and thinking today? I would suggest 
that a certain notion of the theoretical, where theory is the look that we 
direct to our own acts of perception, has always been intertwined with 
a vital and normative account of life, and that it would be worthwhile 
to consider a theory that might entertain a thought of viral or radically 
malevolent life. In order to pursue this counter-possibility of a life that 
is not defined in relation to trauma, I want to conclude by looking at the 
ways in which a certain image of the body has underpinned theory and 
its temporality.
Consider a certain diagnosis of disembodied life that is dominant, pos-
sibly necessary, in contemporary thought. In a series of disciplines, rang-
ing from neuroscience, cognitive science, philosophy, evolutionary psy-
chology, sociology, future studies and cultural studies, it is now common 
to begin with the criticism of the Cartesian intellect. (The historical the-
sis is that there was, once upon a time, a unified human existence, where 
the self was defined socially and collectively, and where nature was not 
yet disenchanted or seen to be brute matter opposed to mind.) Various 
disciplines have taken up distinct criticisms of the Cartesian concept of 
‘mind.’ I will take these criticisms in turn, and look at the ways in which 
a certain idea and ideal of the body-as-organism is posited as the remedy 
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for the fall into the abstractions of Cartesian intellectualism. In contrast 
with a disembodied mind, and a matter deemed to be passive, mindless, 
inert and without relation, theories of living systems have sought to see 
any supposedly distinct beings as emerging from relations. The words 
‘autopoiesis,’ along with ‘homeostasis’ and ‘equilibrium,’ operate across 
all these disciplines with their inter-related diagnoses of the present iner-
tia of thinking life. 
First, neuroscience: this mode of enquiry has benefited greatly from 
the decade of the brain declared by President Bush in 1990, and from 
the accompanying technological developments enabling new means of 
imaging. Although neuroscience is a diverse field, its very potentiality 
is marked by a single critical shift; the neuroscientist is not concerned 
with finding the ‘bit’ of the brain responsible for a certain thought or 
idea, but can now look at systems of relations. A perception does not 
occur in some simple one-to-one correspondence between object in 
the world and picture in the brain, but through complex and distributed 
patterns of relation. We respond to the world, not as blank slates being 
imprinted with data, but as dynamic and self-regulating systems. Life 
strives to maintain itself, and does so not by ‘picturing’ an outside world, 
but through an ongoing, interactive, and non-linear system of responses 
and adjustments. The non-linearity is crucial, even in the most simple of 
perceptions. There is not a self who captures the image of an object, but 
a body orienting itself toward (and anticipating) the world that is always 
given in a certain way. This dynamic engagement will enable the synthe-
sis and relation to data, which in turn produces certain bodily relations, 
and these in turn allow further interaction with the world. If we want to 
understand thinking, according to Antonio Damasio, then we should not 
begin with cognition or representation—some mind housed in a body—
but begin with the body as a self-regulating system, a system that does all 
it can to maintain its own state of equilibrium, and that will ultimately 
experience any bodily emotions or ongoing adjustments as ‘the feeling of 
what happens.’ More importantly, that process of interaction can only be 
between organism and world if there is some boundary that distinguishes 
between surviving life and milieu:
the urge to stay alive is not a modern development. It is not 
a property of humans alone. In some fashion or other, from 
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simple to complex, most living organisms exhibit it. What 
does vary is the degree to which organisms know about 
that urge. Few do. But the urge is still there whether organ-
isms know of it or not. Thanks to consciousness, humans are 
keenly aware of it.
 Life is carried out inside a boundary that defines a body. Life 
and the life urge exist inside a boundary, the selectively per-
meable wall that separates the internal environment from 
the external environment. The idea of the organism revolves 
around the existence of that boundary. (Damasio 137)
What we must remove is ‘Descartes’s error,’ or the idea of mind as 
something distinct from life, for life just is an ongoing dynamic process of 
response, interaction, adjustment, orientation and—most importantly—
sense. There is no possibility of a brute event, a body encountering a force 
that is not always already meaningful. 
This insistence on meaning need not be an anthropomorphic notion. 
And to see this we can turn to the broader and highly influential theory of 
life as necessarily autopoetic, particularly as adopted by the cognitive sci-
ence of Maturana and Varela. One of the crucial features of Maturana and 
Varela’s work is their definition of life that requires some form of bound-
ary or membrane. Their definition allows, then, for autopoesis and mean-
ing. Life is autopoetic because a living being maintains its own internal 
relations; a living system must be able—through interaction with its 
milieu—to sustain itself. Living systems are coupled to environments 
that are always defined as being what they are for that specific system; and 
this is how autopoiesis is tied to meaning. The environment of an organ-
ism is constituted in terms of that body’s possible responses: 
This basic uniformity of organization can best be expressed by 
saying: all that is accessible to the nervous system at any point 
are states of relative activity holding between nerve cells, and 
all that to which any given state of relative activity can give 
rise are further states of relative activity in other nerve cells 
by forming those states of relative activity to which they 
respond. (Maturana and Varela 1980, 22)
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Further, life—unlike other living systems—has a certain self-produc-
tivity that is crucially defined in relation to that system’s border. If a cell 
can live on, and even reproduce, simply by existing in its milieu then we 
can call that cell a living system. Its living-on requires no intervention 
of any process or force other than relation to milieu. A clear contrast, of 
course, would be a machine or mechanism; a typewriter can produce text 
if connected to a human body, an ink ribbon and paper, but a typewriter 
placed in its milieu—sitting on a desk among papers—does nothing 
more than decay through time (even if that decay is considerably slow). 
Maturana and Varela, tellingly, draw upon the philosophical tradition 
of phenomenology and its criticism of Cartesian notions of disengaged 
mind. As long as we define mind as a closed being that may or may not 
encounter some external world, and as long as we see that world as being 
encountered through knowledge, or perception as a mode of ‘picturing,’ 
then we will never understand the life of thought. 
This brings us to the next discipline that draws on notions of distrib-
uted and embodied cognition, linear systems and self-production: artifi-
cial intelligence. There had been a criticism, early in the rapprochement 
between philosophy and artificial intelligence, that had insisted that—fol-
lowing Heidegger—it was the very embodied, active, worldly and practi-
cal nature of thinking life that precluded anything like an ‘intelligence’ 
that might be replicated in a computer (Dreyfus, Dreyfus and Athanasiou 
1986). But those very Heideggerian insights regarding the necessarily 
embodied and temporally complex nature of thinking have now enabled 
new developments in artificial intelligence. If we want to create thinking 
we should abandon the Cartesian model of an information center that 
would direct parts of a body-machine; instead we should begin with the 
response. In the beginning is the action in relation to an environment, 
and this action always occurs in an ongoing process of adjustments and 
responses. Creating a robot could be successful, not by building an infor-
mation-loaded brain-like center, but by creating parts that were capable 
of adjusting and allowing feedback responses with an encountered envi-
ronment. At the simplest level, for example, we would have more success 
in creating a walking machine if we were to begin with leg-like parts that 
could roll and re-balance in response to surfaces. This in turn might tell 
us something about human embodied cognition; we are not computing 
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or representing minds who happen to be placed in bodies that then have 
to encounter some world. On the contrary, we are originally responsive 
and action-oriented and also—more importantly—naturally prosthetic, 
taking whatever we can from the world as an extension of our already 
world-oriented and can-do openness to life: 
The old puzzle, the mind-body problem, really involves a hid-
den third party. It is the mind-body-scaffolding problem. It is 
the problem of understanding how human thought and rea-
son is born out of looping interactions with material brains, 
material bodies and complex cultural and technological envi-
ronments. We create these supportive environments but they 
create us too. We exist as the thinking beings we are, only 
thanks to a baffling dance of brains, bodies, and cultural and 
technological scaffolding (Clark 2003, 10)
We therefore need to rid ourselves of the idea of a mind that would be 
pure and would then use its body or supplement its body with alien mate-
rials. For matter, like the body, is always already familiar, already poten-
tially available for the extension of our being as we make our way through 
life. In the ongoing striving to maintain ourselves all that we encounter 
may be incorporated, taken up as part of our ever-extending and con-
stantly relational being:
Autopoiesis in the physical space is necessary and sufficient 
to characterize a system as a living system. Reproduction and 
evolution as they occur in the known living systems, and all 
the phenomena derived from them, arise as secondary pro-
cesses subordinated to heir existence and operation as auto-
poietic unities. Hence, the biological phenomenology is the 
phenomenology of autopoietic systems in the physical space, 
and a phenomenon is a biological phenomenon only to the 
extent that it depends in one way or another on the autopoei-
sis of one or more physical autopoietic unities. (Maturana 
and Varela 1980, 113)
Evolutionary psychology has also, in a number of different projects, 
taken its inquiry into the emergence of mind away from attention to 
cognition, grammar and formal systems, and instead considered bodies 
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in relations that are always already affective, sensually attuned, emotion-
ally responsive and autopoetic or homeostatic (on an individual and on 
a ‘social’ level). Steven Mithen has argued that before we have language 
as some system for conveying information, or before we have a grammar 
that would synthesize and organize a perceived world, there is an origi-
nally and communally-affective enjoyment of sound, that both gives each 
body a sense of its self in relation, and produces the social system of con-
stitutive relations (Mithen 2006). Robin Dunbar has argued for the orig-
inality of gossip (Dunbar 1996). Against the idea that language begins as 
one body relaying content to another, Dunbar suggests that sound begins 
as a purely relational and communal phenomenon, allowing bodies to 
exist in community, through the feeling of sound and responsiveness.
These developments in the sciences and social sciences have led to the 
emergence of a narrative regarding theory and the time of theory. There 
was a time when, suffering from the disease of intellectualism or mind-
centered (or simply centered) approaches, we examined social systems in 
terms of conscious agents. In so doing we adopted linear notions of cau-
sality, rather than looking at the complex, dynamic, interactive and mate-
rially distributed systems that contribute to any event (De Landa 2006). 
We also, no less disastrously, suffered from the linguistic paradigm, where 
‘a’ system was seen as the ground through which we might interpret the 
world, when in fact the world is a dynamic network of interacting, affec-
tively-attuned, responsive and self-maintaining bodies. Often this diag-
nosis of our misguided commitment to Cartesian notions of disembod-
ied mind has been coupled with a moral program for cultural reinvention. 
Recent work in philosophy has suggested that if we turn to non-Western 
understandings of ‘mindfulness,’ where selves are not command centers 
but properly attuned to the world, existing as nothing more than a series 
of ongoing adjustments and mutual encounters, then we will be able to 
think more ecologically, less instrumentally and—most importantly—
with far greater managerial success (Flanagan 2007).
The three concepts of autopoeisis, equilibrium and homeostasis func-
tion in all these domains, of neuroscience, cognitive science, philosophy 
of mind, social theory and future studies. These concepts all presuppose 
a certain understanding of time, and indicate that the organism has no 
future. The world of the organism is always the organism’s own, unfolded 
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from its own responses and potentialities; any properly futural future 
would be a break with the self-constitution of the organism’s always 
immanent time, and yet all theories of relational organic life posit that 
without some departure from its sphere of ownnness the organism 
would have no life. In itself, or if it remains in itself, the organism has no 
future. There can only be a time to come if we open out from our embod-
ied, relational, world-attuned being. The world within which we are 
situated—if we accept that ‘we’ are nothing other than the situated and 
responsive beings that we are—is always a world encountered in terms 
of possible responses. We exist in meaningful milieus. Our condition as 
embodied, as relating to the world as the beings that we are, is that the 
world is given as this world for us. To a certain extent, then, we are proto-
ecological, originally attuned to our milieu. If we have a future, so it is 
argued, it cannot be one of calculation, instrumental reason and the mere 
continuance or ourselves in isolation. Our future could occur only if we 
remind ourselves of embodiment, if we recall what we really are and once 
again live our attunement to our milieu not as accidental but as intrinsic 
to our very being. 
But there is another sense in which the organism has no future, and 
it is here that I want to turn back to the exclusion of non-bounded life 
from the definition of life in general. As long as we think of life as auto-
poietic, as that which strives to maintain itself, and as that which is neces-
sarily attuned to a milieu, we will regard disembodied life as that which 
ought not to have occurred, or as a simple error: a certain living being—
man—mistook himself for mind, but can always correct that error and 
recognize himself as properly embodied. In defining Cartesian ‘mind’ as 
nothing more than a falsehood we will fail to account for its force, its per-
sistence and the possible futures it presents to the organism that can only 
have a world of its own. Consider what needs to be excluded as long as 
we insist on life as that which is defined by self-maintenance: the virus, 
malevolent thinking, and inhuman futures. I want to conclude by plac-
ing these three excluded lives in contrast with three too-frequently cited 
normative bodies: the child, the Buddhist and the animal. In the current 
literature the Cartesian horror of the disembodied intellect—that is, the 
power of thinking that would not already be attuned to the world, that 
would not be affectively-oriented via a permeable border—is frequently 
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cured by reference to animal, infant or non-Western life. The animal is 
nothing more than orientation or potential action for the sake of ongo-
ing life, not yet burdened by the life-stultifying questions of the intellect. 
Animals also provide the norm for an originally affective and praxis-ori-
ented language; birds and monkeys use sounds as ways of creating bonds 
or affective relations, not as the representation of some idea in general. 
The same applies to infants, whose perceptions are originally less cogni-
tive than affective—seeing the world in terms of what enhances or harms 
the self, and experiencing sound as a sonorous caress (not as the vehicle 
of information). Finally, the Buddhist: if we suffer in the West from cen-
tered, disembodied, linear and instrumental notions of mind, then we 
would do well to pay attention to the eastern tradition of mindfulness. 
Stephen Mithen has appealed to both infants and animals as indicating 
an origin of speech in non-semantic but embodied-relational modes 
of sound, while a series of texts on mindfulness, including the work of 
Owen Flanagan, has criticized Western instrumental consciousness and 
appealed to the more attuned modes of Buddhist awareness (Mithen 
2006; Flanagan 2007).
As I have already suggested, these ideals of a body that is at once iden-
tifiable through time yet also nothing other than its ongoing attuned 
responses must exclude other lines of life and time that are defined less 
through the maintenance of a border in relation, and more in a form of 
rampant and unbounded mutation. A virus cannot be defined as a form 
of life on the Maturana and Varela model; its lack of a border or mem-
brane means that it cannot be considered in relation to its milieu. It does 
not maintain itself, and is not a living system precisely because it is only 
in its parasitic capacity to open other life forms to variations that would 
not be definitive of an autopoetic relation. What might the future or tem-
porality of viral life be? It could not suffer trauma, could not be subject to 
an excess of influx that would destroy its living balance precisely because 
a virus is nothing other than a process of invasion, influx and (to a great 
extent) non-relation. A virus does not have a world: it is not defined 
according to its potential responses that would enable its ongoing being. 
In one respect then, it is only viral life that has a future: both in the sense 
of being able to live on (or more accurately mutate beyond itself) with-
out its own world, and in the sense that ‘our’ future, our world in all its 
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bounded and delicate attunement, is not really a future so much as the 
maintenance of the same through the constant warding off of a future 
that would be other than our own. 
This brings me to the next non-bounded life, malevolence. If we are 
autopoeietic, embodied, attuned, responsive, dynamic and system-
dependent beings, how is it that we have acted in such a way that we have 
created a future that will no longer be a milieu for the organisms that we 
are? If humans are so organically attached to a world that is itself a liv-
ing self-maintaining and organic whole, how did the destruction of this 
symbiotic domain of life take hold? Can we say that the Cartesian figure 
of disembodied life as really a mistake, or is it not a more accurate picture 
of ‘man’ in the anthropocene era? This, I think, suggests that we need to 
consider the future that this non-organic, non-relational, rigidly disem-
bodied life has allowed to occur. If life in its bounded form is relational, 
mindful, attuned, responsive and dynamic (and if this life has no future 
that is not always already its own) then what of the life that did not act to 
maintain itself, that did not respond to its milieu, that did not live with 
the sense of its trauma-sensitive membrane? As long as we fail to con-
sider this life we fail to address the future. In recent attempts to deal with 
our future, and the malevolent damage or willful destruction we have 
enacted upon ourselves, it is often implied that once we recognize our 
truly relational and embodied condition we will indeed have a future. If 
we could only see that we are not Cartesian minds contingently placed in 
a world that is of no concern to us, then we will recognize our originally 
ecological condition and once again live with a sense of the world (where 
sense is mindful orientation). 
One concrete example of an ethic of the future, based on a recogni-
tion of our proper embodiment, is the turn to mindfulness. From phi-
losophy to business management, it is argued that if we recall to ourselves 
our intrinsically embodied and in-the-world being, then we will act with 
respect and care (rather than destructive dominance) to what is not 
the self (but yet is always already constitutive of the self). Do we not, 
with this faith in the malleability, adaptability and possible future of this 
human body that could overcome its Western violence and rigidity, sim-
ply repress and belie that other viral tendency in life? That other tendency 
would not be self-maintaining and autopoetically relational, but blindly 
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active and mutational. What any ethic of mindful responsiveness must 
do is dismiss as non-existent, or non-living, those forces of viral malevo-
lence which have, until now, quite happily proceeded to make their way 
through the world without a thought of sustainability, and without a 
sense of the human as necessarily relational, embodied and affectively 
sensitive. How might we act if we acknowledged or even entertained 
the possibility of this viral and malevolent life, and if we considered the 
human not as a body coupled to a milieu, but as a series of potentialities 
that could branch out into territories beyond its own self-maintenance. 
How would we act if we recognized that insofar as the organism’s future 
is always the organism’s own then the organism has no future? Its time will 
always be determined in advance as the time of its own relations; and 
without the recognition of that other life that destroys such relations the 
organism’s time will come to an end. 
A molecular or viral politics that did not assume the benevolence or 
trauma-resisting membranes of a self-defining body would have the fol-
lowing features. First, an attention to mindlessness: how do unbounded, 
non-self-maintaining processes—processes with no sense of relation—
create a political territory that is not that of the polis or mutually recog-
nizing bodies? And how do those bodies that we are, with only a sense 
of processes in relation to our own living systems—resist all recognition 
and interaction with the mindless? Why do we not have the strength or 
force to think of a world that is not our milieu? Second, a politics of viral 
futures: if we accept life-potentials that are not self-maintaining but that 
operate as nothing more than mutant encounters, then we move beyond 
a politics of negotiation among bodies to a politics devoid of survival. Perhaps 
it is only in our abandonment of ownness, meaning, mindfulness and 
the world of the body that life, for whatever it is worth, has a chance. This, 
indeed, is the direction offered by Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
thought: a capacity to take intuition beyond the organism’s own dura-
tion to imagine qualities as such, a desire to overcome the brain of the 
organized body and approach thought as such opening to the eternal, 
and a relation between art and philosophy that does not assimilate sensa-
tion (the sensible) to what can be thought (the sensed) but approaches 
their warring disjunction (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). Finally, the move 
beyond ‘man’ as isolated thinker will not be back towards the body, but 
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forward to the ‘superman’—to the inorganic potentialities that exist now 
only in confused and all too human composites (Deleuze 1988B).
Chapter 7
Face Race
Defacing and Facing Humanity
The human race is facing extinction. One might even say that there is a 
race towards extinction, precisely because humanity has constituted 
itself as a race. The idea of a single species, manifestly different but ulti-
mately grounded on a single human race of right and reason, has enabled 
human exceptionalism, and this (in turn) has precluded any questioning 
of humanity’s right to life. In actuality humanity is not a race; it becomes 
a racial unity only via the virtual, or what Deleuze and Guattari describe 
as a process of territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritori-
alization. In the beginning is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the 
‘intense germinal influx,’ from which individuated bodies (both organic 
and social) emerge. Race or racism are not the results of discrimination; 
on the contrary, it is only by repressing the highly complex differential 
forces and fields that compose any being that something like the notion 
of ‘a’ race can occur. This is why Deleuze and Guattari argue for a highly 
intimate relation between sex and race: all life is sexual, for living bod-
ies are composed of relations among differential powers that produce 
new events; encounters of potentialities intertwine to form stabilities. 
Such encounters are desiring or sexual because they occur among differ-
ent forces that create new and dissimilar outcomes. If sex and desire refer 
to the relations among different quantities of force, race and races occur 
when those productions of differences are taken to be differences of some 
relative sameness. In the beginning is sex-race or race-sex: the encounter 
of different potentials to form new emergent (relative) identities. Race 
and racism occur through such intersections of desire, whereby bod-
ies assemble to form territories. All bodies and identities are the result 
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of territorialization: so that race (or kinds) unfold from sex, at the same 
time that sexes (male or female) unfold from encounters of genetic differ-
ences. All couplings are of mixed race.
It is through the formation of a relatively stable set of relations that bod-
ies are effected in common. A body becomes an individual through gath-
ering or assembling (enabling the formation of a territory). A social body, 
tribe or collective begins with the formation of a common space or terri-
tory but is deterritorialized when the group is individuated by an external 
body—when a chieftain appears as the law or eminent individual whose 
divine power comes from ‘on high.’ This marks the socius as this or that 
specified group. Race occurs through reterritorialization, when the social 
body is not organized from without (or via some transcendent, external 
term) but appears to be the expression of the ground; the people are an 
expression of a common ground or Volk. The most racially determined 
group of all is that of ‘man’ for no other body affirms its unity with such 
shrill insistence. ‘Humanity’ presents itself as a natural unified species, 
with man as biological ground from which racism might then be seen as a 
differentiation. 
The problem with racism is neither that it discriminates, nor that it 
takes one natural humanity and then perverts it into separate groups. 
On the contrary, racism does not discriminate enough; it does not rec-
ognize that ‘humanity,’ ‘Caucasian,’ or ‘Asian’ are insufficiently distin-
guished. Humanity is a generality or the creation of a majority of a mon-
strous and racial sort. One body—the white man of reason—is taken 
as the figure for life in general. A production of desire—the image of 
‘man’ that was the effect of history and social groupings—is now seen as 
the ground of desire. Ultimately, a metalepsis takes place: despite sur-
face differences it is imagined that deep down we are all the same. And 
because of this generalizing production of ‘man in general’ who is then 
placed before difference as the unified human ground from which differ-
ent races appear, a trajectory of extinction appears to be relentless. Man 
imagines himself as exemplary of life, so much so that when he aims to 
think in a posthuman manner he grants rights, lifeworlds, language and 
emotions to nonhumans. (And when ‘man’ imagines animal art or lan-
guage he does so from the perspective of its development into human 
art and language; what he does not do is animalize human art, seeing art 
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not as an expressive extension of the body, but as an expressive matter in 
its own right.) Man’s self-evident unity, along with the belief in a histori-
cal unfolding that occurs as a greater and greater recognition of identity 
(the supposed overcoming of tribalism towards the recognition of one 
giant body of human reason) precludes any question of humanity’s com-
position, its emergence from difference and any further possibility of its 
un-becoming. Humanity has been fabricated as the proper ground of all 
life—so much so that threats to all life on earth are being dealt with today 
by focusing on how man may adapt, mitigate and survive. Humanity has 
become so enamored of the image it has painted of its illusory beautiful 
life that it has not only come close to vanquishing all other life forms, and 
has not only imagined itself as a single and self-evidently valuable being 
with a right to life, it can also only a imagine a future of living on rather 
than face the threat of living otherwise. Part of the problem of human-
ity as a race lies in the ambivalent status of art, for art is the figure that 
separates white man par excellence: humanity has no essence other than 
that of free self-creation, all seemingly different peoples or others must 
come to recognize their differences as merely cultural, as the effect of one 
great history of self-distinction. However, if art were to be placed outside 
the human, as the persistence of sensations and matters that cannot be 
reduced to human intentionality, then ‘we’ might begin to discern the 
pulsation of differences in a time other than that of self-defining human-
ity. Art would not be an extension of the human, a way in which man lives 
on and creates himself through time. Art would be bound up with extinc-
tion, signaling the capacity of matters to insist and persist beyond any 
animating intent.
Far from extinction or human annihilation being solely a twenty-first 
century event (although it is that too), art is tied essentially to the non-
existence of man. Art has often quite explicitly considered the relation 
between humanity and extinction. For it is the nature of the art object 
to exist beyond its originating intention, both intimating a people not 
yet present (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 180), and yet also often pre-
supposing a unified humanity or common ‘lived.’ Wordsworth—yes, 
Wordsworth!—was at once aware that the sense of a poem or work could 
not be reduced to its material support, for humanity is always more than 
any of the signs it uses to preserve its existence: 
Face Race 143
Oh! why hath not the Mind
Some element to stamp her image on
In nature somewhat nearer to her own?
Why, gifted with such powers to send abroad
Her spirit, must it lodge in shrines so frail? 
(Wordsworth 1991; The Prelude V 45-49). 
If the archive were to be destroyed, would anything of ‘man’ remain? 
Art gives man the ability to imagine himself as eternally present, beyond 
any particular epoch or text, and yet also places this eternity in the fragile 
tomb of a material object: ‘Even if the material lasts only for a few sec-
onds it will give sensation the power to exist and be preserved in itself 
in the eternity that coexists with this short duration’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 166). ‘Man’ as a race (as a unified body imagining himself as a natu-
ral kind) is essentially tied to extinction: for man is at once an ex post 
facto or metaleptic positing of that which must have been there all along, 
awaiting eternal expression. At the same time ‘man’ is also that being who 
hastens extinction in general by imagining himself as a single tradition 
solely worthy of eternal life, stamping the world with his own image. This 
unified humanity that has become intoxicated with its sense of self-pos-
iting privilege can only exist through the delirium of Race, through the 
imagination of itself as a unified and eternal natural body:
All delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racist. 
It is not a matter of the regions of the body without organs 
‘representing’ races and cultures. The full body does not rep-
resent anything at all. On the contrary, the races and cultures 
designate regions on this body—that is, zones of intensities, 
fields of potentials. Phenomena of individualization and sexu-
alization are produced within these fields. We pass from one 
field to another by crossing thresholds: we never stop migrat-
ing, we become other individuals as well as other sexes, and 
departing becomes as easy as being born or dying. Along the 
way we struggle against other races, we destroy civilizations, 
in the manner of the great migrants in whose wake nothing 
is left standing once they have passed through. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004a, 94)
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Racial delirium is not only a passage through differential flux from 
which identity emerges; it also entails that ‘we destroy civilizations’—
affirming the potentiality of reducing any produced culture or tradition 
to ruins. Man exists above and beyond any particularity; as one grand 
racial unity, he is that through which cultural distinction emerges. If racial 
delirium occurs as an affirmation of the possibility of anything becom-
ing extinct, racism is a neurotic grip on survival. Racism—including, 
and especially, the affirmation of ‘man’—is a repression of racial delir-
ium; racial delirium would open up to all the differences and intensities 
beyond any unified or generic ‘man.’ By contrast, racism affirms one great 
unity—the properly human—in which various kinds might be seen to 
differ by degree, being more or less human. Humanity is always a virtual 
production or fabrication that posits itself as ultimate actuality, occluding 
the differentials from which it emerges. 
The fabrication of man as a race that at once enables the lure of essential 
unity, and yet places that unity in the fragile monuments of art today (in 
the twenty-first century) faces the actual threat of extinction. Given that 
threat, how might art adjust to a milieu of imminent, probably certain, 
disappearance? How might this race that has for so long surrounded itself 
with art, and mirrored itself in art, open out to the world upon which it 
depends but which it has nevertheless almost annihilated? How does the 
human race turn from mirroring itself, enclosing itself in the cave of its 
own images, to thinking its inextricable intertwining with fragile life?
These questions are not new. All art has the problem of extinction and 
race at its core. 
Any sentence that begins with ‘All art…’ needs to be treated with 
extreme suspicion. The logic of racism, after all, has always defined the 
properly human from a single moment—deep down they are all (or 
should be) just like ‘us.’ And, as already mentioned, the figure of art is 
crucial to this unifying lure: deep down we are all human, all the same, 
and express ourselves differently in the grand tradition of human art. 
Such claims are less often made by art historians than they are by phi-
losophers, who are fond of speaking of art as such, or art in general, or 
the essence of art, and who usually deploy such concepts to smuggle in 
normative concepts of humanity. When a philosopher defines what art 
is he is usually making a moral claim about life, and this is especially so 
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when philosophy seemingly detaches itself from the assumptions of nor-
mativity, when philosophy speaks for man in general. Kant’s insistence 
on aesthetic judgment as reflective, presupposes Western art practices of 
framed and detached art objects: man realizes that he is not just a physi-
cal body, but a subject who can feel himself as a creative being responsi-
ble for the reason of the world. When Jacques Derrida affirms that ‘litera-
ture is democracy’ (Thomson 2005, 33; Kronick 1999, 166) he includes 
all literary practice under a high modernist norm of framed voice (art is 
not what is said, but a presentation that there is ‘saying’); when Theodor 
Adorno (2004), more explicitly, shows the aesthetic as properly dis-
closed in modernist formalism he allows art in general to be oriented 
towards the disjunction between concept and reality; various Marxisms 
or historicisms will begin an account of art in general from this or that 
exemplary object (the social novel, Greek tragedy, postmodern reflexiv-
ity). Deleuze and Guattari seem both to fall into this (possibly unavoid-
able) universalizing tendency with their distinction between an art of 
affects and percepts and a philosophy of concepts. And yet their insis-
tence that art emerges from a pre- or counter-human animality and that 
this ‘art’ lies in the capacity of sensations to persist in themselves, opens 
the thought of an inhuman time, and an eternity outside man (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 182). This is why, also, they pay so much attention to 
the twinned concepts of race and face: for it is art that at once forms the 
figure of a common humanity (man as homo faber), at the same time as 
the resistance and decay of art objects opens life and creation to tempo-
ralities beyond those of a self-legislating humanity.
It is most often philosophers, determined to secure a domain of life 
that is not yet submitted to convention, instrumentality, recognition, 
opinion, or assumptions of human nature, who will find in art as such 
that which precedes, exceeds or disturbs given systems. Art either offers 
us the capacity to reflect upon the worlds ‘we’ have formed (Habermas 
1987), or, art brings ‘us’ back once again to humanity’s eternal capacity 
to be nothing other than the image it creates from itself (Agamben 1999, 
68). But there are two ways this eternity might be thought: as humanity’s 
destiny—man as the capacity to create the thought of the universal—or 
as humanity’s annihilation: for perhaps it is not man (or man alone) that 
witnesses or evidences a temporality outside organic specified life. If art 
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is necessarily always concerned with annihilation and specification (or 
the production of species, and the persistence of sensations beyond the 
life of the creator) then any claim that art is essentially or eternally of a 
certain mode belies art’s distinct fragility. That is, the claim to something 
like art in general reinforces the sense of man or humanity in general, and 
occludes what Deleuze and Guattari have presented as the animality of 
art, its existence in pure matters of sensation. 
When Deleuze and Guattari [1994, 165] argue for art as the preserva-
tion of sensations that exist before man—sensations that persist in them-
selves—they go a long way to destroying the race of man. 
[P]henomenology must become the phenomenology of art 
because the immanence of the lived to a transcendental sub-
ject must be expressed in transcendent functions that not 
only determine experience in general but traverse the lived 
here and now, and are embodied in it by constituting living 
sensations. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 178)
Art is not the expression of humanity, in general, but the destruction 
of any such generality through the preservation and temporality of the 
‘nonorganic life of things’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 180). Art, tradi-
tionally conceived, has been racial in a double sense: it offers figures of 
man in general (always—in Western art—the white face of the subject); 
and is then archived as the expression of a humanity that comes to know 
and feel itself through the creation of its own pure images. 
Art, Face, Race
Art is always the preserving of a sensation that is of its time, but that is 
submitted to existence for all time. If art is to figure something like ‘the 
human’—and if the human is, philosophically, an openness to world that 
is given best in the face—then it must always do so through the mate-
rial figure of some specified head. Emmanuel Levinas’s argument that the 
face is singular, and that the singular relation to any face disrupts a logic 
of calculation and specification, is an extreme philosophic argument; it 
takes up the premise of philosophy—of a radical transcendence that is 
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not of this world of beings—and yet returns that transcendence to the 
privileged body of man:
The same and the other can not enter into a cognition that 
would encompass them; the relations that the separated being 
maintains with what transcends it are not produced on the 
ground of totality, do not crystallize into a system. Yet do we 
not name them together? The formal synthesis of the word 
that names them together is already part of a discourse, that is, 
of a conjuncture of transcendence, breaking the totality. The 
conjuncture of the same and the other, in which even their 
verbal proximity is maintained, is the direct and full face wel-
come of the other by me. This conjuncture is irreducible to 
totality; the ‘face to face’ position is not a modification of the 
‘along side of ...’ Even when I have linked the Other to myself 
Figure 1: Joanna Kane, William Blake deathmask, from The Somnambulists, 
2008. Dewi Lewis Publishing 2008. Photo courtesy of Joanna Kane.
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with the conjunction ‘and’ the Other continues to face me, to 
reveal his face. (Levinas 1979, 80-81)
Levinas’s elevation of the face relies on an experience of a singularity 
that would be liberated from all generality, that would not be a specifica-
tion of this or that universal type. Levinas’s appeal to the face is at once 
non-semantic, for the face disrupts generality and communication or 
shared notions of what counts in advance as human; the face appears in 
its singularity as this face, before me, here and now. If, however, such a 
face were to be figured in art it would need to take on some specifica-
tion, where specification is always of the species or race. A face ‘as such’ 
without species might be thought but it could only be figured through 
this or that concrete head. Even when it does not figure human bodies, 
persons or faces, art is always about face and always about the extinc-
tion of species. It is always a presentation of this earth of ‘ours’ witnessed 
from our race: ‘All faces envelop an unknown, unexplored landscape; all 
landscapes are populated by a loved or dreamed-of face, develop a face to 
come or already past’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, 191). So there are 
two twinned (yet necessary) impossibilities. First, a work of art can live 
on, as eternal and monumental, only if it takes on a material support: my 
thoughts can be read after my life only if I inscribe them in matter. And 
yet, second, that matter is also essentially fragile, corruptible and subject 
to decay. A face—or the witnessing of the subject in general—can only 
occur through some racialized head: I can only imagine humanity in gen-
eral, as spirit, through the species. The eternal—the sense of art, the sub-
ject of the face—is always constituted through this object, this head. The 
logic that intertwines face, race and art is the logic of life: a unified body 
or species can only occur through persisting beyond individual bodies—
a race is like an artwork or monument, surviving beyond individual 
life—and yet, such persisting unities also only survive through variation. 
A race or species varies and opens to other differences in order to live 
on, just as the individual human subject can persist through time, beyond 
himself, only by supplementing himself through the matters of art.
A work of art is only a work if it has taken on some separable and repeat-
able form, but it is just that taking on of a body (or incarnation) that also 
suffers a process of decay. That is, just as the art object is possible because 
of a selection of matters that will both resist dissolution (in the short 
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term) and be exposed to inevitable decay, so the bounds of a race are pos-
sible only because of a specification that requires an ultimately annihilat-
ing variability; a race or species is possible only because of something like 
an art in life, a variability that both enables the formation of living borders 
but that also entails the annihilation of bounds. A race is at once the gath-
ering of sameness, a certain genetic continuity, and an openness to differ-
ence—for a race continues through time via sexual variation.
In the remaining sections of this chapter I want to explore two ideas 
about extinction and race in relation to art works that will allow us to look 
at the ways in which all life is oriented to an oscillation between extinc-
tion and specification (or ‘raciation’), and that this leads to an impure 
border between the faces of philosophy—or the idea of a humanity as 
such—and the heads of art, or the material figures through which that 
humanity is given. 
As a preliminary opening to these two ideas of race and extinction I 
want to consider three visual images, the first of which is the smiley face 
that came to stand for acid house culture, while the second is William 
Blake’s death mask refigured first by Francis Bacon’s 1955 ‘Study for 
Portrait II (after the Life Mask of William Blake),’ and second by the 
contemporary Edinburgh photographer Joanna Kane (Kane 2008). 
All of these images, in different ways, problematize the distinctions 
between the face and the head, between philosophy and art, or between 
species-survival and extinction. If we want to consider something like a 
pure form of the face (theorized philosophically) then we could turn to 
Levinas’s detachment of the face from all generality, calculation, media-
tion and specification: for Levinas a face is not a head. The latter is a body 
part, and might also figure something like the biological human species 
to which ‘we’ would owe certain allegiances and contracts. On a bodily, 
psycho-physical or (for Levinas) non-ethical level, it is because others 
have bodies like mine that I enter into certain sympathies, and this would 
allow ‘us’ to maintain ourselves in relation to external threats and a milieu 
of risk (so the head would also signal something like Bergson’s ‘morality,’ 
which is a bonding formed through relative likeness [Bergson 1935]). 
For Levinas, all philosophy that has been grounded on being, or that has 
tried to determine some ideal of justice, humanity and order in advance 
emanating from a general physical humanity, annihilates the radical 
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singularity of the face. It is the encounter with this face, here and now, 
that disrupts convention, sign systems, repeatability and doxa; it is this 
singular face that prevents the reduction of otherness to an event within 
the world. The face enables us to pass from (or through) the heads that 
we recognize as part of a common species, to the other whom we can 
encounter but never know. Or, in Bergson’s terms: from something like a 
common morality of humanity premised on a specified kind, one would 
pass to the thought of a virtual, not yet present and singular other. 
The face would give us something like pure life: not the form or mat-
ter that one recognizes as the same through time and that is subject to 
decay and exposure to risk, but the animating spirit of which matter is a 
sign. The face for Levinas is, after all, not a sign or mediation of humanity 
so much as an experience or rupture with all mediation and sense. (The 
same applies for those who invoke his work today, amid conflicts among 
peoples [Butler 2006, 133].) Life, however, is never pure and its pro-
cesses of variation and creativity are known only through the relative sta-
bility of bounded forms. These forms and bounded beings are perceived 
as the beings that they are only by reducing the intense fluctuations and 
differences into ongoing and recognizable figures. At the other end of the 
spectrum from the pure life of a perception that is not yet frozen or deter-
mined into any relatively inert figure is the mere head. If the head for 
Deleuze and Guattari occurs with a pre-modern tribal individuation that 
is not yet that of humanity, it is possible to see this head again today in 
the post- or counter-human head of the smiley face. So lacking in distinc-
tion that it has neither race, nor humanity, nor artfulness, the smiley face 
signals loss of life (having become a punctuation mark in emails and text 
messages: ‘:)’). It is the retreat from specification and the removal of any 
definitive body—anything that would allow for engaged sympathy—that 
makes the smiley face at once the most vulgar of heads, as though even 
the primitive animal totem heads (or portraits commissioned through 
patronage) were still too singular to really enable the joys of a loss of face.
In two recent books the neuroscientist Susan Greenfield has com-
mented on the contemporary problem of meaning, sensation and iden-
tity. Drugs that work to overcome depression may operate by relieving 
the brain of its syntactic work, allowing the body to experience sensation 
as such without laboring to tie it into significance. A depressed person 
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cannot, Greenfield argues, simply enjoy a sip of espresso, the feel of sun-
shine on the skin or the sound of a flowing stream (Greenfield 2000). The 
depressive is focused on meaning or connection, tying sensations into a 
resonant whole, and cannot therefore experience the senseless ecstasy of 
sensation as such. An experience is meaningful if it is placed in the con-
text of past encounters and future projects, but a certain joy is possible 
only if that neural network of sense is also open to sensation. One must 
be a self—having a certain face and singularity that defines one as who 
one is in terms of one’s projects—but one must sometimes also be just 
a head: a capacity to feel or be affected without asking why, or without 
placing that sense in relation to one’s own being and its ends. Greenfield’s 
more recent book, ID, has—despite her earlier recognition that we some-
times need to let go of identity and meaning—lamented what she sees 
to be an attrition of our neural architecture (Greenfield 2008). While 
the current drug and computer-fuelled retreat from syntax and recogni-
tion—and its accompanying sense of self—has its place, contemporary 
culture’s focus on flashing screens, disconnected sensations and imme-
diate intensities is hurtling in an alarming manner to a total loss of face. 
There is a widespread loss of being someone, and a disturbing tendency 
towards being ‘anyone.’ 
That such a process of neural extinction accompanies species extinction 
is not a mere coincidence, and that such a movement towards not being 
someone is symbolized by the smiling head of ecstasy use should give 
us pause for thought. As the species comes closer to the extinction that 
marked its very possibility as species, it has retreated more and more into 
its own self-identity, becoming more and more convinced of the unity of 
race (the humanity of man in general). One could only become this or 
that marked race—especially the race of man—by closing off absolute 
difference and englobing oneself into a determined and self-recognizing 
kind: ‘When the faciality machine translates formed contents of whatever 
kind into a single substance of expression, it already subjugates them to 
the exclusive form of signifying and subjective expression’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004b, 199). Is it any surprise that today, confronted with actual 
species extinction, ‘man’ ingests drugs that relieve him of meaning, buys 
screens that divert his gaze away from others, and consumes media that 
pacify him with figures of a general and anodyne ‘we’? Is this loss of face 
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something that is accidentally destructive, or could we not say that the 
face of man emerges from such self-enclosure? Is not the grand scene of 
Levinas’s ethics—one face to another without intrusion of a third or any 
other world—not the mode of coupling that has led to the earth’s deface-
ment? Today’s culture of self-annihilation—an overcoming of face, sense 
and bounded recognition—may not be as lamentable as Greenfield and 
others suggest. It may be a perfectly inhuman (and therefore wonder-
ful) response to a world in which the value and art of one’s species is no 
longer unquestionable. Is face, human face in its radical distinction and 
immateriality, really what one wants to save? 
Acid house visual and aural culture, apart from being signaled by the 
smiley face, rely on an elimination of a time of development and figura-
tion in favor of a time of pulsation. Music of this style, along with trance 
and later forms of dubstep and brostep, destroy the man of speech and 
reason for the sake of sensations liberated from humanity. Not only do 
the drugs that accompany trance and house music allow for the experi-
ence of sensation without a framing of sense, the music is character-
ized by instrumental—usually digitally synthesized—repeated chord 
sequences, with infrequent and non-complex modulations, pulsing 
rhythms and uses of language that are sonorous rather than semantic. 
Visuals that accompany this music are not so much abstract as minimal, 
not geometric forms and figures but intensities of light and color. That 
this movement of acid house is part of a broader tendency towards loss of 
face is signaled by the smiley head it takes as its totem, by the general cul-
ture of counter-syntax described by Greenfield, and by the strange neural 
tie between the face and specification. What such late capitalist events 
disclose is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a ‘higher deterritorialis-
tion;’ there is not a movement back to the one single ground of humanity, 
but a creative release that opens out towards a cosmos of forces beyond 
humanity. More specifically one might note, then, that it is not by inclu-
sion or extension of the categories of rights and humanity that one might 
overcome the intrinsic racism (which is also a species-ism) that regulates 
the concept of man. Rather, it is by intensifying sensations that one is lib-
erated from the face of the signifying subject, opening forces to the inhu-
manity of the cosmos:
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The face is not animal, but neither is it human in general; there 
is even something absolutely inhuman about the face. To the 
point that if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape 
the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become 
imperceptible, to become clandestine, not by returning to ani-
mality, nor even by returning to the head, but by quite spiri-
tual and special becomings-animal, by strange true becom-
ings that get past the wall and get out of the black holes, that 
make faciality traits themselves finally elude the organization 
of the face…. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, 189)
One of the most commonly cited neural disorders in much of the cur-
rent popular literature regarding the brain is Capgras syndrome, where 
a patient without any delusion or loss of cognitive function, sees a close 
relative but then claims that this relative is an alien or imposter (Feinberg 
and Keenan 2005, 93). (This would be the opposite tendency of ecstasy 
culture where every stranger appears as a beloved.) What is missing is 
not any visual or cognitive input but affective response: if the emotional 
intensity or affect is not experienced then I claim—despite all evidence 
to the contrary—that this is not my mother, or child or partner. This 
syndrome has been widely cited in order to claim that we are not solely 
or primarily cognitive beings, and that our relation to others requires 
an affective response to their visual singularity—not simply the knowl-
edge or recognition of who they are. This might seem both to support 
and refute the Levinasian face. On the one hand it seems that—despite 
Levinas’s claims that the face of the other makes an impelling claim on 
me—it is really only certain faces with a specific visceral genealogy per-
tinent to our own being that are truly experienced as faces; everyone else 
is a mere head. On the other hand, it also appears that the face is not one 
object in the world among others, not reducible to a knowable and iden-
tikit type, for faces are radically singular. Faces engage affective registers 
that cannot be overridden by cognitive or simply visual inputs. A face at 
once has no race, for if I see this other as a face then I am devoted to an 
affective response that has nothing to do with general (or genetic) speci-
fications. On the other hand, the face is absolutely racial, for there is no 
such thing as the face of humanity in general, or a global fellow feeling; 
the face that engages me, disturbs me and transcends cognition is the 
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face that is bound up with my own organic and specified becoming. The 
face is at once that which is radically exposed to extinction, given that I 
experience as face only those heads bound up with my world, time and 
life. At the same time, the face appears to be quite distinct from organic 
survival; the body of the other person is before me, and yet something is 
missing. The affect, which is not a part of their body but is bound up with 
their capacity to be perceived in a certain manner, is what marks their 
singularity:
The human head implies a deterritorialization in relation to 
the animal and has as its correlate the organization of a world, 
in other words, a milieu that has itself been deterritorialized 
(the steppe is the first ‘world,’ in contrast to the forest milieu). 
But the face represents a far more intense, if slower, deterri-
torialization. We could say that it is an absolute deterritorial-
ization: it is no longer relative because it removes the head 
from the stratum of the organism, human or animal, and con-
nects it to other strata, such as significance and subjectifica-
tion. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 191)
One response to the border of the face—to this strange body part that 
is at once an organic head and also a marked out, fragile and exposed sin-
gularity—is a form of willed extinction. If there has been a tradition of art 
dominated by portraits, signatures, leitmotifs and claims to radical dis-
tinction and living on, there is also a counter-tradition of the head rather 
than the face, concerned with annihilation, indistinction and becoming 
no one. Faced with the all too fragile bounds of one’s specified being one 
could either cling more and more desperately to one’s englobed human-
ity—asserting something like Levinas’s pure face as such—or one could 
confront the head head-on. 
Both Francis Bacon’s portrait of Blake and the contemporary Scottish 
photographer Joanna Kane’s photograph are taken from William Blake’s 
death-mask. Blake, perhaps more than any other artist, exposed the 
impure logics of extinction, specification and art. Resisting an increas-
ing culture of commodification and the annihilation of the artist’s hand, 
Blake would not submit his poetry to the printing press, nor subject his 
images to the usual methods of reproduction. Determined not to lose 
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himself in the morass of markets, mass production and already given sys-
tems, Blake engraved every word of his poetry on hand-crafted plates, 
colored every page with his own hand, invented his own mythic lexicon 
and gave each aspect of every one of his ‘characters’ a distinct embodied 
form. As a consequence of seizing the act of production from the death 
of general systems, and directly following the assertion of his own sin-
gularity against any general humanism, Blake’s work is more subject to 
decay, extinction and annihilation than any other corpus. Because Blake 
resisted the formal and repeatable modes of typeface, and because he 
took in hand his own creation of pigments and techniques of illumi-
nated printing, it is not possible to detach the pure sense or signature of 
Blake’s work from its technical medium. The more Blake took command 
of technicity or matter—the more he rendered all aspects of the work art-
ful—the more exposed his work was to the possibility of annihilation. 
It was because Blake’s work was so specific, so distinct, so committed to 
the living on and survival of the singular, that it was also doomed to a 
faster rate of extinction. (Blake’s work can never be fully reproduced or 
anthologized.)
Similarly, one can note that it is because it was so masterful at survival, 
at securing the sense of itself and its worth as a species, that humanity as a 
race faces accelerated destruction.
Both Bacon and Kane depict Blake not through the surviving portrait, 
but through the death-mask. If the portrait is one of the ways in which the 
head is framed, signed, attributed and placed within a narrative of artist as 
author, creator and subject of a world of intentionality that can be entered 
by reading and intuition, this is because the face of the portrait is tied to 
an aesthetics of empathy, in which the hand of the artist is led by the idea 
of a world that is not materially presented but that can be indicated or 
thought through matter. In this respect the portrait can be aligned with 
what Deleuze refers to as a history of digital aesthetics, in which the hand 
becomes a series of ‘digits’ that in turn allows the world to be visualized, 
not as recalcitrant matter, but as a quantifiable mass in accord with the 
eye’s expectations (Deleuze 2005, 79). The digital—as universalizing and 
generalizing of the world—therefore presupposed what Derrida referred 
to as a Western assumption of a pre-personal ‘we’—the humanity in gen-
eral that would be able to view and intuit the sense that is before me now 
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(Derrida 1989, 84). For all its supposed resistance to mediation, repre-
sentation and a history of Western being that has reduced the event of 
encounter to a general ‘being,’ Levinas’s ‘face’ is insistent on an imme-
diate relation to otherness that is not diverted, corrupted or rendered 
opaque by the decay-prone flesh of the head. What sets the aesthetics 
of empathy, which would discern a spirit in the bodily figure, apart from 
the aesthetics of abstraction is just this positing of an immateriality that 
transcends matter. It is the other, given through the face, whose presence 
is not arrived at by way of analogy or concepts. This is possible only if 
all those matters that tie a subject to specification and therefore certain 
extinction are deemed to be transparent or external to some pure other-
ness as such, to some pure face that is not corrupted by the head. 
The portraits of Blake, like the sense of Blake’s work in general, do 
indeed survive and circulate beyond the author’s living body. Even so, 
that face of Blake and the sense of the work that survives beyond decay-
ing matter are possible and released into the world only through a matter 
that is intrinsically self-annihilating. An aesthetics of abstraction, in con-
trast with empathy, is possible through a production, from matter, of pure 
forms; abstraction constitutes formal relations distinct from the singu-
lar, localized and subjective experiences of living organisms. One might 
therefore say that it is only through racial delirium—passing through and 
annihilating all the species of man—that one finds something other than 
racism, or man as he properly is. This might effect an ‘about-face.’ Blake’s 
work already confronted this relation between, on the one hand, discern-
ing the world as possessed of spirit (a world of innocence in accord with 
an ultimately human face), and, on the other hand, a world of matter 
devoid of any life other than its reduction to pure forms of digits (the 
world of ‘single vision and Newton’s sleep,’ where experience knows in 
advance all that it will encounter). In his illuminated printing and engrav-
ing techniques Blake’s works confronted the resistance of the hand in rela-
tion to a matter that was neither pure form, nor living spirit, but yielded 
something like an analogical aesthetics—the genesis of forms and life 
from the chaos of materiality. One could refer to this as a radically haptic 
aesthetic in which the eye can see the resistance of form emerging from 
matter, feeling the resistance of (in Blake’s case) the hand, and in the case 
of the deathmask the curvature of the head (Colebrook 2012A). 
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Bacon’s paint adds its own flesh of color to the form of the mask, while 
Kane’s highly finished photography renders the material object spiritual, 
not by gesturing to the face but by granting the matter itself its own lumi-
nosity. The visual surface of the photgraph, rather than the gazing face 
of the portrait, seems to posses at once its own spirit and its own tem-
porality, specification and line of duration. It is matter itself, and not the 
living form it figures, that seems to endure opening its own line of sur-
vival, extinction and specification. Kane’s faces-heads are higher deterri-
torializations in two senses. The face that enables empathy and alterity 
becomes a head again, but not a head of the living organism so much as a 
material artifact of matters that are themselves expressive. The art object 
that would seem to signal the human organism’s potentiality to free itself 
from mere biological life, to create that which endures beyond its own 
being, itself shows all the signs of material fragility, exposure and annihi-
lation. Philosophy finds faces in art; art is that creation of a signification 
of a sense beyond any body, of an endurance liberated from the instru-
mentality of the human organism. But there is always something of the 
crumbling, decaying, unspecified head in the faces of art. 
Chapter 8
Posthuman Humanities
Suddenly a local object, nature, on which a merely partial subject 
could act, becomes a global objective, Planet Earth, on which a 
new, total subject, humanity, is toiling away (Serres 1995, 5).
There was something odd about Stanley Fish’s speedy intervention in the 
‘debate’ about the closure of certain humanities departments:
But keeping something you value alive by artificial, and even 
coercive, means (and distribution requirements are a form of 
coercion) is better than allowing them to die, if only because 
you may now die (get fired) with them, a fate that some vision-
ary faculty members may now be suffering. I have always had 
trouble believing in the high-minded case for a core curricu-
lum—that it preserves and transmits the best that has been 
thought and said—but I believe fully in the core curriculum 
as a device of employment for me and my fellow humanists. 
But the point seems to be moot. It’s too late to turn back the 
clock. (Fish 2010)
In the general milieu of non-debate that pitched economic rationalism 
against an unquestioning right for the humanities to continue existing in 
its current form, Fish admitted that certain nineteenth-century ‘pieties’ 
would, today, not be believed. Fish himself did not disclose whether he 
believed these pieties or whether they ought to be believed; he went on 
to admit that keeping the valued humanities alive would require possibly 
coercive means. These means would not be a justification of the humani-
ties but ‘aggressive explanation’ of the ‘core enterprise.’ Along the way 
Fish laments that it would be French departments—French, the once hot-
bed of real ideas—that seem to be expendable in the way that Spanish is 
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not. Now, such a paean is odd given that one might have thought that 
if one really valued and wanted to sustain what ‘we’ learned from the 
French in their high theory heyday it might have been that education as 
a ‘core enterprise’ might be worth questioning (both for reasons of poli-
tics in Foucault’s sense, or the way disciplines constitute illusions of ‘the’ 
polity, and for reasons of good thinking, such that ‘keeping something 
you value alive’ might best be achieved not by clinging to survival but by 
a joyously destructive and active nihilism). Fish already suggests in his 
title—‘The Crisis of the Humanities Officially Arrives’—that the crisis 
was implicit up until now. Indeed the humanities have been in crisis, and 
for good reason. If, as Husserl already noted very early in the last century, 
the ‘sciences’ were in crisis because of a certain notion of ‘man’ as a natu-
ral animal blessed with technical reasoning capacities, then such a crisis 
could not but affect the humanities. Even Husserl accepted the impos-
sibility of grounding any new knowledge or future-oriented discipline 
on man as he actually is and suggested that dealing with the crisis would 
entail opening a new line of thought beyond natural ‘man.’ 
Today, in a century that can begin to sense, if not articulate, humanity’s 
capacity to destroy its own species-being, along with the milieu that it has 
constitutively polluted to the point of annihilation, what sort of defense 
might one make for the future of humanities disciplines? Should one 
not, rather, say ‘no’ to everything that has defended and saved man and 
his future, especially to the concept of life and potentiality of which man 
would be the utmost expression? Do we not require a new discipline? 
This would need to take the form not of the humanities, especially if the 
humanities were to take on a certain motif of the posthuman. That is, if 
the humanities were to live on by consuming, appropriating and claiming 
as its own the life of animals, digital technologies, inter-disciplinarity (or 
the rendering of science as human) then there would merely be a con-
tinuation of a reactive nihilism. 
Posthumanism, as I will define it here, is not an overcoming of the 
human but takes a similar form to the structure of nihilism. Here is 
Nietzsche’s diagnostic account if nihilism: a ‘higher’ world of truth is 
positied behind appearances, so that this actual world is given lesser 
value. When science fails to establish that greater foundational higher 
world, we fall into despair, left as we are this only this given world. If 
160 Chapter 8
belief in a transcendent redemption negated the force of this world for a 
higher world, then a reactive nihilism responded to the loss of transcen-
dence with despair, the horror that there might be nothing more than 
this world. Similarly, humanism affirms all value and being on the basis 
of the human logos: what is true and right is that which can be rendered 
rational. When that belief in a rational and grounding humanity falls 
away, what we are left with is a world minus man, a world in which there 
is no longer a truth or being, only observation. We subtract man’s logical 
supremacy from the world and are left with the contingency of observa-
tion (Wolfe 1995). In this respect, the retreat to a world in which there 
is only man, not God, remains theological—for God has been subtracted 
but the world as God-less (abandoned to man) remains. The posthuman, 
similarly, renounces human privilege or species-ism but then fetishizes 
the posthuman world as man-less; ‘we’ are no longer elevated, separated, 
enclosed, detached from a man-less world, for there is a direct interface 
and interconnection—a mesh or network, a living system—that allows 
for one world of computers, digital media, animals, things and systems. 
There is a continuation of the humanities, which had always refused 
that man had any end other than that which he gave to himself, in the 
posthuman notion that man is nothing but a point of relative stability, 
connected to one living system that he can feel affectively and read. Not 
only have motifs such as ‘affect,’ ‘posthuman,’ living systems and digital 
media been explicit topics—giving the impression that ‘the’ humanities 
can survive criticisms of the illusions of a once-dominant (supposedly) 
Cartesian rationalism, these motifs have intensified and entrenched the 
strategies that have always marked the humanities. They allow for busi-
ness as usual—in the same manner that nihilism allowed for a continued 
theologism; we have abandoned God and man, but now live this world 
as what is left after the subtraction of God and man. What we have are 
living interconnecting systems, with no point of exception, privilege or 
transcendence. If a world devoid of God and man continues a certain 
myopia of insisting that what is is that which can be observed, this ultra-
human posthumanism is conducted in a reactive and resentful mode. For 
what have ‘the posthuman,’ ‘affective’ or ‘ethical’ turns licensed? There 
has been an avowed reaction against a supposed linguisticism or textual 
narcissism (also referred to as linguistic idealism), so that the God of 
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language is dead, and we no longer believe that this world of ours is given 
order from without by ‘a’ system of language or structure which it would 
be the job of literary critics or cultural studies to decode. There has been 
a return to life, bodies, animals, ecology and the inhuman in general, as 
though we are once again liberated from the prison of our humanity, no 
longer distanced from the world and now able to find a truly post-theory, 
posthuman world of life. We turn back to history, contexts, things, bod-
ies, life and nature.
The humanities would, through all its demarcation disputes, attacks, 
defenses and mutations be defined not by a normative notion of the 
human but by an anti-normative insistence that man is not, for he has 
no positive being other than that which is given to him by virtue of his his-
torical and living becoming. The humanities would be primarily critical 
and interpretive, and would be entwined with a logic of negation and 
refusal. The sciences would be procedural, operating from within para-
digms (however sophisticated, reflected upon or provisional) while the 
humanities would occur through self-distancing or reading: whatever life 
or system is given, it is the task of the humanities—because there is no 
such thing as the human—to open a space of conversation, legitimation, 
questioning or critique. Without such a space one would be reduced to 
the ruthless actuality of metrics or utilitarianism. ‘Man’ as given in the 
humanities is not the man of science (subjecting the world to so many 
repeatable, efficient and quantifiable functions). Nor is the humanity of 
the humanities the ‘man’ of the human sciences (whereby man’s social 
and political being can be read as an expression of what Foucault refers 
to as his ‘empirical density’: man speaks and labors because of the needs 
of life, and it is this emergence from life that allows man to read himself 
in today’s anthropology, social linguistics, evolutionary psychology and 
cognitive archaeology). The man of the humanities was already posthu-
man, possessing no being other than his reflexive capacity to read his 
own ungrounded and utterly flexible becoming. ‘At the very moment that 
we are acting physically for the first time on the global Earth, and when it 
in turn is doubtless reacting on global humanity, we are tragically neglect-
ing it’ (Serres 1995, 29). 
For Michel Serres humanity is not a concept that grounds the humani-
ties, nor is ‘man’ a concept expressed by the various disciplines that 
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comprise the humanities. Rather, ‘humanity’ is a meteorological impera-
tive, a concept that needs to be created today in order to confront the 
change in techno-geological climates. Serres’s work, despite its manifest 
humanism in The Natural Contract, does not take the form of a resistance 
to the technical reduction of man to systems. (What his work demands, 
in a manner similar to Deleuze’s affirmation of differential calculus, is not 
an overcoming of calculation but a more subtle differential calculation: a 
reckoning of the quantities and systems produced by the relations among 
the bodies of the human species and the other forces upon which it is 
parasitic.) Serres’s theorization of the human is not a posthumanism that 
would happily conflate human existence with life in general. Such post-
humanisms are, as I have already suggested, ultimately ultra-humanisms 
insofar as they attribute all the qualities once assigned to man—quali-
ties such as mindfulness, connectedness, self-organizing dynamism—to 
some supposedly benevolent life in general that needs to be saved from 
the death of merely calculative systems. Against this Rosalyn Diprose has 
re-asserted the role of human meaning, perception and value in provid-
ing an opening of the event in an otherwise leveled world:
Formulating an ethics for the posthuman world requires 
a more considered ontology to supplement that which is 
assumed in biopolitical analysis. The challenge is to bet-
ter understand what kind of collective practices allow the 
emergence of the ‘event’ within assemblages of human, non-
human, meaning, and technical elements without ignoring 
the mediating role of (historically conditioned) human per-
ception, receptivity and responsiveness. (Diprose 2009, 13)
That is, supposedly, the value of the humanities today, lies both in its 
ideal resistance to a culture of economic rationalism and narrow utilitari-
anism and its less pious claim to educate students with transferable skills 
or critical reasoning or rhetorical flexibility. The humanities of posthu-
manism has happily abandoned species-ism and exceptionalism—man is 
no longer adjudicator or hermeneutic arbiter outside the web of life—for 
there is one de-centered, mutually imbricated, constantly creative mesh, 
system or network of life. According to Timothy Morton: 
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The ecological thought imagines interconnectedness, which 
I call the mesh. Who or what is interconnected with what or 
whom? The mesh of interconnected things is vast, perhaps 
immeasurably so. Each entity in the mesh looks strange. 
Nothing exists all by itself, and so nothing is fully ‘itself. ’ There 
is curiously ‘less’ of the Universe at the same time, and for the 
same reasons, as we see ‘more’ of it. Our encounter with other 
beings becomes profound. They are strange, even intrinsically 
strange. Getting to know them makes them stranger. When 
we talk about life forms, we’re talking about strange strangers. 
The ecological thought imagines a multitude of strange strang-
ers. (Morton 2010, 15)
Morton’s project differs both from the simple ecological affirmations 
that would reunite humans with a lost nature (for he aims to think ecol-
ogy without grounding and unifying nature), and also from the strands 
of ‘object oriented ontology’ that would insist that not everything is con-
nected (Harman 2012, 132). And it is this latter possibility of disconnec-
tion or detachment that is, I would suggest, productively inhuman. Yes, 
most avowed posthumanisms have celebrated the destruction of man as 
the ground of all reason, but what they have brought back is one grand 
whole of interconnected systems of observation (often readable in terms 
of some grander system of class, power or life). But it is the sacrifice of 
man as Cartesian subject in favor of a posthuman ecology of systems that 
allows the humanities to live on. If the human is assumed to be noth-
ing more than an interface, already at one with a world that is one liv-
ing system, then posthumanism is nothing more than the negation of a 
humanism that never was. It is an ultrahumanism precisely because once 
man is abandoned as a distinct system or inflection he returns to char-
acterize nature or life in general, just as the death of God left an implicit 
and widespread theologism that no longer had a distinct or explicit logic. 
Posthumanism is an ultrahumanism and partakes of the same metaleptic 
logic of reactive nihilism. In nihilism, a higher world is posited to justify 
or grant worth to this world. This higher world is posited from a reaction 
against the force of this world. When that supposed transcendence is no 
longer affirmed, this world becomes a world minus transcendence, godless, 
worthless, void and negated. Humanism posits an elevated or exceptional 
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‘man’ to grant sense to existence, then when ‘man’ is negated or removed 
what is left is the human all too human tendency to see the world as one 
giant anthropomorphic self-organizing living body. Not surprisingly, 
there become increasingly shrill calls for human meaning (including a 
pragmatic or humanized religion, and a certain substitution of literature 
for God as the ground of human sense-making). ‘Man’ is effected as that 
animal who would be especially poised to read the logic of life, and this 
because of his capacities for speech and sociality; it is the creation of man 
that enables a certain concept of life. When man is destroyed to yield a 
posthuman world it is the same world minus humans, a world of mean-
ing, sociality and readability yet without any sense of the disjunction, gap 
or limits of the human. Like nihilism, the logic is metaleptic: the figure 
of man is originally posited in order to yield a sense or meaning of life, 
and yet when man is done away with as an external power what is left 
is an anthropomorphic life of meaning and readability. A certain idea 
of man—Foucault notes—was intertwined with the possibility of the 
human sciences and of a concomitant notion of life. If, for Foucault, both 
‘man’ and ‘life’ emerge in the eighteenth century this is because there is 
a new distribution in the table of knowledge, a new fold between inside 
and outside. Rather than examining the forms of living being in a world 
of analogies—with humanity being an expression of a broader cosmol-
ogy, there is now something like life as such with its specific temporality 
and imperatives. Whereas humans had been privileged beings (blessed 
with reason) it is now man who is at once empirically constituted by life 
(required to speak, labor and constitute polities because of the needs of 
his species being) and yet also capable of reading that logic of life as tran-
scendental: psychoanalysis, Marxism, ethnography, structuralism and 
(today’s) evolutionary psychology or cognitive archaeology all account 
for the modus of the human organism according to a certain logic of life. 
[T]he end of metaphysics is only the negative side of a much 
more complex event in Western thought. This event is the 
appearance of man. However, it must not be supposed that he 
suddenly appeared on our horizon, imposing the brutal fact 
of his body, his labour and his language in a manner so irrup-
tive as to be absolutely baffling as to our reflection. It is not 
man’s lack of positivity that reduced the space of metaphysics 
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so violently. No doubt, on the level of appearances, moder-
nity begins when the human being begins to exist within his 
organism, inside the shell of his head, inside the armature of 
his limbs, and in the whole structure of his physiology; when 
he begins to exist at the center of labour by whose principles 
he is governed and whose logic eludes him; when he lodges 
his thought in the folds of a language so much older than him-
self that he cannot master its significations, even though they 
have been called back to life by the insistence of his words. 
But, more fundamentally, our culture crossed the threshold 
beyond which we recognize our modernity when finitude was 
conceived with an interminable cross-reference with itself. 
Though it is true, at the level of the various branches of knowl-
edge, that finitude is always designated on the basis of man as 
a concrete being and on the basis of the empirical forms that 
can be tied to his existence, nevertheless, at the archaeologi-
cal level, which reveals the general, historical a priori of each 
of these branches of knowledge, modern man—that man 
assignable in his corporeal, labouring, speaking existence is 
possible only as a figuration of finitude. Modern culture can 
conceive of man because it conceives of the finite on the basis 
of itself. (Foucault 2003, 346)
Today, even though man as a privileged being has been incorporated 
into a posthuman plane of interacting living systems what remains is the 
reactive and ultrahuman logic of finitude: it is because there is life (or a 
being’s relation to an ecology) that one can only know the world as it is 
given through organic conditions. A being is alive insofar as it maintains 
itself and does so in relation to a milieu that it perceives according to its 
own capacities; humans and animals have worlds, and the world is not 
so much data to be represented by an imposed order nor a book of life 
but an interactive and dynamic mesh of living systems. One can account 
for language, labor and life according to a single logic of man: a being 
emerges from the needs of self-maintenance (which in the case of man 
require language, the polity and labor), but it is man who has the capacity 
to read the enigmatic density of life. His empirical being is the sign of a 
broader logic (a transcendental logic of life). 
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If the humanities—for Foucault—had any value it would not be as an 
extension of this logic—such that we might see literature as emerging 
from evolving and self-furthering life, or as somehow the means by which 
the empirical being of man might be awakened to his proto-transcenden-
tal powers of critique. Rather what Foucault referred to as literature would 
evidence something like a force beyond life, a machinic power that could 
not be referred back to the self-furthering human organism (Deleuze 
2006, 110). Language would not be the system through which we could 
read man’s emergence from a general order of life as self-maintenance; it 
would not be world-disclosive, nor an extension of organic and organiz-
ing imperatives of life. 
Now if it is this man (of finitude) that has been removed from excep-
tionalism in the posthuman landscape, and if the humanities disciplines 
have abandoned poetic assumptions of human speech as a special or 
privileged domain for revelation, what remains is a negative or reac-
tive continuation of anthropomorphic projection by other means. Self-
maintaining organicism and auto-poeisis are everywhere. In terms of 
theory this has led to a posthuman landscape in which there is one gen-
eral dynamic system with animals, machines and digital codes all woven 
to constitute a single ecology; the knowledge procedures are generally 
extensive, subsuming more and more events within the domain of one 
evolving and efficient life. It is for this reason that Rosi Braidotti has 
marked out two distinct modes of posthumanism, one of which would 
draw attention to the ways in which lines of life and thought are ‘topo-
logically bound’—not considered to be one expressive aspect of one sin-
gle system of life. The posthumanism of which Braidotti is critical is of 
a single-system where all observations can be grounded on a single self-
expressive living whole (Braidotti 2006, 199). What is not considered in 
the posthumanisms of living systems are radically differing intensities, or 
intensive multiplicities, in which different speeds and economies open 
different and incompossible systems. I would suggest that it is no sur-
prise, then, that certain Luddite modes of literary Darwinism have gained 
literary vogue. Despite the sophisticated achievements of Darwinism in 
philosophy and science (from thinkers as diverse as Elizabeth Grosz and 
Stephen Jay Gould) that have stressed a certain divergence from func-
tion in evolutionary life, there has been a proclamation of the return of 
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literary studies to purposive and meaningful life. Not only have explicit 
versions of literary Darwinism led to a rejection of high theory (a high 
theory that had supposedly imprisoned thought in language [Carroll 
2004,29]); there has also been a more general proclaimed posthuman-
ism that considers the absence of man to be a license for a new literalism, 
with direct talk of life, affect, bodies and ethics/politics. 
The ethical turn, like the affective turn, is a turn back away from a 
supposed human imprisonment within language to the real and collec-
tive conditions of existence. One might cite, as an example, Eva Ziarek’s 
critique of Agamben. Agamben had already attacked the deconstruc-
tive attention to limits in order to retrieve the event of saying or open-
ing of the political (Agamben 1999, 209). Ziarek, in turn, wants to take 
Agamben’s general concept of potentiality, from which the polity would 
open, and locate this force in intersubjective communality: ‘potentiality 
cannot be understood, as Agamben seems to suggest, in terms of the iso-
lated subject and what ‘he can or can not do,’ because it is fundamentally 
a relational concept, emerging from the encounter with another ‘you.’’ 
(Ziarek 2010). 
In a similar manner Hardt and Negri also want to turn away from the 
locatedness of centering points of view, and therefore from language 
and other constituting, inhuman and transcendent (to human life) sys-
tems, to the commons, the multitude—immanent political bodies that 
would have nothing outside or beyond themselves (and certainly not any 
imposed norm of humanity):
The primary decision made by the multitude is really the deci-
sion to create a new race or, rather, a new humanity. When love 
is conceived politically, then, this creation of a new humanity 
is the ultimate act of love. (Hardt and Negri 2005, 26)
In addition to these general affirmations that would now return man to 
the one common life of which he is a political and benevolent, and ulti-
mately productive, expression, new ‘posthuman’ objects of interest also 
return differential structures to purposive, self-maintaining, fruitful and 
generative life. 
Digital media studies and animal studies affirm a continuous milieu 
of exchange in which there is neither a radical outside nor any limit to 
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human comprehension. There has emerged in addition to a posthuman-
ism that affirms a simple, continuous interface a critical posthumanism 
that affirms embodiment. In reaction to those who feel that human-
ity may extend or overcome itself through technology, there have been 
those who stress the resistance and significance of the embodied sub-
strate, directly rejecting the ‘substrate neutral’ claims of those who stress 
computation (Dougherty 2001). Critical posthumanism reacts against 
the idea that the body is nothing more than contingent hardware or a 
vehicle for an intelligence or humanity that is primarily informational; 
this counter-technophilia is more critical of the residual humanist (or 
Cartesian, or rationalist) assumption that ‘we’ have now arrived at a point 
in history where technology might overcome the body. Critical posthu-
manism is nevertheless—like other affective, ethical, corporeal or post-
linguistic ‘turns’—a retrieval of the lived body that follows the same logic 
of reactive nihilism. That is, whether one uncritically affirms the capacity 
for humans and life to evolve to a point of posthuman freedom from all 
grounded biology, or whether one maintains an insistence on bodies and 
interests, one nevertheless grants the human (and the humanities) a con-
tinued critical role of reading and meaning. What is left out of play is the 
rigid separation or malevolence of the human that can neither be willed 
away in a mode of techno-vital euphoria, nor retrieved as some point of 
re-creating invention.
By contrast, both Serres and Deleuze focus on the inhuman multi-
plicities of systems: Serres’s concepts of parasitism and pollution allow 
for an examination of what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as stratifica-
tion (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 176). While systems are relational, it is 
also the case that appropriations, overcodings and disturbances produce 
distinct registers. The human, as a concept, would be one way of think-
ing technological, meteorological or disciplinary thresholds that create 
intense ruptures. Humanity would be a disturbing outcome of systemic 
events, not an origin. Given that both Serres and Deleuze’s concepts of 
humanity or ‘the people’ are futural—gestures towards how we might 
think the ways in which the human-sensory motor apparatus has inter-
sected with and created new speeds for other systems—it is not surpris-
ing that both Serres and Deleuze and Guattari have a counter-interdis-
ciplinary mode of linking discourses without commensurability. What 
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occurs is cross-contamination or discursive germinal warfare rather than 
communication and a common life world.
It was the genius of Foucault to take the modern logic of life and show 
its direct consequences for human disciplines. It is the turn to life—the 
idea that social historical man can be explained by a more general process 
of species being (or man as a laboring political animal)—that enables 
social sciences. These disciplines are reactive because they no longer pres-
ent norms as direct imperatives but as following on from the needs of 
life; there can only be biopolitical management of populations if there are 
human sciences that enable an ethics of knowledge, an organization of 
the human species according to broader requirements of existence. The 
humanities, if they react against this reduction of man to a material body 
and affirm either the capacity of man as a speaking, laboring being not 
to speak or work (Agamben’s impotentiality) or more standard humanist 
affirmations of that which is not quantifiable because embodied, affective 
and lived, do nothing more than maintain the normative logic of life that 
would entail their redundancy. That is: let us say that the human sciences 
and bio-politics reduce ‘man’ to bare life, to being manipulable and man-
ageable data. It follows that either the humanities becomes a supplement 
to this model—business ethics, bio-ethics, the production of transferable 
skills or critical reasoning—or, it argues that ‘humanity’ is never simply 
data, information, animality or bare life but has an excess of potentiality 
that remains unactualized. This would allow certain versions of posthu-
manism—those that argue for the ways in which animals or digital media 
complicate any simple Cartesian or rationalist model of the human—to 
keep the humanities alive. Man would not be mere biological mass, nor 
an information machine, and for this reason his ‘rights’ could neither be 
saved in themselves nor extended to animals and humans: on the con-
trary, the embodied interactions of humans, machines and animals would 
evidence a richness of the lived, of the affective, or suffering or lived body. 
So if man as a particular and exceptional being has been vanquished, 
what is saved is nevertheless a highly normative (theological-organic) 
logic of life in which the bounded and self-separating body with a world 
of its own is affirmed against various calculative reductivisms. 
So what of the humanities, if anything at all, might we say is really worth 
saving? Stanley Fish’s objection to the closing of humanities departments 
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never makes quite clear just what mode of humanities he wishes to save, 
or why such survival would truly be worthy. He does refer to the hor-
ror of closing French departments when it was precisely French culture 
that was the breath of life for humanities departments in the 1980s. One 
might note as an aside the odd objection to losing French (French!!!!); 
Jean-Luc Nancy even protested, ironically, that it would of course be 
more efficient to learn ‘Java’ or Chinese (as the language of business). 
Was he really, in leaping to the defense of the humanities, suggesting that 
saving French was properly open and futural, while emphasizing Chinese 
was mercantile—akin to reduced ‘languages’ to ‘Java’? 
Peut-être serait-il judicieux d’introduire à la place, et de manière 
obligatoire, quelques langages informatiques (comme java) et 
aussi le chinois commercial et le hindi technologique, du moins 
avant que ces langues soient complètement transcrites en anglais. 
(Nancy 2010)
Leaving aside what French might contribute to the twenty-first cen-
tury, one needs to ask what aspect or consumed fragment of this mourned 
French theory yields a properly viable mode of humanities study. A cer-
tain strand of French thought—one highly suspicious not only of ‘man’ 
but of certain structures of knowledge in which the emergence of sys-
tems and idealities might always be returned to the lived—is precisely 
what has been occluded in so called posthumanism today. Indeed, the 
humanism that has been rejected is Cartesian computational or cogni-
tive rationalism in favor of embodied, affective, distributed, emotional or 
subjective life. The humanities would somehow return disengaged log-
ics and structures to the properly living or embodied plane of life from 
which they emerge. It is not only Habermas (1987), then, with his insis-
tence that sciences always emerge from a lifeworld who domesticates 
and anthropomorphizes knowledge systems. It is what currently passes 
for French-inflected theory that celebrates the primacy of the lived. N. 
Katherine Hayles, one of the key figures of contemporary posthuman-
ism, proclaims her distinction and theoretical sophistication from a naïve 
computationalism in a return to embodiment, and the lived. For Hayles:
The computational universe becomes dangerous when it 
goes from being a useful heuristic device to an ideology that 
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privileges information over everything else. As we have seen, 
information is a socially constructed concept; in addition 
to its currently accepted definition, it could have been, and 
was, given different definitions. Just because information has 
lost its body does not mean that humans and the world have 
lost theirs.
Fortunately, not all theorists agree that it makes sense to think 
about information as an entity apart from the medium that 
embodies it. Let us revisit some of the sites of the compu-
tational universe, this time to locate those places where the 
resistance of materiality does useful work within the theories. 
From this perspective, fracture lines appear that demystify the 
program(s) and make it possible to envision other futures, 
futures in which human beings feel at home in the universe 
because they are embodied creatures living in an embodied 
world. (Hayles 1999, 244)
This ‘critical’ posthumanism is reactive in two inextricable senses, mor-
ally/politically and epistemologically. As Nietzsche described the logic 
of ressentiment: the lesser value of my life, the suffering or weakness I feel, 
is caused by some evil other—an other whose power and mastery proves 
their evil and my valued innocence. Like nihilism, which posits a higher 
world, diminishes the worth of actuality, and then falls into despair when 
the higher world is lost and there is nothing other than the actual, so res-
sentiment attributes all the world’s ills and evils to the Cartesian man of 
rationalism and instrumental reason, and finds enchanted life and unified 
nature to be worthy because innocent and other than human. One posits 
a value outside life (humanity) that would render life meaningful or wor-
thy, and when that value is no longer affirmed or believed in one lives on 
in a state of weak, mournful and enslaved subjection. Only the humani-
ties can grant meaning to the world: in the absence of both God and man 
all we are left with is meaning. Various calls to save the humanities rely 
upon an asserted ‘something’ that must be irreducible to the quantitative 
materialism of economic rationalism. Methodologically or epistemologi-
cally this mystical ‘x’ can either be the return of the multitude as self-cre-
ating whole as event (Hardt and Negri), the human as bare potentiality 
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witnessed in its impotentiality (Agamben), the affective or lived experi-
ence that is manifest precisely in its alienation, or just a general weak affir-
mation of meaning (Cottingham 2003, Wolf 2010; Eagleton 2007). Just 
as Foucault (1978) argued that man would be maintained by a process of 
enquiring into his hidden sexuality that must be the cause of his being, 
so the human and humanities survive by continually searching for that 
ultimate cause from which calculative and scientific reasoning must have 
emerged. One reacts against theory and disenchantment by a return to 
the lived. Mark Hansen, self-proclaimed new philosopher of new media, 
insists that it is precisely when digital media produces images with which 
I strive (but fail) to identify or empathize that ‘my’ lived and affective 
embodiment is, by default, re-affirmed: 
the shift of affective power here explored—from image to 
body—goes hand-in-hand, and indeed exemplifies, a larger 
shift currently underway in our incipient digital culture: 
from the preformed technical image to the embodied pro-
cess of framing information that produces images. What this 
means, ultimately, is that we can no longer be content with 
the notion that we live in a culture of already articulated 
images, as philosophers and cultural theorists from at least 
Bergson to Baudrillard have maintained. … Bluntly put, the 
processes governing embodied life in the contemporary info-
sphere are disjunctive from those governing digital informa-
tion. Accordingly, in our effort to reconfigure visual culture 
for the information age, we must take stock of the supple-
mentary sensorimotor dimension of embodied life that this 
heterogeneity makes necessary. Since there is no preformed 
analogy between embodiment and information, the bodily 
response to information—that is to say, affectivity—must 
step in to forge a supplementary one. In order for us to experi-
ence digital information, we must filter it through our embod-
ied being, in the process transforming it from heterogeneous 
data flux into information units—images—that have mean-
ing for us to the precise extent that they catalyze our affective 
response. (Hansen 2003, 225)
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That is, the more inhuman, dehumanizing, replicating, alienating or 
simulating the image—the more the human appears as nothing more 
than appearance susceptible to inauthentic doubling—the more my 
alienated and impossible human feeling persists. It is as though the inten-
sity of the despair I feel at your claims that God does not exist simply 
proves—through my very sense of loss and sadness—that really there 
must be a God or spirituality after all, known in His retreat or in my 
mourning. I feel a loss of meaning, ergo it is.
The second example of subjective recuperation comes from Žižek, who 
draws upon Rancière and Badiou to criticize a postmodern politics of a 
single domain of circulating opinions and tolerated identities in order 
to affirm the event of the subject. In a mode akin to St. Paul’s universal 
Christianity in opposition to Greek sophistry or ‘the Jewish discourse of 
obscurantist prophetism,’ the subject is not an affirmed substance within 
the world, nor a messianic visitation from another world, but is given only 
in its act of break or disorder—again known only in its not being known:
the way to counteract this remerging ultra-politics is not more 
tolerance, more compassion and multicultural understanding 
but the return of the political proper, that is, the reassertion of 
the dimension of antagonism that, far from denying universal-
ity, is consubstantial with it. Therein lies the key component 
of the proper leftist stance, as opposed to the rightest asser-
tion of particular identity: in the equation of universalism with 
the militant, divisive position of engagement in struggle. True 
universalists are not those who preach global tolerances of 
differences and all-encompassing unity but those who engage 
in a passionate fight for the assertion of truth that engages 
them. (Žižek 1998, 1002)
The problem with humanism, so it seems, is that it is deemed to be 
rather inhuman. The Cartesian subject of calculative reason, along with 
computational theories of mind or representation, including both older 
humanisms of man as supreme moral animal and posthumanisms envi-
sioning a disembodied world of absolute mastery, cannot cope with the 
complexity and dynamism of affective life. The humanities should, sup-
posedly, be posthuman in this quite specific sense: the destruction of 
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man—the being who represents a world to be known—would give way 
to one single domain of life as living system. There would no longer be a 
privileged center of knowing, nor ‘a’ world in general, just a web, network 
or mesh of multiple worlds. This would either yield a macro-organicism 
of Gaia and deep ecology along with a humanities oriented towards care, 
concern and eco-criticism or deep ecology, or—and these two paths are 
not mutually exclusive—a highly interdisciplinary mode of humanities 
in which words and texts are part of the same circulating web of things, 
bodies, technologies, images or any other event. It is not surprising then 
that philosophy has argued for connecting the mind back to the world 
(Clark 1997) or putting mind into life (Thompson 1997), and for think-
ing of societies and living bodies, as well as political systems and lan-
guages as assemblages of interconnected and immanent, but always real-
ist and material, registers (De Landa 2006; Protevi 2009; Latour 2005). 
But if systems theory, assemblages and living systems approaches allow 
the humanities to live on, no longer as privileged decoders of culture 
but just as readers of systems alongside other (possibly more scientific) 
readers, then perhaps the most valiant posthuman ultra-humanist modes 
of humanities have been those that appeal to science for a grounding of 
their modes of reading; no longer are they seduced by the specialness 
of literary objects. It is in this manner that Brian Boyd neatly points out 
Derrida’s ignorance of the scientific findings for language’s emergence 
from life, a point that then allows Boyd to pursue a science-based liter-
ary Darwinism that, like the work of Joseph Carroll, corrects the ‘high 
theory’ notion of linguistic construction:
If they had been less parochial, the literary scholars awed by 
Derrida’s assault on the whole edifice of Western thought 
would have seen beyond the provincialism of this claim. They 
would have known that science, the most successful branch 
of human knowledge, had for decades accepted antifounda-
tionalism, after Karl Popper’s Logik der Forschung (The Logic 
of Scientific Discovery, 1934) and especially after Popper’s 
1945 move to England, where he was influential among lead-
ing scientists. They should have known that a century before 
Derrida, Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection—
hardly an obscure corner of Western thought—had made 
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anti-foundationalism almost an inevitable consequence. I 
say ‘parochial’ because Derrida and his disciples think only 
in terms of humans, of language, and of a small pantheon of 
French philosophers and their approved forebears, especially 
the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. There was some excuse for 
Derrida in 1966, but there is none for the disciples in 2006, 
after decades of scientific work on infant and animal cogni-
tion. (Boyd 2006)
Like many other turns, returns or reassemblings Boyd’s argument takes 
the form of a redemption narrative: we used to be Cartesian, computa-
tional, humanist, linguistically enclosed, but now we have discovered life. 
The humanities now takes everything in and in abandoning the closure of 
the literary object regains the world—the living, dynamic and interdisci-
plinary world. Manual De Landa also writes about materialism’s capacity 
to save us from linguistic narcissism or idealism (De Landa 2006, 12-13), 
while Andy Clark specifically refers to putting the world back together 
again (although his culprit, as with Evan Thompson, is not French theory 
but Cartesianism and computationalism) (Clark 1998 xi-xii).
Mind is a leaky organ, forever escaping its ‘natural’ con-
fines and mingling shamlessly with body and with world. 
What kind of brain needs such external support, and how 
should we characterize its environmental interactions? What 
emerges, as we shall see, is a vision of the brain as a kind of 
associative engine, and of its environmental interactions as 
an iterated series of simple pattern-completing computa-
tions. (Clark 1998, 53)
Would the humanities be worth saving in such a world? Would not 
humanities scholars be better replaced by journalists—reporting and 
disseminating findings from the sciences—or by scientists themselves? 
If, as Boyd claims, understanding literature really requires understand-
ing evolution would you not rather trust someone with a rigorous train-
ing in that area? And if the body and its neural responses were really the 
basis for what goes on in digital media, who would you save, a critic who 
can correct Deleuze by looking back to Bergson or someone who just 
received a NSF grant for a new fMRI machine? 
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There is a definite historical sense and teleology here: language, lit-
erature and the objects of the humanities—including ‘man’—emerge 
from life. Man, unfortunately, made the mistake of regarding himself as 
distinct from life, leading to Cartesianism and linguisticism, but science 
has redeemed us. Neuroscience has returned the brain to affective emo-
tional life, and evolutionary theory has returned that living affective life 
to a broader narrative of the organism’s efficiency. Interdisciplinarity will 
save the humanities as will a sense of historical emergence or genesis. We 
will become posthuman via consumption—absorbing information and 
methods from the sciences—and extension: no longer limiting human 
predicates such as thought, affect, pathos and signification to humans.
It might seem to follow, then, that a combination of the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Michel Serres would finally be in order. Consider the key 
motifs of their works: an inter-weaving of different disciplinary registers 
(mathematics and poetry), a refusal to isolate the human animal from 
life, a sense of life as a multiplicity, a complex historical sense that would 
destroy the history of man in favor of a history of bodies (where bodies 
would include technological objects, words, languages, animals, polities, 
cities and images) and an emphasis on sense. The latter term would not 
be meaning or the way in which the world is for ‘us’ but would open out 
onto a broader domain of interaction and relations (as well as that which 
is devoid of relation and connection). What I would suggest, though, is 
that there is an inhuman (rather than posthuman) approach to knowledge 
offered by the ways in which Deleuze and Serres approach the problems 
of history and sense, and that such an approach would not extend the life 
of the humanities by melding it with a single interdisciplinary domain 
of which the sciences would also be a part, but would intensify certain 
dimensions of the humanities only by destroying certain majoritarian, 
anthropomorphic or dominant components.
It is true that Deleuze and Guattari weave together insights from sci-
ence linguistics, art, philosophy and the social sciences, not only in A 
Thousand Plateaus but also in What is Philosophy? The latter volume poses 
the question of philosophy as a genuine problem; it does not so much 
define philosophy extensively (generalizing from what has already actu-
ally occurred) but rather creates an intensive plane: if we can see science, 
art and philosophy as they are already given, what are the distinct forces 
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that make these lines of thought possible? On the one hand, philosophy 
art and science emerge from virtual powers (such as the capacity, in art, 
for sensations to be presented as such); on the other hand, Deleuze and 
Guattari also specify the economic, imaginary, geographical and histori-
cal conditions for something like the philosophical practice for creat-
ing concepts. They also locate art, not in human practice, but in animal 
life. However, it is precisely through the expansion of a disciplinary ten-
dency beyond its human form that Deleuze and Guattari destroy a cer-
tain model of inter-disciplinarity. If one could think of concepts, affects 
and functions not as practices grounded in a self-maintaining human life, 
then one would not only have to rethink the supposed self-evident good 
of inter-disciplinarity and the unity of the humanities, but also the future 
and survival of disciplines and the dominant image of the (now highly 
humanized) humanities. Such a future would not assume the value of liv-
ing on in its current form, either of humanity or the humanities, and it 
would abandon such assumed values precisely because of what we might 
refer to—after Serres—as climate change. If we could imagine the radical 
sense of climate, from clima and inclination, or the inflection that yields 
a certain patterning of what surrounds us, then we might say that now is 
the time to question the human and posthuman basis of thinking, espe-
cially when the posthuman has been a return of the human into one sin-
gle life with one single inclination, that of ongoing self-maintenance. To 
conclude with a more positive—which is to say, destructive—approach 
to thinking beyond the interdisciplinarity of the humanities I will con-
clude with drawing upon two concepts from Serres—parasitism and pol-
lution—and two concepts from Deleuze and Guattari: concepts/affects 
and higher deterritorialization. Assembled together these concepts can 
yield a new sense of sense and a new sense of history.
At its broadest the concept of parasitism would at first seem to place 
Serres’s approach within a single and unified field of knowledge, as it 
yields a model not just for relations among living bodies, but for infor-
mation systems and—one might say—life in general. But if the relation 
of parasitism, and its capacity to displace the illusion of predator-prey 
relations, is general , then what parasitism discloses are irreducible dif-
ferences and 
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ularities that require highly discerned cuts and judgments. Whereas 
a predator would be a vaguely self-sufficient body, capable of maintain-
ing itself and using some other body as means of sustenance, the parasite 
would have no existence other than that of supplementarity: ‘And that 
is the meaning of the prefix para- in the word parasite: it is on the side, 
next to, shifted; it is not on the thing, but on its relation. It has relations, 
as they say, and makes a system of them. It is always mediate and never 
immediate’ (Serres 2007, 38-39).
To claim that man is parasitic, rather than a predator, and that this 
occurs in a life of parasitism in general entails several consequences for 
humanism, posthumanism and the ‘disciplines’ that might be adequate to 
thinking the inhuman. If one abandons the concept of predator then one 
also abandons the concept of the good and just relation: it would not be 
the case that a proper humanity would use ‘its’ natural milieu according 
to reasonable or ecological needs, maintaining a balance with a world he 
uses but towards which he could also contribute (by cultivating, re-plant-
ing, mitigating, adapting, capping, trading and offsetting). There would 
be no good humanity of reasonable predatory use that might be morally 
distinguished from a parasitic humanity that would be nothing more 
than a consumer or digester of energies not its own. For that is the nature 
of distinction and being: one is not a unified body that then might pro-
duce good (self-sustaining) or evil (ultimately short-term and destruc-
tive) relations to one’s milieu. 
Let us accept that humanity is and must be parasitic: it lives only in 
its robbing and destruction of a life that is not its own. Our current pre-
dicament of climate change, whereby we have consumed and ingested 
blindly—bloating and glutting our body politic through the constant 
destruction of resources without recompense—would not be a late acci-
dent, nor a misjudgment of a post-industrial age. To be a body is to be 
a consuming body, to be in a relation of destructive consumption with 
what is effected as other, as resource, through consumption. Climate 
change would be the condition of human organicism in general: for there 
would be no climate, only clinamen, an inclination, deviancy or parasit-
ism that creates a supplemental body (of man) who would then retroac-
tively imagine that he has an environment, a klima, for which he ought 
to have been more mindful. But if this places humanity as one aspect of 
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a general parasitism, then it is also the case that ‘man’ occurs as a specific 
inclination or deviation, and it would be the task of thinking to examine 
each parasitic swerve (human and non-human) according to its own dif-
ferential. The deviation that enables mathematical systems, for example, 
would occur when the counting procedure deflects from living praxis and 
becomes a formalized supplemental system. From here one could then 
examine the geneses of formalization and ideality. Similarly, one could 
see poetry as a specific parasite, taking the language of speech and action 
and developing a relation among sounds and rhythms of the voice and 
script, but with no benefit from the organic or living bodies and practices 
from which it emerged. 
Attempts to return systems to the sense of their origin—to see litera-
ture as benefiting the bodies from which it emerged, to see digital media 
as grounded in affect and embodiment, or to see all disciplines as expres-
sions of one self-maintaining life-world would be to suffer from the illu-
sion that parasitism goes in two directions. Not only does Serres insist 
that it does not; this irreversibility can be evidenced by any semi-autono-
mous or parasitic system. A system develops its own laws of survival irre-
spective of its host, and this is so even if the complexity of relations often 
confuses—for observers—who is host and who is parasite. Not only 
could there be no general inter-disciplinary humanities, whereby each 
discipline recognized its place in the ongoing self-understanding of man; 
each declination or parasitism would have its own inflection. As parasitic 
it could not be grounded in ‘the’ body of a single life.
This leads to pollution, which cannot be seen as some late-industrial 
nor specifically human inclination. It would not be the deviation from 
proper inhabitation, for inhabitation as such involves not just added 
markers or territorial inscriptions but contributing something like waste 
or matter that elicits disgust or revulsion to an approaching outsider 
(Serres 2008, 29). There is a connection here with parasitism that further 
debilitates (or ought to debilitate) ‘our’ usual notions of ecology, environ-
ment and symbiotic interconnectedness. Pollution is not simply making 
a niche, having a world that would, in turn, contribute to other worlds; 
to pollute or mark a space as one’s own habitus is to subtract, diminish 
and defile the origin’s integrity. If there is only pollution, and if there is 
no clean or ethical living, or if ethos is entwined with abjection then one 
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could not attribute climate change to man alone. That is another way 
of saying that climate change would not be recognizable as long as one 
remained in a human or posthuman mode of thinking: for such a mode 
would begin with man destroying his milieu (anthropogenic climate 
change would then require man to mitigate, adapt or trade in order to live 
on). And posthuman celebrations of a single ecology would not be able 
to face a condition of climate change in general. To live and inhabit is to 
be parasitic, to pollute, to alter the clima, to effect an inclination that can-
not be remedied or mitigated by some return or retrieval of the proper. 
This suggests several critical and positive conclusions. Critically one 
could no longer ground ethics on an understanding of a proper human-
ity: not only humanity in general but any living form—any being that 
marks or territorializes itself—must distinguish itself from its milieu. In 
the beginning would be neither mutual exchange nor symbiosis but theft 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, 203). Survival and self-maintenance, or 
the creation of a specificity or identity, require deviation and distortion. 
Where does this leave notions of ecology, symbiosis and Gaia? On the 
one hand Serres’s focus on the clinamen reinforces the relational aspect 
of all being: there are not identities or terms that then enter into relation, 
nor a world of individuals or beings who must then somehow contract 
with or contact each other. But this is not to suggest either that there 
is one harmonious world, expressed each in its own way by each living 
form. On the contrary, as in Deleuze’s monadology, Serres’s Leibnizian 
world is one of incompossibility. Not only is each inclination or deviation 
an opening and disruption of a quite specific or singular differential—a 
quite singular creation of a field—it occurs always as disruption of other 
differentials and relations. The emphasis on parasitism and pollution pre-
cludes any nostalgia or restoration; in the beginning is defilement. This 
then yields a far more positive conception of a natural contract, which 
would not be man becoming one with nature as one living and symbi-
otic whole. Rather, it is precisely the supposedly ethical position of man 
as an interdisciplinary animal—man as assembler and negotiator of a 
single field of knowledges—that would give way to a natural contract that 
is a multiplicity, with divergent rather than harmonious lines of inflec-
tion. Climate change in a positive sense, following on from this parasit-
ism and pollution, would occur as a negotiation or natural contract of the 
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infinitely multiple. The contract is at once epistemological and legal, for 
it requires not only that man recognize his natural milieu, but that the very 
concepts of milieu, environment and climate in their singular sense would have 
to be rendered obsolete if nature also ‘contracts.’ Nature also has its inflec-
tions, worlds, multiplicities and differentials. We could not, then, imagine a 
grounding or ideal (even inaccessible) nature that is lost in the creation 
of technical systems. There has always been globalization; each event in 
the world is a disturbance or distortion that enables something like an 
inflection or inclination to occur from chaos. (A new threshold occurs 
with modern post-industrial humanity precisely because its inflections 
do not just radiate outward and create local distortions but deterritori-
alize or become inflections of the whole, capable of infecting or pollut-
ing every other line of system or parasitism.) The ‘contract’ of the natu-
ral contract is therefore not a signature (an act of the hand, inscribing a 
blank surface) but a contraction (the introduction of a noise or pollutant 
that ramifies throughout the open whole). Here is where Serres’s work 
connects with Deleuze’s similarly divergent Leibniz-ism. The world is a 
monadology, an infinitely divisible chaos in which smaller and smaller 
differentials will enable subtler and subtler relations and encounters—
so that there is no nature in general outside or beyond the multiplicity 
of contractions: ‘organs fully belong to matter because they are merely 
the contraction of several waves or rays: the nature of a receptive organ is 
to contract’ (Deleuze 2006b, 111). If, today, networks of technology and 
techno-science have, in their parasitism, effected something like a total-
ity of nature in general, this is not as an object of scientific knowledge so 
much as a field of implication:
Classical Western philosophy never calculated the cost of 
knowledge or action but considered them to be free of charge. 
However, as soon as work appears, everything is subject to 
the martial law of price. The yield of work is never one on 
one; there are always residues and garbage. As long as work 
remains cold and local, price is calculated in terms of profit 
and loss. As soon as heat enters work, the productivity of the 
thermic machine is calculated. When world-objects are in 
operation, the cost becomes commensurable with a world 
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dimension. Local, negligible waste is succeeded by global pol-
lution of the world. (Serres 2006)
In a manner that seems close to Hardt and Negri’s positing of a new 
global humanity effected through the immaterial networks of technology 
Serres suggests that a global ‘we’ has emerged, requiring a reflexive disci-
pline concerned with humanity’s total polluting power. Here is where one 
might note a disjunction between the affirmation of the people as ‘miss-
ing’ in Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 176) and Serres’s almost mournful 
lament of this new ‘we’ with unforeseen destructive powers that finally 
produces nature as a totality (not so much as on object of knowledge but 
as a consequence of destruction). 
For Serres something like humanity has been rendered possible and 
effective not because of knowledge as recognition but because of a 
general polluting and parasitic power that has overtaken the locality 
of systems and relative disturbances. If we align this new ‘subject’ with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s recognition of capitalism as an axiomatic then 
this provides us with a new way of thinking about a positively destructive 
‘humanities.’ This would be inhuman, rather than posthuman, precisely 
because the creation of the single system or axiom where work and pro-
duction overcode all other relations, including supposedly environmen-
tal or ecological imperatives of survival and adaptation, would need to be 
annihilated to give way to differentials along a different axis.
Consider, here, Deleuze and Guattari’s created concepts, in What is 
Philosophy? which are not extensive insofar as they do not name or gener-
alize actually existing disciplines but are intensive: they create or mark out 
speeds and rhythms for thinking. Consider concepts: although it is possi-
ble in a weak and general sense to locate concepts as one part of everyday 
speech, Deleuze and Guattari create a concept of concepts. A concept, 
considered philosophically, possesses a unique speed and rhythm. The 
concept of the cogito, for example, did not label an already existing entity, 
nor did it perform a move in an already practiced language game. Rather, 
when Descartes creates the concept of the cogito he slows thought 
down, retreats from action and efficiency, and from practical communi-
cation and institutes a thoroughly new, virtual and philosophic terrain. 
Doubt is oriented to a perception of the world as calculable, of ‘a’ subject 
as self-present, of philosophy as a mode of questioning and of bodies as 
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suspended or placed in parentheses. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari also 
create the concept of affects/percepts and functions. The former do not 
describe already existing art practices, nor what art always is. Like the 
concept of philosophy and its capacity to create concepts, the concept of 
art (as the production of affects/percepts) intuits a potentiality that may 
exist in a mixed or impure form in thinking as it currently is, but that can 
be intimated and gestured to futurally in what thought might be. What 
would it be to create a percept that would not be the perception of some 
observer, or an affect that would be neither the affection of an author nor 
an affection produced in the reader/viewer? 
By creating the concept of the concept in What is Philosophy? Deleuze 
and Guattari allow for a new mode of philosophy: if democracy is a con-
cept then the problem of democracy is not so much what it is (what social 
systems are really democratic) but the orientation it creates in thinking. 
What would it be to develop a socius with no other power than its own 
capacity for decision? Similarly, by creating the concept of affects and 
percepts they enable a new mode of art theory: how might we imagine 
a work, not as the communication of an author, nor as the representa-
tion of a world, nor as the meaning it yields for its readers, but as a ‘stand 
alone’ or monumental detachment of percepts and affects from the lived? 
The affect or percept would yield color as such, melancholy as such: one 
might think here of the attempt to capture light in paint, to capture the 
sounds of the earth in synthesizers, or the striving to sculpt courage in 
stone. Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts—the concept of philosophy as 
the creation of concepts, of art as the production of affects—allow us to 
think beyond ‘the humanities,’ beyond ‘interdisciplinarity,’ and they do 
so in ways that intersect fruitfully with Serres’s concepts of parasitism, 
pollution and a new humanity. 
For Serres a threshold is reached with current extensions of pollu-
tion that create a difference in kind. Humanity is no longer one pollut-
ant or polluter among others, creating a territory, milieu or inclination. 
Humanity effects a climate change of climates; there are no longer mul-
tiplicities of inclinations, but an inclination or clima that has extended 
to such a degree that is constitutes a difference in kind—a pollution of 
such intensity that it now precludes the dynamisms, systems and distur-
bances of anything outside its own terrain. Serres argues that this calls for 
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a concept of humanity. Such a concept would not be a reflection upon 
man as he is or has been, would not be a critical uncovering of the spe-
cific life of man. As a futural concept it would, like Deleuze and Guattari’s 
created concepts of philosophy, art and science, require and enable an 
interrogation into humanity as inclination. How is it possible that in a life 
or earth that is nothing other than a multiplicity of inclinations and para-
sitisms one specific line or disturbance has taken over the whole, at the 
very expense of its own tendency? If all life is improper, noisy, disturbing 
and deprived of any grounding or proper form—if, in the beginning, is 
the swerve—then how might one account for both the overtaking of the 
plane of disturbances and the emerging desire for a survival not of man as 
he is—a humanity that would manage its polluting tendencies—but that 
might create a new concept of itself? 
The very concept of the humanities in its dominant form—as critical 
and interdisciplinary—would need to be destroyed in a productive man-
ner. This is because the idea of man that underpins the humanities as an 
interdisciplinary problem has been extensive: disciplines are activities, 
achieved by a division of labor, with man examining himself as a histori-
cal animal whose life creates him as a social and linguistic being capable 
of self-reflection and communication. It is not surprising that this man 
of reflexive knowledge and moral self-management confronts climate 
change as an extensive and managerial problem: how might we use less 
in order to live longer, how might we act more frugally in order to sur-
vive? But if we accept that there are capacities or potentialities that are 
not those of managerial man—either Serres future humanity or Deleuze 
and Guattari’s ‘still-missing people’—then we would have to abandon 
the idea of earth as environment to which we might bear our proper and 
restorative relation, along with the humanities as some domain of com-
munication that might return us to our better selves. A futural approach 
to disciplines would embrace and intensify the distinct inclinations 
of thinking—the differences of thinking in concepts, colors, sounds, 
affects—and would not assume precisely what climate change forces us 
to question: Why, if information regarding our polluting and parasitic 
existence is so extensive, are we so incapable of thinking intensively, of 
imagining a different inclination beyond that of the adaptation and sur-
vival of man?
Chapter 9
Why Saying ‘No’ to Life is Unacceptable
Just what counts as acceptable or unacceptable is obviously a cultural, 
social and historical variable. That being so it might still be possible to 
make claims regarding broader structures of unacceptability, and certain 
motifs that, within epochs, dominate cultural production. We can perhaps 
begin by asking—today—just what might count as unacceptable in gen-
eral. That is to say, one can imagine all forms of socially refused content, 
ranging from prohibited actions and lifestyles to censored content. But 
on what grounds or by what logic is the border between the acceptable 
and the unacceptable drawn? The problem can be given some generality 
and purchase today if we ask what the rationale for accepting or refusing 
something might be, and—further—what forms the limit of acceptabil-
ity today. I would suggest that despite dispute over what counts as accept-
able the governing rationale for dispute is the concept of life: one either 
argues for an intrinsic ‘right to life’ or one asserts one’s rights to choose 
on the basis of the autonomy of one’s own life. The logic of normativity is 
grounded on life, which is to say that norms are not—as they once might 
have been—given transcendently (as what is dictated by God or social 
propriety)—but are immanent to life. One either argues against gay mar-
riage, single parenting or other alternative lifestyles on the grounds that it 
threatens ‘our way of life’ (including the family, reproduction, maintain-
ing humanity as it is), or one insists on the right to determine one’s life. 
Cultural production also reinforces this unquestioned affirmation of life: 
from lifestyle channels, to reality television’s display of life, to celebrity 
culture to legal and medical dramas and the increasingly close-angled 
camera work displaying the minutiae of life, all external criteria give way 
to the value of life itself. At first glance it appears that the enlightenment 
project of removing all forms of transcendent justification—Church, 
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State, privilege and prejudice—has been achieved, and now there is 
nothing other than life. And yet, such a frenzied surge in an unquestion-
ing insistence on the value of life is accompanied both by an inability to 
confront the imminent demise of life (whether that be by way of accel-
erated extinction due to climate change, or disaster scenarios resulting 
from terrorism, nuclear warfare, viral pandemic or bio-weapons and 
resource depletion—or, the inevitable panic that would follow on from 
and exacerbate the appearance of any of these threats.) In addition to 
the shrill insistence on the primacy of life, and alongside the deluge of 
information regarding increasing and exponentially accelerating threats 
to life, there has been a strange incapacity to ask the question of life. That 
is: now that life appears to be in danger of disappearance, diminution or 
mutation beyond recognition, living humans indulge both in greater and 
greater insistence on the sanctity of life, and seem incapable of directly 
confronting the intensifying threats that menace the present. 
The hinge of the acceptable is life, both because acceptability is nego-
tiated on the basis of life, and because any question of life is evidently 
unacceptable. This inadmissibility of the question is most clearly the 
case precisely when the question of life seems to have been posed. That 
is, when cultural production turns directly (as it does occasionally) to 
the problem of life, it is precisely at that point that the question of life 
refuses to be asked. The question of what we accept and do not accept, 
what we can consider or question and what remains beyond question, is 
probably always a query of some interest. But the question of the value 
of life should gain in interest (if not urgency) for us now, and for three 
reasons. First, the question or problem of life is now an actual question 
that is everywhere being asked (and yet also deferred in the very mode 
of the question’s formation.) We are no longer simply confronted with 
the ‘meaning’ of life, or the enigma of existence, for it is quite possible, 
probable or increasingly certain that we will begin to witness the begin-
ning of the end of life (mass extinctions, resource depletion threatening 
human order, climate change that is moving at a pace beyond predictions 
of exponential acceleration, and even the strange mutation of the human 
brain via digital technologies and visual culture that may spell the ‘end’ 
of cognitive man). Yet, oddly enough, despite the urgency of this prob-
lem the question of life has—more than ever—been articulated in terms 
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of meaning, with a flurry of supposedly deeply philosophical accounts of 
the unavoidable horizon of meaning when approaching what appears as 
life (Wolf 2010; Cottingham 2003; Eagleton 2007). Further, and despite 
recent academic and philosophical insistence upon life’s meaning, there 
has been a surge of cultural production focusing on life’s termination—
ranging from disaster fiction and cinema to survival guides for end-of-
the-world scenarios. In addition to a flourishing genre of post-apoca-
lyptic cinema and literature, there have also been documentaries and 
non-fictional thought experiments about the world without humans, the 
aftermath that would follow catastrophes, and other human-witnessed 
posthuman scenarios. In sum, the problem of the continuation of life 
ought to be at the forefront of reflective inquiry (and is indeed played out 
in a series of fictional and semi-fictional scenarios) but the problem is (in 
that very process of being played out) displaced. It is as though cultural 
production, at least in its dominant mode, is indulging in Freud’s grand-
son’s Fort-Da game: we play and replay the disappearance and reappear-
ance of life, and do this to anticipate and master an event that concerns 
our (in this case, very real and possible) non-existence. Third and finally, 
even in its barely articulated, suggested, but not fully posed mode, the 
form of the question of life has altered in the twenty-first century. Until 
recently, if the problem of life were posed it took the form of theodicy, 
or justification: of how ‘we’ can explain life’s utter cruelty and seeming 
disregard for human suffering. It is this question that is played out in Job, 
in Greek tragedy, in Milton’s Paradise Lost and even perhaps in modern 
novels, such as William Godwin’s Caleb Williams, where inscrutable 
injustice is now politicized (and can be attributed to corrupt and there-
fore remediable institutions). A pre-modern form of tragedy would, in 
pre-Christian mode, confront the tragic contingency and inhumanity of 
life (and it was Nietzsche who admired this noble capacity of Greek trag-
edy’s encounter with the brute force of existence); in Christian thought, 
especially in its modern Miltonic mode, the seeming tragic senselessness 
of life will ultimately be redeemed in a regained paradise. In works such 
as Godwin’s Caleb Williams the experience of tragic desperation and the 
inhumanity of life is historicized and seen to be symptomatic of a social 
system that may (and should) be transformed. These modern novelistic 
explorations of life’s cruelty are tales of fortitude, and of the nobility and 
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dignity of withstanding the force of existence. The endpoint of this tradi-
tion might be Kafka or Beckett, in which the individual confronts a life 
that is tragically void of all sense and (for that individual at least) hope. 
One can either interpret Kafka and Beckett existentially (as writers who 
face the void of non-meaning) or regard that experience of the void as 
a (potentially) political hope for a world of non-damaged life. It is per-
haps thoroughly modern to shift from a tragic acceptance of the brute 
contingency of life to some sense that the struggle itself is one of per-
sonal meaning. (This was why Nietzsche so admired the ancient Greeks, 
for having the capacity to experience the violence and ‘festive cruelty’ of 
life’s force, without moralizing [Nietzsche 2000]. Today, and for some 
time, the tragic mode has become less acceptable as tragic. Some form of 
resolution or compensation usually closes narrative form. The forces of 
good triumph in the end, or suffering itself is given meaning: Hollywood 
cinema rarely allows itself a conclusion void of redemption, while tales 
of suffering—from Born on the Fourth of July (1989) to The Pursuit of 
Happyness (2006) and 127 Hours (2010) are morality plays of individual 
triumph rather than an exploration of cosmic indifference.) Even so, and 
despite a refusal to confront the limits of life just when the historical actu-
ality of life’s end is becoming apparent, though not witnessed, it is pos-
sible to note a shift of genre away from human-to-human adversity to, at 
least initially, something like a war between humans and the cosmos (and 
this despite all the deep ecology proclamations of our oneness with life).
A new mode of the question of life has come to dominate cultural pro-
duction: not, ‘Why are humans subjected to the brutal force of existence?’ 
but: given human brutality and life-destructiveness, by what right will 
humans continue to survive? It is no longer life that needs to be justified, 
but the human species’ malevolent relation to life. Nietzsche had already 
charted the ways in which ‘man’ as a moral animal had been effected from 
an inability to accept the violence of the forces of life. Whereas Ancient 
Greek tragedy was initially akin to a theater of cruelty, not yet indulging 
in justification, the positing of a ‘higher world’ that would justify life cre-
ated man as a slavish animal (Nietzsche 2007). When that higher world 
was turned inward, it was not God who enslaved man, but ‘humanity’: 
we are now always already guilty, chastened and humiliated by an ideal 
of our own making, and fall into nihilistic despair if the once imagined 
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higher world seems no longer real. Freud made a similar observation: 
once we move from a tribal competitiveness and warring aggression and 
take on the command to love one’s neighbor as oneself we can only react 
neurotically: in my failure to love my fellow man I will turn that guilt 
back upon myself in damaging self-aggression. Both Freud and Nietzsche 
diagnosed the twentieth century’s incapacity to face up to the inhuman 
contingency of existence; if life is horrific then someone must be guilty, 
and why not both attribute that guilt to man as he has been, while insist-
ing on a proper humanity that will emerge from the human wreckage?
We simply cannot live existence without granting it some sort of mean-
ing. That, itself, is not the problem. As Adorno and Horkheimer described 
the dialectic of enlightenment: the ‘shudder’ of existence prompts a 
magical projection of our own anthropomorphic limits on the world. If 
enlightenment destroys the mimesis or doubling of the world that has 
reconfigured life in order to render it acceptable to humans, this process 
of enlightenment nevertheless achieves ‘disenchantment’ by containing 
and mastering the world—silencing all the sounds of damage and suffer-
ing. The horrors of twentieth-century atrocities did much to destroy our 
forms of meaning, allowing high modernism and the art of the absurd to 
emerge. For Adorno, modern art’s refusal to grant the world harmonious 
order was a sign that we might be able to move beyond our inability to 
confront disjunction. We need to move beyond an absurd abandonment 
of all hope without falling back into kitsch resignation with art acting as 
the promise of happiness. Yet today it is not nihilistic despair in the face 
of non-meaning that seems to be the dominant affect. On the contrary, 
not only is meaning now the seemingly unquestionable horizon of human 
existence—ranging from ‘philosophical’ studies to the Oprah Winfrey 
Network and projects of individual self-development—cultural produc-
tion reaches its points of tragic despair by questioning the rampant vio-
lence of humans in relation to life rather than life’s lack of concern for 
humans. It is not humanity that is cruelly placed in an inhuman world, 
so much as an inhuman humanity that has become unjustifiable in an 
anthropomorphized world. 
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The Post-Apocalytpic
The opening of the twenty-first century is marked by a supposedly new 
genre (or the efflorescence of an old genre) of the post-apocalyptic. 
However this term is used, one way we can make sense of the post-apoc-
alyptic is to note that scenes of near-destruction of the human milieu 
are followed by an exploration of what will survive or remain, or what 
ought to survive or remain, after the absence of humanity as we now 
know it. The post-apocalyptic is best read as a question posed: just as the 
human species starts to approach the real possibility of its actual non-
existence (whether through climate change, viral pandemic, terrorist use 
of nuclear or bio-weapons, wars on the terror aiming to avert the latter, 
resource depletion, panic, or any conjunction of the foregoing) there 
is a barely perceived and half-articulated problem of how and whether 
humans ought to survive. What is it about humanity that one would want 
to accept? Further—as the very use of the word ‘post-apocalyptic’ indi-
cates—the genres and modes in which this problem is articulated pre-
clude the problem from being posed. There is a constitutive inability to 
confront the very content that ‘we’ are nevertheless constantly replaying. 
According to Freud art is primarily a rendering acceptable of otherwise 
indulgently unacceptable private content (Freud 1908). Jokes, similarly, 
allow otherwise unacceptable content to circulate, allowing what can 
be thought but not really said to find some outlet (thus explaining, for 
Freud, the body’s explosion in laughter). Beyond Freud, and in a line that 
runs at least from Adorno to Jameson, there is a commitment to the idea 
of narrative and form as processes that render the intolerable tolerable. 
Despite its debt to Marx, this strand of what I would refer to as existential 
or Hegelian Marxism problematizes a Marxist concept of ‘the political’ 
that has tended to dominate whatever is left today of ideology critique: 
according to this basic Marxist imperative of politicizing or denaturaliz-
ing whatever appears as simple, inevitable, universal or irrevocable, one 
ought to historicize the present, and account for the genesis of the social 
and political world on the basis of ‘man’s’ transformation of that world. 
What appears as intolerable should not be seens as inevitable but re-read 
as an outcome of the division of labor and the conditions of production. 
Nothing should simply appear as transcendent, inhuman and inscrutable. 
For Adorno, working against theodicy, there is an imperative to maintain 
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an irresolvable negativity or disjunction between the sense we make of 
the world and a ‘world itself ’ that can only be given as other than the 
human (Adorno 1983, 361). The shudder of existence, or the brute oth-
erness of life that simply cannot be lived, is tempered in general by the 
projective processes that form the world. What appears today in the form 
of ‘the aesthetic’ enables us to have some sense of a historical trajectory in 
which the radically alien and contingent force of life has passed through a 
process of animism, or a mythologizing reduction of the world, through 
enlightenment (or the reduction of the world to so much calculable and 
‘disenchanted’ matter) through to modernism (Adorno and Horkheimer 
2002). Modernism, for Adorno, is counter-bourgeois and counter-kitsch, 
an experience of form in its deadness, in its incommensurability with life. 
Without endorsing Adorno’s high modernist resistance to the easily con-
sumed and already circulating forms that render the world always already 
amenable, it is nevertheless worthwhile to pursue this crucial insight: art 
can be seen as having a humanizing function, a rendering of the world into 
some form of manageable order. In quite different ways Paul de Man, also 
indebted to Hegel in some respects, and also less ready to see language’s 
ordering of the world as a process of meaning or familiarity, sought to 
draw attention—however impossibly—to language and form as radically 
inhuman (Cohen, Colebrook and Miller 2011). For both Adorno and 
De Man, the text or art operates as a disjunction, negation or instance of 
‘deadness’ or ‘afterlife.’ It is the lure of ‘the aesthetic’ to imagine that art is 
somehow an expression of ‘life.’ 
If art in general is a formalizing process that grants the raw violence 
of life some moralizing structure, then certain modes of narrative would 
seem to intensify what Fredric Jameson (writing after Adorno) has sum-
marized as the ideological transformation of existential horror into social 
symbolization. Science fiction, for example, codes otherness as such into 
the delimited and opposed figure of the alien or invader ( Jameson 2005, 
141). (Spy fiction has its different narrative modes of discerning or read-
ing just who or what counts as a threatening other, or just where the lim-
its and readability of self and other lie). In so doing narrative parses into a 
temporal project—an overcoming of adversity—what could not be con-
fronted as such: our subjection to life. The novelistic imagination tends 
to personalize, or even render familial, the symbolizing order that had 
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once—in epic or tragic modes—required a confrontation with forces 
that required more than ‘life management.’ If one examines cultural pro-
duction today the manifest content that seems at first to confront radi-
cally threatening forces is ultimately returned to the genres of family 
drama and romance, as though even the end of human existence could 
be Oedipalized. That is, there is an efflorescence of disaster and post-
apocalyptic narrative, but always with a narrative resolution that restores 
a basic human binary (such as the romance ending that allows humanity 
to triumph in The Adjustment Bureau [2011] or the victory of New Age 
humanoids over corporate and military greed in Avatar [2009].) Even a 
story as bleak as Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (especially in its cinematic 
adaptation of 2009), devolves around a father-son relation: the man and 
boy wander a landscape while struggling for survival against remaining 
humans; the journey concludes with a sense of the possible renewal of 
the family-maternal bond as the son is taken in by a potential new fam-
ily. In blockbuster entertainment, the 2008 film Traitor figured the ‘war 
on terror’ and the conflict between fundamental Islam and US security 
and espionage as ultimately a problem of fraternal misunderstanding: 
the warring individuals ultimately find common cause in the discovery 
of their underlying humanity. It is as though terrorism and militarism 
could be overcome if only we could return, once again, to face-to-face 
encounters. One might add to this continual anthropogenicism any num-
ber of disaster epics that are organized into human-human agonistics: it 
is never the earth, the climate, contingency or catastrophe as such that is 
presented as the intruding force of destruction; rather, it is some identifi-
able face that allows the sheer violence of adversity to be translated into a 
resolvable and symbolized other. 
Occasionally, however, within narrative trajectories there have been 
moments when the question of life reaches articulation. If life—or the idea 
of a body that goes through time, manages an external world, and then 
arrives at its own end—has always been figured through some narrative 
imaginary that renders stark contingency into a mastered and acceptable 
sense (Brooks 1984), then the question of life seems to destroy narrative. 
I want to cite two pre-contemporary examples before looking at the dif-
ferent ways in which the question of life’s acceptability has changed its 
structure in the twenty-first century.
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Narrative Life
In Milton’s Paradise Lost, which is a self-proclaimed theodicy or justifica-
tion of the apparent intolerability of life, Adam asks God why he (Adam) 
was made so unfairly and impossibly free. If we accept that man deserves 
to be expelled from paradise because he chose to transgress the order of 
Eden, it does not follow that man deserved to be given this task in the 
first place. Adam’s lament cries out against the burden of human freedom, 
or man’s capacity to act against life. Why did God make him thus? 
Did I request thee, Maker, from my Clay
To mould me Man, did I sollicite thee
From darkness to promote me, or here place
In this delicious Garden? as my Will
Concurd not to my being, it were but right
And equal to reduce me to my dust,
Desirous to resigne, and render back
All I receav’d, unable to performe
Thy terms too hard, by which I was to hold
The good I sought not. To the loss of that,
Sufficient penaltie, why hast thou added
The sense of endless woes? inexplicable
Thy Justice seems; yet to say truth, too late,
I thus contest; then should have been refusd
Those terms whatever, when they were propos’d: 
(Paradise Lost 10: 742-757).
God responds by unfolding a vision of history: Adam will see increas-
ing violence and destruction, but will eventually see man benefit from 
grace and forgiveness. If, after all this evil, God will still sacrifice his son, 
allowing man to receive a law that is now internalized and accepted from a 
condition of forgiven fallenness, then life once more makes sense. Human 
life, for all its apparent perversity is ultimately a higher good, all the bet-
ter for having turned away from, and then re-found, itself. One might say 
that all narratives are theodicies, or ways in which the seemingly sense-
less destruction of existence is given redemptive form. The unacceptable 
is rendered acceptable, not just in the sense of what is socially frowned 
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upon being presented as more palatable—but in a more radical sense in 
which something like the social is formed. Narrative creates the lure of a 
world in common, an order of sense and humanity, in which otherness is 
personalized and rendered familial and familiar. 
This has specific purchase today: it is almost as though the more 
unimaginable the possible forces of destruction appear to be, the more 
local our narrative imagination becomes. In addition, though, to the 
process of narrative as social symbolization—in which order as such is 
constituted—the problems, intolerable conflicts or disjunctions to which 
narrative responds are varied. One can imagine the ways in which race, 
sex, social disintegration, internecine conflicts, historical transitions and 
so forth, all need to be worked through by narrative ( Jameson 214). 
What is suggested by Adorno’s approach, and in Jameson’s concept of 
ideology, is that these ‘political’ figures are ideological precisely because 
they give a binary and humanized form to existential conflict as such:
The fantasy level of a text would then be something like the 
primal motor force which gives any cultural artifact its reso-
nance, but which must always find itself diverted to other, 
ideological functions, and reinvested by what we have called 
the political unconscious. ( Jameson 129)
On the one hand, then, there is an ordering or meaning-producing 
function of narrative, a function that answers what might be referred to 
in general as the problem of existence. On the other hand, there are his-
torically specific ways in which the modes of this question or conflict are 
formed; the ways in which intolerable life is reconfigured and rendered 
acceptable vary according to just what the horrific other of humanity is 
deemed to be. 
In Paradise Lost, and theodicy generally, the problem is the burden of 
human freedom in relation to a God and life that must be conducive to 
harmony. In Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein the similarly formed question 
is now directed to man (Victor Frankenstein) by his monstrous progeny. 
Here the question is not so much human freedom as humanity’s creation 
of a world in which its offspring are then abandoned. What duty do we 
owe to the future? If Victor Frankenstein plays God he does so not only 
in his creation of a living being who is at once a mirror of his own being 
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and yet deemed by him to be lesser, but also in his tyrannical laying down 
of terms the monster cannot accept. Allegorically, Shelley can be seen 
to be posing Milton’s question again, somewhat blasphemously: what 
sort of God creates a being and then leaves it wandering in a world of 
despair? Or, as the monster accuses Victor, ‘You, my creator, abhor me; 
what hope can I gather from your fellow creatures, who owe me nothing? 
They spurn and hate me? The desert mountains and dreary glaciers are 
my refuge.’ (Shelley, 94.)
The creature’s plea to his maker is also an allegorical questioning of 
humanity’s relation to production: how can we leave a populace of the 
future so miserably orphaned? In Shelley’s case this is sharpened by the 
fact that the monstrous being of the future promises to be less rapacious 
than man (even though he still is refused by his creator):
My food is not that of man; I do not destroy the lamb and the 
kid to glut my appetite; acorns and berries afford me sufficient 
nourishment. My companion will be of the same nature as 
myself, and will be content with the same fare. We shall make 
our bed of dried leaves; the sun shall shine on us as on man, 
and will ripen our food. The picture I present to you is peace-
ful and human, and you must feel that you could deny it only 
in the wantonness of power and cruelty. (Shelley, 128-9)
Shelley’s novel is a play of mirrors (directly re-writing Paradise Lost), 
in which ‘man’s’ plea against existence is at once given a political-alle-
gorical form (so that the monster appears to be a disenfranchised other 
who could, in theory, be redeemed and included), at the same time as 
the monster’s creator and pseudo-God also feels the utter horror of what 
it had intended to create as a free, productive and world transforming 
being. The maliciously and thoughtlessly reproductive Victor poses the 
same question to himself: how can one go on living when existence is 
intolerable, when one’s free actions yield such monstrous outcomes: 
‘Cursed, cursed creator! Why did I live? Why, in that instant, did I not 
extinguish the spark of existence which you had so wantonly bestowed?’ 
(121). Shelley’s formulation aims to give some political purchase to the 
existential question, suggesting that it is Victor’s theological imaginary 
that prompts him first to play God and then to hold on to proper notions 
196 Chapter 9
of man and morality in the face of the monster’s rather ecological and 
reasonable request. Even so, Shelley—like Milton—begins by posing the 
question of the intolerable terms of life for man. If Milton seeks resolu-
tion in grace, a ‘paradise within’ and a future when the world shall be ‘all 
in all,’ Shelley suggests a more radical response: the truly human future 
does not close itself off to the non-carnivorous generations who will live 
in the glaciers and deserts. Something like the ‘properly human’ functions 
as Shelley’s political answer to the question of life. Like Marx, Adorno 
and Jameson after her, Shelley will suggest that the existential shudder of 
existence should properly be understood not as a relation between man 
and world, but among men. To varying degrees all these writers—from 
Milton and Shelley, to Marx, Adorno and Jameson—recognize that it is 
ideological and hasty to present adversity as a simple problem in the form 
of an isolated and humanized other, but it is also insufficient to abandon 
thinking and fall into an existential despair with regard to the brute vio-
lence of existence. 
Criticism, in this tradition, has as its task to hold on to the notion that 
damaged life might be redeemed, while avoiding the easy fantasy solu-
tion that would lie in attributing evil to some binary other. To this end 
Shelley undertakes a genealogy of the self: she describes the genesis of 
Victor’s monster, who first encounters the sensations of life and then 
becomes humanized by overhearing a reading of Milton’s Paradise Lost 
(and then Volney’s Ruins of Empire). After this basic training in human-
ity the monster is, however, spurned by those he encounters, primarily 
because of his visible difference from the humans with whom he feels 
such kinship. Shelley’s politicization of what seemed for Milton to be a 
problem of human freedom (or the relation between life and law) is—
if we accept Jameson’s definition of ideology—a counter-ideological 
gesture. What appears as the pure horror of life, or what for the moral-
izing Victor can only be the menacing threat of beings who are radically 
other, is seen ultimately by Shelley to be a problem of critical enlighten-
ment. What appears as existentially unacceptable should be transformed 
through social and political revolution. If recognition were granted to the 
potential hordes of the future one would be faced not with violence but 
sympathy and pity. Political solutions are therefore akin to the formalizing 
procedures of art: what appears as intractable, unacceptable, intolerable 
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or horrifically other can be given resolution by transforming torment as 
such into an anthropogenic problem. If Jameson argues that ideology is 
the way in which politically unacceptable structures are given imaginary 
resolution, and that the social symbolism of narrative completes a redis-
tribution that should properly be revolutionary, then this is because of 
his post-Marxist commitment to transforming seemingly natural, univer-
sal or intractable problems into human-to-human struggles.
Minus the Political
An entire genre of what has come to be known as post-apocalyptic film 
and literature currently and repeatedly, with ever increasing verve, plays 
out a fantasy of human near-disappearance and redemption, and does so 
precisely when our energies ought to be focused on what humans have 
done to the planet and how they might desist from so doing. In response 
to this deluge of cultural production, we would need to adjust the Marxist 
approach to politics and humanization. Marxist critique aims to human-
ize and historicize—the two gestures being the same: what appears to 
be simply and universally intolerable needs to be recognized as having 
a history, where history is a history of labor and human relations. When 
those human relations are naturalized or ‘frozen’—when the family or 
the male-female couple appears as the fantasy frame through which all 
horrors can ultimately be resolved—then, for Marxism, it is the figure 
of bourgeois man that needs to be criticized and historicized. The prob-
lem is deemed to be intra-human and intra-historical: we should be able 
to imagine forms of collective, non-exploitative and historically trans-
formative modes of life—not resign ourselves to the apparent ‘natural’ 
injustices of the present. But what if the problem today were not that of a 
justice among humans? What if social political revolution among human 
beings were still to leave the relation between the human species and life 
in the same place? Today’s frequently cited Marxist cry—it is easier to 
imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism—should be read 
as symptomatic. Should we not be more concerned with the world’s end 
than the relations among markets and individuals? The Marxist premise 
that we cannot save the world ecologically until capitalism is dealt with, 
should be questioned, and reversed: as long as we imagine life and the 
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world to be primarily anthropogenic, or emerging from human mean-
ing and history, we will not confront the disjunction between the human 
species (in all its modes) and the life that it regards as its own. A new 
mode of critique that would not be political would be required. Indeed, 
it is the political gesture, or the understanding of conflicts as ultimately 
intra-human, that needs to be questioned. One needs a hypo-Marxism 
or counter-Marxism whereby the very premise of Marxism—man as a 
laboring animal who furthers his own life—needs to be recognized as the 
limit of thinking. For what ‘we’ cannot accept is the obvious counter to 
this assumption: man is not an animal who furthers his own survival. 
For Milton and Shelley the problem was that of the violence of life 
for an ill-equipped human. Whereas Milton will respond theologi-
cally—arguing that God’s grace and the unfolding of human history will 
justify the seemingly unjustifiable torments of life, Shelley will adopt a 
more modern and political approach: humanity is capable of living well, 
living in a humane manner, if only social and political structures were 
transformed to be conducive to sympathy and recognition. If we came 
into existence like Frankenstein’s monster—through sensations, read-
ing and a dwelling with loving others—rather than through doctrines of 
piety, then we would be capable of living without the torments of impla-
cable injustice. Shelley diagnoses human despair and regards its genesis 
as human, but for that very reason also resolvable. And this is in accord 
with the critical tradition that I have already and that culminates in an 
Adorno who regards the violence of existence to be something humanity 
finds intolerable and will thereby either mythically project onto an ani-
mated other, or ‘rationally’ subject to its own order. Critique or dialec-
tics recognizes that the sense or acceptability we have projected onto the 
world is at once not the world’s own and yet—politically—demands to 
be brought into being.
Things have changed. The overwhelming question that presses itself 
upon us—requiring incessant repression and working through—is not 
the question of how we humans were placed in a world in which the task 
was too hard, the conditions too bleak or the burden of freedom too con-
fronting. The question is not one of how we humans can justify hostile 
life, but how we can possibly justify ourselves given our malevolent rela-
tion to life. 
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The current vogue for what is misleadingly called post-apocalyptic 
fiction seems to indicate that we are now feeling (if not thinking) a new 
relation between the human species and time. More accurately, we are 
experiencing humanity as a species, not just a humanity that emerged 
from the depths of time but a specified mode of organism that will one 
day have had its time. Just as post-Darwinian nineteenth-century litera-
ture had a sense of deep time—feeling some alarming presage of a time 
before humans and adjusted its plot structures accordingly, literary and 
cinematic form is struggling with forms of expression that might cap-
ture a new mode of inhuman time. We rehearse over and over again our 
near annihilation, playing a cosmic version of Freud’s grandson’s fort-da 
game, in which we replay our disappearance (semi-traumatically) and 
then stage our return and redemption (Freud 1961). This problem now 
focuses not on creation—why was man created given the hard terms of 
his existence?—but on extinction: what reasons might we fathom for 
wanting our survival? (Here it is not a question of justifying the life that 
man must face, but of justifying the man who has done so much to de-
face life). Humanity has been violent all too violent; it is not the horror 
of existence that tortures humanity but a humanity that can do nothing 
other than destroy itself and its milieu, and all—perversely—for the sake 
of its own myopic, short-circuited and self-regarding future.
Living Extinction
In 2008 The Day the Earth Stood Still featured a deadpan alien (played 
appropriately by Keanu Reeves) who informed humanity that its vio-
lence and destructive modes of consumption no longer entitled it to life 
on earth.  The narrative of the film proved this judgment and diagnosis 
to be peremptory: Keanu is given the chance to see the benevolent side 
of humanity through the eyes of a young boy, and the annihilation of 
the human species is delayed.  A common motif in science fiction nar-
ratives of alien invasion, the judgment of humanity as life-denying and 
life-unworthy is neither refuted nor answered, but simply set aside as the 
plot hurtles toward redemption.   Humanity is split in two: the worth-
less, violent, historical and life-denying humans perceived by the judg-
ing aliens, and the proper (futural) humanity that is created and revealed 
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by the morality tale of the narrative. In The Adjustment Bureau of 2011, 
human freedom—that which makes us human and therefore supposedly 
worthy—is judged to be the cause of sufficient destruction to the point 
where man’s free existence can no longer be permitted. This adaptation 
of a Philip K. Dick story features a team of intervening agents whose task 
is to allow humanity to run its proper and seemingly free course while 
making minor corrections if events appear to stray from their appropriate 
end. The heart of the film concerns a love story that is at odds with the 
prescribed order of events. Despite a series of more and more complex 
adjustments, and in the face of all adversity, the lovers—even with one 
of them knowing about the ‘adjustments’—remain committed to their 
love. They stand firm, despite the warnings of the catastrophes that fol-
low. The tale is heroic and Promethean, but not tragic. In the end it is 
this miniscule and possibly disastrous granting of human love and free-
dom—against the ‘adjustments’ of the angelic guardians—that wins the 
day. One of the adjusters had already explained to the male lead (Matt 
Damon) that human freedom, when given free reign, has led to the dark 
ages and (among other things) the first and second world wars (includ-
ing the Holocaust). Even so, narrative sympathy is with the love and free-
dom that asserts itself against such bureaucratic calculation, and this is in 
accord with a common motif of science fiction’s postulates of the end of 
man. There is something pernicious, evil or apolitical in simply denying 
the right to existence of humanity; such diagnoses appear as unaccept-
ably ruthless, as having no feeling for the love and passion that makes us 
human. This is so much the case that dystopian visions of the world need 
be no different from the present other than presenting the absence of 
human passion, even if that absence creates a world of peace and happi-
ness. The classical statement of this malaise is Brave New World (Huxley 
1932) where a manufactured happiness is presented as horrifically inhu-
man, but the reasoning is the same in The Adjustment Bureau; there is 
something insidious about a world that might be managed, for our bene-
fit, or in which it had been decided that we ought to be guided away from 
our freedom to be violent. 
As I have already suggested, the once common question of theodicy 
that challenged the goodness of life and man’s tragic subjection to a vio-
lence beyond that of his own comprehension, has been reversed into a 
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problem of human destructiveness towards an otherwise neutral, if not 
benevolent, milieu. In the 2007 Oliver Hirschbiegel film The Invasion, the 
central character played by Nicole Kidman faces a world in which a virus 
is released when a space shuttle crashes to earth. The virus causes its hosts 
to become inhumanly robotic, void of all passion. Despite the absence of 
war and violence that would ensue, the narrative has a typical redemp-
tive trajectory that sees the virus vanquished with the world returned to 
its human order. (Or disorder: the film concludes with newspaper head-
lines of war and other returns of violence.) Why, we might ask, do Brave 
New World scenarios of passionless peace seem so objectionable, and 
why—precisely when we do indeed face a future of possible human non-
existence (and sooner rather than later)—is present discourse focused 
on how we might survive, rather than whether we ought to survive? Or, 
if we accept the parochial desire to survive why can we not hear all the 
voices that accuse us of an existential worthlessness? The present seems 
to be split between two myopias of the future: the first is evidenced by 
climate change policy’s discourse of managerialism. We speak of adapta-
tion, mitigation, sustainability, cap and trade and even—despite cataclys-
mic game-changers—of recovery and renewal. Given the stark facts, how 
could ‘our’ survival possibly be adjusted in terms of using slightly less, 
or consuming at a slower rate, or with one part of the globe trading its 
destructive emissions with another? Even beyond the crises of climate 
change, other disaster scenarios—ranging from terrorism and viral pan-
demic to panic and systemic collapse—seem to require something that 
is a difference in kind, not degree. It could not be a question of either 
adjusting our desires and expectations to a diminished future, or finding 
other resources of energy and maintenance. For the problem lies not in 
the substance of energy—of what, if you like, we accept as our milieu—
but the mode of acceptance as such. As long as there is something like life 
that presents itself as that which must be sustained, or—worse—as that 
by which we value sustainability (such that the good is what allows life to 
continue as it is), we have failed to ask the question that is being repeat-
edly articulated and yet never addressed.
I want to conclude by looking at the new dominant mode of reaction 
formation questions: these are questions that at first glance appear to face 
forward to the future but that are ultimately ways in which the reality of 
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the future is covered over. In short, one may say that it is precisely at the 
point in humanity’s history when the question of the acceptability of the 
species ought to be asked that this very question mutates into a defense 
mechanism. By asking how we will survive into the future, by anticipating 
an end unless we adapt, we repress the question of whether the survival 
of what has come to be known as life is something we should continue to 
admit as the only acceptable option.
The Violence of the Question
Before looking at the culturally dominant modes of the question I want 
to consider a philosophical example, for it brings the flagrant self-delu-
sion of humanity into sharp focus. For quite some time the philosopher 
Peter Singer has posed a rather uncomfortable thought experiment: I am 
wearing a pair of designer shoes and I pass by a child drowning in water 
that is deep enough to kill the child but insufficiently deep to pose any 
risk to me. I decide not to save the child because doing so would damage 
my shoes (2009). (In an earlier version [1972] Singer simply set saving 
the child against allowing our clothes to become muddy.) Singer suggests 
that few, if any, of us would accept this decision. We would save the child. 
And yet, he goes on to argue, we continually choose small and not highly 
significant or necessary material pleasures over the minor and barely 
noticeable material sacrifices it would require to save the lives of distant 
others. If we faced up to the real situation of our choices—which Singer 
suggests we ought to do by extending the range of our consideration 
beyond the immediate sympathies of those who are present to us—then 
we would conclude that we ought to give up a not too significant portion 
of our material wealth for the sake of benefiting an other in a way that 
is far more life-preserving than the minor life-enhancement of a pair of 
designer shoes. In response to this provocation Richard W. Miller (2010) 
starts to assess the degree to which sympathy and sacrifice for others 
diminish what is integral to the self. He argues that it might make sense, 
in terms of a person’s self-definition and the duty they owe to themselves, 
to act more kindly to those closer at hand (including one’s children and 
one’s self). Singer’s case is already thoroughly (but perhaps disturbingly) 
reasonable. He is not asking us to sacrifice all inequalities or benefits for 
Why Saying ‘No’ to Life is Unacceptable 203
the sake of saving other lives, just those that would not diminish our own 
pleasures and happiness significantly. Singer accepts a limitation of sym-
pathy and an apparently non-negotiable selfishness, such that his argu-
ment—for all its audacity as a thought experiment—is really quite com-
patible with a world in which some people just do have more than others. 
The critical responses to Singer’s principles of sympathy and charity dis-
close the degree to which human selfishness or self-maintenance is not 
only the accepted principle of living well, but lies at the heart of moral 
philosophy. Morality is deemed to be a question of doing what is required 
in order to be the being that I am (Wolf 2010). There is, it seems, a sense 
in which either acting without principle or giving up too much of one’s 
wealth would threaten my self-identity. What is scandalous, I would sug-
gest, is not that humans have placed their own survival as more valuable 
than other lives, but that at the heart of moral philosophy is an assump-
tion that nothing is more valuable or definitive of value than human life’s 
capacity to maintain and define itself. We ground value on life, either the 
sustainability of life, or our capacity to give our lives form and definition, 
or—to really face up to the circularity—we value life because it is life that 
makes value possible. 
Life is, properly considered (which is to say, always considered in terms 
of what defines humanity), selection: we say that something is living if it 
maintains or strives to maintain itself through time. The dispersed, the 
haphazard, the inert, the contingent, the diffuse and the unformed—
these are not living. They are therefore not only not valuable but also 
(significantly) not valuing. We value what values: we defend animal life 
because it too makes its way in the world, possesses a degree of choosing 
this rather than that, and is therefore on its way to something like mean-
ing or sense. We seem to think not only that the prima facie value of life 
lies in its modes of flourishing, but that something like destruction and 
annihilation are other than life and therefore unacceptable.
This brings us back to the new mode of the existential question: how 
can humanity be at once the figure of that which renders life self-evi-
dently valuable (because humanity is that animal that values) and yet be 
the being that has—through valuing itself—annihilated not only oth-
ers of its own kind, but precipitated the end of all modes of life, valuing 
and otherwise? How is it that humanity defines itself as that being that 
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inevitably chooses life, and yet has done so by saving only its own life? 
Why is it that the increasingly shrill affirmation of life—not just human 
life, but life as a living that furthers and values itself—occurs precisely at 
the moment in the history of life when it is at its most destructive and at 
its most evident end? 
In series three, episode nine, of True Blood (2010), the villainous anti-
hero Russell Edgington appears suddenly on live National News to tear 
out and chew the spine from the broadcasting newsreader.   Edgington 
announces an end to vampire-human reconciliation—the seeming motif 
of True Blood’s ongoing elegy to the desirability of human passion—and 
declares that a vile, destructive, violent and planet-destroying humanity 
must give way to another more worthy species. The question is not so 
much answered as deflected. The narrative trajectory of True Blood, its 
romantic propulsion, lies in the desirability of being human: while the 
villainous vampires embrace their immortality, the heroic central fig-
ure seeks the love that is only possible with human finitude. Despite 
this, of course, the vogue for vampire fiction and the fanzine embrace of 
Edgington as the twenty-first century’s ‘mad, bad and dangerous to know’ 
type suggests that the manifest yearning for being human covers over a 
deeper flirtation with a sense of the end of man. If humanity has always 
asked questions about its predicament, it has—as I have suggested—
begun to consider the violence of its being in relation to the very figure of 
life that has rendered the human exemplary of life as such. 
Now, when the actual end of man approaches, when it seems neces-
sary to ask what mode of the human—if any at all—should live on, the 
discourse of life can apparently only consider questions of degree rather 
than questions of kind. We ask how we might survive, adapt, mitigate 
or even trade our way into the future; we do not ask whether there is a 
future for us, and we cannot ask this because the ‘we’ of the question is 
at once that which has defined life and that which is essentially hurtling 
towards its own extinction. What disturbs us today is not theodicy, or 
how human life can live with the violence of its milieu, but anthropodicy, 
or how human life can avoid asking how it might justify itself.
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Finally
How has the common figure of the self-evident value of human life 
given way to an increasing sense of species guilt and preliminary mourn-
ing?  Why, just as humanity begins to have some sense of its end, are poli-
cies of survival, adaptation, mitigation and climate change, accompanied 
by a wide sense and figuration of the unacceptable nature of human life? 
Nothing defines the concept of reaction formation better than the pres-
ent: everywhere there is evidence of the nonviable and unacceptable 
modus of human life, and yet the one notion that is unacceptable—inca-
pable of being heard—is that human life has no value. This is not to say 
that—being without value—what has come to be known as humanity 
ought to extinguish itself, but rather to say that what is left of the human 
needs to confront the absence of value. (Some arguments, such as those 
of David Benatar (2006) that ‘prove’ that coming into human existence 
is always a harm—for all its provocation—remain thoroughly within the 
axiology of life: Benatar argues that human lives are more likely to be 
dominated by suffering rather than joy and are therefore not to be cho-
sen. He therefore considers human life as something that humans choose 
or do not choose—when it is perhaps more probable that life is thrown 
at humans, and humans are thrown into life. It is perhaps more provoca-
tive not to ask about the value of human life for humans but of human 
life for life.) For it is value and the holding on to that which saves itself, 
preserves itself, values itself and maintains itself that has precluded con-
frontation with the question that we are at once screaming out and yet 
also not hearing.
One way to pose the question of the unacceptable is to consider what 
we, as a species, might affirm as our own or reject as inhuman. This is 
a standard and complex border, played out in the thought experiments 
of monstrosity and the genre of the supposedly post-apocalyptic. If we 
imagine a future where certain aspects of humanity take over then we may 
adjust ourselves accordingly. Dystopias are warnings or cautionary tales 
in which a tendency of the present may be averted. (This is perhaps why 
many post-apocalyptic dystopias have considered unacceptable solutions 
to the problem of energy (ranging from the cannibalism of Soylent Green 
[1973] and Kenneth Cook’s Play Little Victims [1978] to the faux humans 
bred for maintaining the rest of us in Brave New World and Moon [2009].) 
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Such dystopias would, presumably, act as salutary cautions against us fol-
lowing the course of our current actions to the nightmarish conclusions 
that would follow. If we imagine another species—vampires—who are 
defined by a certain inhumanity that has manifested itself in the human 
species, then the battle for humanity as life becomes a figural war against 
the future. The vampiric or zombied other is an allegory for humanity 
gone awry, the bad humanity from which we can save ourselves in order 
to emerge as properly and justifiably human. That is: we imagine what it 
might be for the inhumanity within ourselves—a rapacity, ruthlessness 
and consuming rage—to become a species in its own right (figured as the 
dystopian man of the future). Rather than deal with humanity’s war on 
itself we have narrativized and figured the horror of humanity into some 
distant other. We imagine that it is in the future that man becomes can-
nibalistic, void of empathy, ruthlessly calculative, and so dependent on 
technology that he ceases to think; in this exercise of the imagination we 
preclude considering all the ways in which this ‘other’ dystopian ‘man’ 
has already (and has always already) arrived.
The supposedly future narratives of the post-apocalyptic are counter-
futural. We represent the future as possibly overtaken by destruction, can-
nabilism, zombies, violent technocracy or the invasion of mindlessness; 
in so doing we present as possibly futural and counter-human just those 
tendencies that have marked the species to date. In so doing—for all our 
post-apocalyptic or techno-utopian posthuman imaginings—we remain 
tied to a nostalgia for the properly human that has supposedly been 
threatened by an inhumanity that may appear from without. We remain 
in a state of denial or reaction towards the future in two senses: human-
ity’s end presents itself to us, and rather than ask the question this poses 
we instead imagine external threats to the species that are then warded 
off in a clear species-species agonistics. (One would not want to read too 
much, or perhaps anything at all, into the current vogue for vampire fic-
tion, except perhaps to note that like late eighteenth-century gothic it 
occurs alongside the frenzied affirmation of the life of man against vari-
ous forms of threatening transcendence.) We also war against the future 
by presenting the world of the present—a world of species self-annihi-
lation and global rapacity—as a future dystopia, or as a possibility that 
may occur unless humanity saves itself. What we do not ask, and herein 
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would lie a possible acceptance of the future, is not whether man ought 
to survive, but why this question is so unacceptable as to be constantly 
displaced and dis-figured.
Chapter 10
The Joys of Atavism
A single duration will pick up along its route the events 
of the totality of the material world; and we will then be 
able to eliminate the human consciousness that we had at 
first laid out at wide intervals like so many relays for the 
motion of our thought: there will now only be impersonal 
time in which all things will pass (Bergson 1965, 47)
Every living being borders on death; or perhaps it might be more accu-
rate to say that every being has one side turned towards the non-living. 
Without that border between life and non-life, without the living being 
closing itself off to some extent from the fullness of life, there would 
be a pure influx, intensity or becoming without any resistance or sta-
sis. If there were to be something like pure life, then it would be akin 
to Bergson’s ‘pure perception’: in its purest mode perception would be 
an unmediated capture of what is given, without the distinguishing and 
forming marks of memory:
we ask that perception should be provisionally understood to 
mean not my concrete and complex perception—that which 
is enlarged by memories and offers always a certain breadth of 
duration—but a pure perception, I mean a perception which 
exists in theory rather than in fact and would be possessed 
by a being placed where I am, living as I live, but absorbed in 
the present and capable, by giving up every form of memory, 
of obtaining a vision of matter both immediate and instanta-
neous. (Bergson 2007 [1912], 26)
‘Pure life’ would be something like an unimpeded becoming, a burst-
ing forth of energy, or what Bergson describes in the beginning of 
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Creative Evolution as a force of explosive power that is not yet divided 
into an exploding or differentiating power and an exploded matter that 
is differentiated. But a living being is never ‘pure life,’ for a living being 
closes itself off, to some extent, from the world’s energies; a being is in 
part its open engagement with the world, but also a certain refusal of the 
dynamic life of the world, a selfsameness that remains unto itself and 
limits relations and stimuli. To say that every being borders on the non-
living is to acknowledge a certain inertia that is intertwined with what 
it means for a being to become. Life can be considered as a double ten-
dency, an explosive power of creative difference, and a counter-tendency 
of resistance: ‘it is probable that life tended at the beginning to compass 
at one and the same time both the manufacture of the explosive and the 
explosion by which it is utilized. In this case, the same organism that had 
directly stored the energy of the solar radiation would have expended it 
in free movements in space. And for that reason we must presume that 
the first living beings sought on the one hand to accumulate, without 
ceasing, energy borrowed from the sun, and on the other hand to expend 
it, in a discontinuous and explosive way, in movements of locomotion’ 
(Bergson 1911 A, 115-16).
But, like Bergson’s ‘pure perception,’ this pure life of explosive/
exploded force is speculative: what we encounter are mixtures, which we 
can intuit by seeing each composed being as in part dynamic and open, 
in part closed and stable. Rather than refer to this counter-tendency of 
resisting creative difference as death, it is perhaps more accurate to say 
that the condition of any ongoing sameness is some capacity to resist 
the differentiating fluxes of time—a certain non-living or material fixity. 
This way of thinking about the fold between life and non-life would allow 
us to think about texts and their relation to a counter-vitality without 
assuming that texts were living beings (or it would allow us to think of 
living beings as texts, as in some part detached from the life from which 
they emerge and distinguish themselves). Today, more than ever, it might 
appear to be fruitful to mark a distinction between texts and life, for there 
is currently an efflorescence of theories seeking to explain writing and 
other technical systems as extensions of the living organism’s will to sur-
vive. Various evolutionary Darwinisms have reacted against the modern-
ist insistence on the force of writing and disembodied voices and have 
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sought to see literature as primarily adaptive and cognitive (Boyd 2009; 
Zunshine 2006). Insisting on a certain and necessary lifelessness in all 
beings, including texts, is perhaps one of the great ideas we can take from 
a Bergsonian/Deleuzian tradition of modernism. On the one hand we 
would need to insist on a certain lifelessness of the letter, but to do so 
would not be to mark a simple binary distinction between texts and liv-
ing bodies, but to see all bodies as both living and non-living (and per-
haps at their most alive when exposed to annihilation).
Perhaps a text, to be a text (or to be read), must at least in part be con-
sidered alive. When John Milton made a case for allowing books to cir-
culate freely he suggested that one would destroy more life (or spirit) by 
annihilating a book than would be lost by murdering a human: 
unlesse warinesse be us’d, as good almost kill a Man as kill a 
good Book; who kills a Man kills a reasonable creature, Gods 
Image; but he who destroyed a good Booke, kills reason it 
selfe, kills the image of God as it were in the eye. Many a man 
lives a burden to the Earth; but a good Booke is the pretious 
life-blood of a master spirit, imbalm’d and treasur’d up on pur-
pose to a life beyond life. (Milton 1905 [1644], 9)
A book has the capacity to extend the spirit or sense from which it 
emerged well beyond the author’s life; but it is also because of that after-
life that a book is always potentially dead, not only because it lives on 
by taking a material form that could be destroyed, but also because that 
same materiality has a force of its own that cannot be contained by the 
organic life of authors, readers or even the world from which it emerged. 
The condition for any being’s survival, its ‘living on,’ is that it take on 
some distinct and repeatable form: but it is that very distinction, ipseity 
or separateness that also cuts the text or body off from an ongoing life 
that will necessarily outlast the living. If there can be something like ‘a’ 
life then this is only because there is a difference and distinction between 
a specified being and the milieu from which it draws its sustenance. In the 
case of literary texts: a book can survive and be read if it is incarnated or 
given a material support that is not reducible to the animating intention 
of author or reader, but it will also therefore have a life or force distinct 
from any animation or sense. 
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In the case of literary modernism we can be even more specific: mod-
ernism could emerge and have being only because it made a claim to life, 
but this claim was destructive of life in its actual self-maintaining modes 
and appealed to another life, beyond organic survival. Key to this joyous 
atavism was a disdainful attitude towards the textual archive, alongside 
a recognition of deep archival forces. As a literary movement, modern-
ism needed at once to regard the textual archive as so much noise and 
dead weight; at the same time, modernism could only take hold not by 
producing more literary life but by deadening the textual corpus that was 
at its disposal. One would read texts not as extensions or expressions of 
life, but as detached fragments with an odd afterlife. There is, I will argue, 
something to be gained—today more than ever—by reading modernism 
not as vitalism but as murderous textual annihilation. Further, this coun-
ter-vital modernism of the dead letter is best read through the supposedly 
vitalist work of Henri Bergson. If modernism were to be reread not as 
a lament on the infertility and deadening of the West, with the implied 
goal of revitalization of the word, but as a creatively destructive move-
ment of willed extinction, then several consequences would follow. First, 
we would need to rethink both postmodernism and post-structuralism, 
given that both these movements are rendered possible by a certain 
response to modernism. Second, a new sexuality of modernism would 
emerge that would be essentially queer. (That is, it would be by deflec-
tion, divergence, deviation and dehiscence—and not reproduction—
that modernist writing would operate: at once destroying the archive 
while allowing new archival forces to emerge.) To make this second point 
more clear and specific, I’d like to begin with the counter-thesis of mod-
ernism as a vitalism, with the underlying sexual (and racial) normativity 
that any vitalism or privileging of life would entail ( Jones 2010).
Modernism and vitalism: responding to the mechanized, industrial, 
rationalized, quantifying, capitalist and reifying forces of an increasingly 
reductive world of homogeneous time and space, modernism sought 
to inject life into a desiccated western tradition by giving blood to the 
voices of the past. Descending into Hades where all the voices of history 
and becoming had been reduced to so much noise, the modernist artist 
would once again experience the opening or genesis of culture, retriev-
ing life’s original, animating and fertile voice. (Pound’s first Canto begins 
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with just such due homage to the prophetic souls of the past, with the 
task of finding voices other than the ‘impetuous impotent’: ‘Poured we 
libations unto each the dead … I sat to keep off the impetuous impotent 
dead, / Till I should hear Tiresias’ [1987].) Such a theme of revitaliza-
tion could be figured in profoundly sexual, and intensely heterosexual 
terms. Joyce’s Ulysses returns to the murmur of Molly Bloom’s body—
ironically distancing itself from the novel’s long series of feminine/mater-
nal oceanic motifs (such as Stephen’s early figurations of his mother’s 
image as ‘Ghoul! Chewer of corpses,’ or Leopold Bloom’s recollection 
of Palestine as the ‘grey sunken cunt of the world’ [ Joyce 2000, 8, 50]). 
Although Ulysses is in tune with so much of modernism in its depiction 
of a series of failed and infertile sexual encounters, it nevertheless ends 
with an affirmative, fluid, embodied, feminine and open return to life. It 
is as though the novel’s narrative trajectory, from Bloom’s urination and 
defecation, through the city of Dublin and a funeral—interspersed with 
the disembodied voices of newspapers, advertisements, fragments of the 
past and Stephen Dedalus’s scholarly musings—can be opened towards 
a future, however fragile and ironic, of purely potential (not yet embod-
ied or actualized) life. It is possible to read the canonical texts of literary 
modernism as all addressing the problem of an infertile archive by imag-
ining some act of (hetero)sexualized and unselfconscious redemption. 
Such a claim is easy to make in the case of Yeats, Lawrence, Pound, and 
Eliot. Yeats’s ’Leda and the Swan’ presents the involuntary and inhuman 
event of sexual coupling as a violently creative force, and this could be 
contrasted with the personal and immobilizing passions that are elicited 
by women caught up in the petty and historical plays of politics. (‘The 
Circus Animals’ Desertion’ laments: ‘I thought my dear must her own 
soul destroy / So did fanaticism and hate enslave it’ [Yeats 2011, 212].) 
Lawrence also contrasted a dark, disruptive, and counter-bourgeois sex-
ual force with the ‘human all too human’ (paralyzingly infertile) love of 
marriage. In ‘The Ladybird,’ Count Dionys tells the very English Daphne: 
‘The true living world of fire is dark, throbbing, darker than blood. Our 
luminous world that we go by is only the white lining of this’’ (Lawrence 
2002,180). Eliot’s The Waste Land diagnoses the inertia of the modern 
city by contrasting the mechanical and neither voluntary nor violent sex 
between ‘the typist’ and the ‘young man carbuncular’ with the absent 
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and mourned softly flowing Thames. Pound situates bankers, journal-
ists and homosexuals in the same infertile circle of hell. Like the other 
modernists, redemption is not gained by any form of Romanticisms’s 
‘spousal verse’; classic muse figures are, if anything, ironized. But there is 
something akin to a distant oceanic feminine that would seem to offer life 
beyond the limits and disenchantments of actual women. That this non-
reified, flowing, dynamic and pre-systemic life is feminine is clear in liter-
ary modernism (allowing the artist in turn to be something like a creator 
giving form to the formless). 
There is a tension, then, in the vitalist strategy of modernism: on the 
one hand, literary revitalization takes the form of a critique of already 
actualized and bounded forms (and is implicitly powered by a drive to 
overcome already constituted norms of ‘man’ and gender); on the other 
hand, this shockingly new vitality is figured via a highly sexualized meta-
phorics of the force of life infusing passive matter. The vitalist philoso-
phers of modernism—including Bergson—would seem to be so focused 
on a critique of human and bounded figures of life that nothing like a 
gendered or sexual normativity could be valorized. And yet if we take the 
accepted reading of Bergson as a vitalist who was critical of ‘man’ into 
account, it seems hard to avoid the problem of sexual difference in two 
senses: Bergsonism would be set against a static norm of man and yet 
would affirm all those masculine figures of active, forceful, creative, inci-
sive, penetrative and productive life that have marked gendered thinking 
(Hill 2008). Why, we might ask, has sexual difference been such a rigid 
and persistent figure in questions of life? Apart from narrowly psycho-
analytic answers, which have their legitimacy, it seems obvious that ques-
tions about life would take their cue from the image of the living being, 
and that sexual reproduction—despite being one mode among many 
of reproduction—would be a ready figure for considering not only the 
emergence of bounded living forms from an otherwise not-yet-specified 
matter, but also the living being’s relation to the life that it expresses. 
What psychoanalysis contributed to the understanding of the imaginary 
conditions of life was that the border between living and non-living was 
sexual. That is, the living being, in order to live, must be open to what is 
not itself—must bear a relation of desire (or of attaining what is not yet 
the case) towards its milieu. Life must be open to influx from the outside. 
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But in order to be a living being, the organism must also close itself off, in 
part, from the full force of the life from which it emerges: full overcoming 
of desire or difference would annihilate the being’s individuation. Sexual 
difference figured as gender allows this strange border between living 
being and life to be negotiated imaginatively or (following Bergson), 
intellectually, for the intellect is that faculty that allows the complex-
ity of life to be managed through concepts that reduce intensive differ-
ence. Life would be imagined as some fluid, oceanic, maternal plenitude 
from which the bounded form of a distinct and representing body would 
emerge. To think of mind as a camera that cuts the world into assimilable 
units of information: this, according to Bergson, is at how the intellect 
manages and imagines itself. An ‘image of thought’ is formed in which 
mind is a picturing machine. This capacity of the intellect to reify itself 
via some image of detached mind could only be countered by retrieving 
an intuition of life that would be at odds with all our figures of ‘man.’ 
In many ways this Bergsonian appeal to life beyond the bounds of the 
already formed organism is in line with a broader modernist critique 
of the figure of man as a Cartesian subject. Anti-Cartesianism gener-
ally has proceeded by appealing affirmatively—against man—to quali-
ties that had once been figured as feminine but that now seem to offer 
ways of thinking about the vital order as such. Life would not be ratio-
nal, bounded, logical, efficient and progressive, but dynamic, open, fluid 
and affective. One would move from gender—or older motifs of man as 
subject relating to formless but potential matter—to sexual difference. 
Fecund, creative, explosive, fluid, unbounded, potential, and intensive 
life would be that from which the desiccated and disenchanted intel-
lect would emerge. All those predicates that had once been attributed 
to a chaotic femininity opposed to male reason would now characterize 
life as such, and the modernist-vitalist critique of the subject would be a 
critique of man. Man would, through an intuition of vitality, destroy the 
gendered binary that had locked him into an affectless, lifeless, disem-
bodied Cartesian prison; he would become one with—and not simply 
the medium for—all that had been projected onto the feminized figures 
of life. Whereas other modernists used scenes of jouissance to overcome 
the miserable pleasures of bounded male-female coupling, figuring a 
form of un-self-conscious depersonalization achieved through sexual 
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boundlessness, Bergson contrasted the joy of transcending intuition with 
the self-serving consumption of bourgeois pleasure:
There is a difference of vital tone. Those who regularly put 
into practice the morality of the city know this feeling of well-
being, common to the individual and society, which is the 
outward sign of the interplay of material resistances neutraliz-
ing each other. But the soul that is opening, and before whose 
eyes material objects vanish, is lost in sheer joy. Pleasure and 
well-being are something, joy is more. For it is not contained 
in these, whereas they are virtually contained in joy. They 
mean, indeed, a halt or a marking time, while joy is a step for-
ward. (Bergson 2002, 325)
Bergson’s vitalism—like modernism more generally—could be consid-
ered as a passage to impersonality via something like ‘becoming-woman.’ 
Not surprisingly, then, Bergson’s way of thinking about thought’s over-
coming of its own imprisonment in the image of man takes on a phallic 
mode: penetrating what is not itself, emerging with ever more nuanced, 
distinct, differentiating and dynamic forms (Hill 2008). 
Imagine, though, another Bergsonism, another modernism and—in 
turn—another twenty-first century (another way of proceeding after 
modernism that would not be the usual—if multivalent—postmodern-
ism). What if modernism were not a vitalism? How would a different read-
ing of Bergson create a different present, after a different, non-vital, and 
essentially queer modernism? Before exploring what this might mean I 
want to put forward the following claim: post-modernism, especially as it 
ceases to theorize a dynamic relation to modernism and becomes a form 
of proclaimed posthumanism, becomes an ultra-humanism. This is espe-
cially so if we take note of the turns towards affect, literary Darwinism, 
and cognition, all of which seek to explain complexity and systems as 
extensions of life rather than pursuing Bergsonian notions of splitting, 
bifurcation, and the branching out into differences in kind (rather than 
degree). If we reverse today’s vitalisms and then trace a genealogy of a 
counter-vital post-modernism, we can find another Bergsonian modern-
ism. Such a historical move would be in accord with a Bergsonian method 
of retracing the path of evolution in order to explore certain bifurcations, 
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at once finding an explosive origin that would yield the force from which 
distinction emerges, while also finding a more profound difference. To 
revisit a tired question: what then is/was modernism, and how did post-
modernism mark its difference from the former? 
Modernism—against notions of revivification and the vitalist critique 
of technology—can be considered as a profound attention to the force 
of the dead (Goldman 2004). We should not, I would suggest, see James 
Joyce’s most explicit presentations of the dead voice—the newspaper 
lines, malapropisms, clichés and mechanical voices of the city—as points 
of inertia to be overcome by the life of writing. We could consider a tran-
sition from the paralysis of Dubliners, where the dead letters of cliché and 
script seem to immobilize life, such that the absence of expression leads to 
a detachment between bodies and their desires, to a liberation of prolifer-
ating voices in Finnegans Wake. But I would suggest that there is already a 
counter-vital, counter organic, and lifeless (pro-paralysis) celebration of 
the word in Dubliners. Consider, here, Bergson’s theory of both laughter 
and dreams. For the most part the body’s energies are organized towards 
survival, focused on the efficient and productive present; when that orga-
nization breaks down, and the body appears less as organism and more 
as machine, the body convulses in laughter (Bergson 1911 B). Similarly, 
when the body is asleep, no longer oriented to tasks at hand, the images 
of dreams surge forth. In Dubliners it is the functional, embodied, practi-
cal, and seemingly expressive relation to language that operates through a 
unified, rigid, and organic image of life. In the ‘easy’ flows of conversation 
and banter, life moves on, steadily, progressively, automatically—and it 
is perhaps this ongoing life that is the real paralysis of Dubliners. By con-
trast, it is when language appears as dead, when the body is no longer 
given expressive passage to the word, that there is a break with the line of 
time; something like the perception of ‘time in its pure state’ emerges. It 
is, for example, when writing is seen as a proper and personal extension 
of the self—when writing is organic—that Joyce describes the same dull 
round of suburban normality: it is only when writing is liberated from 
life, when one no longer grounds systems of inscription on the suppos-
edly self-maintaining organism, that one disrupts the normalizing figure 
of bodily life. 
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Bergson laid the grounds for formulating a counter-vitalist approach 
to system and techne. Consider his key thesis of creative evolution: in 
the beginning is an explosive force of differentiation, with no distinction 
yet between differentiating force and differentiated matter. If this origi-
nal explosive power or potentiality to differ could be considered to be 
life, then we would have to redefine life beyond its bounded forms, and 
beyond organic notions of self-maintenance. Certain vitalist moralisms 
would have to be rethought. We could not, for example, hold the stan-
dard narrative that begins with an organism or relatively stable form, with 
bodies then becoming enslaved to and alienated by the systems it created 
for its own efficiency; nor could we conclude from such a narrative of 
life-alienated-by-techne with the resulting imperative to revitalize the rai-
son d’etre of life from which all systems emerged and towards which they 
ought to return. Reading Bergson and Modernism against this normal-
izing mode would open a new counter-politics. 
It is no surprise, perhaps, that Derrida—commenting on Heidegger’s 
theory of time—makes a brief remark pertinent to today’s renewed inter-
est in Bergson and life: the problem, Derrida argues, with any attempt 
to avoid a ‘vulgar’ (spatialized, quantified, punctuated) notion of time is 
that in order to think about time or have a concept of time we must have 
some notion of time in general. The very nature of cognition or concep-
tualization must render any supposedly proper, fluid, pre-articulated or 
originating temporality into some repeatable mode. In so far as one thinks 
and experiences time as time there will always be a reduction of time to 
what cannot be considered as some pure temporality of difference. For 
Derrida, then, Bergsonian notions of intuition or of creating a concept 
adequate to every perception would be typical of a logocentric metaphys-
ics of presence (Derrida 1982, 60). Rather than appeal to a proper tem-
porality before the ‘fall’ into techne, language and quantification, Derrida 
suggests that one can might think forward to the promise of the concept. 
It is not the case that there is some proper origin of life belied by lan-
guage; for it is the idea created by language that offers something like a 
time ‘to come,’ a future beyond any of the actualized forms of the pres-
ent. This promise of concepts—or the difference of concepts from any 
already given life—yields a politics of futurity. We do not look back to a 
lost life, a lost democracy, a belied justice or a mourned origin. We allow 
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the concept to open ‘justice to come,’ or ‘democracy to come,’ via a mes-
sianic promise without the full body of the messiah (Derrida 2005, 86). 
Not surprisingly, then, Derrida reverses a Marxist ethics of alienation and 
the proper: it is not the case that one could or should ‘exorcise’ all the 
phantoms and ghosts that have deflected life from its original and pur-
posive striving. The condition of ‘life’—some ongoing self-sameness—is 
death; some technical system that is not the body itself allows for a stable 
bounded form. The lived body is possible because of systems of labor, 
action, language, society and relation that are not the body’s own. Thus, 
Derrida’s ‘Marxism’ focuses on the double bind of spirit: on the one 
hand, the future, reading and ‘living on’ require some notion of spirit, of 
what life would or should be beyond its already actualized forms; at the 
same time, that appeal to spirit will always haunt and alienate the very life 
it supposedly fulfils (Derrida 1994). Not surprisingly, Derrida, explor-
ing the difference and distance of the ‘letter’ from anything like a bodily 
or originating life, increasingly focuses on the ‘word’ in modernist writ-
ing, especially the writing of Joyce. Whereas in his early work, Derrida 
(1978 A) had questioned the Joycean project of the book and its claims 
to equivocity—adopting all the languages of the world and time—he 
increasingly celebrated Joyce and literature as offering a mode of decon-
struction and democracy. The word in Joyce would not be grounded in 
sense, and—as in all literature—the detachment of word from the pres-
ence of voice would allow the word as such, in itself, to circulate freely in 
a democratic opening that would not anchor language back to some puta-
tive origin. Democracy would not be some return of all systems (such as 
language) to the expressive life of man; democracy is the free circulation 
of anything that can be said, the open right to ‘say anything.’
One might say, then, that post-structuralism is indebted to a certain 
counter-organic vitalist reading of modernism: the word is not an exten-
sion of the body, and cannot be returned back to the living voice with-
out remainder. The word itself has force or life, creating relations and 
events that are generated neither by bodies nor subjects. Close to this 
post-structuralist counter-organic vitalism of the word or trace—and yet 
importantly different—would be an attention to the power (if that is the 
correct word) of explosive destruction or atavism. Recall that Derrida’s 
philosophy is, on his own insistence, radically open and futural. It is the 
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power, not of life, but of the word, trace, concept or idea that generates 
an open promise: there can be no actuality that can exhaust the idea or 
concept of justice, and it is the force of the concept—as that which would 
insist on a sense above and beyond any actual instance—that will yield a 
‘justice to come,’ allowing us to conclude that deconstruction ‘is justice.’ 
For Bergson, rather than moving from the ideal promise of the concept 
to an open future, intuition would destroy what has come to be assem-
bled by concepts. Intuition of differential movements would fracture 
ongoing sameness and the forward movement of concepts, and would 
‘retrace’ the path from which concepts emerged. This would ultimately 
allow for the emergence of ever finer differences that would be destruc-
tive of the word, and would explode the forward propulsion of organic 
striving. Life is at war with itself: it is at once an explosive differentiation 
that would preclude anything like a line of time in which a past would be 
retained in order to organize a future, while life also harbors a tendency 
towards quiescence that diminishes the force of the differential for the 
sake of self-sameness. 
Bergson’s criticism of organicism traces a different path from what 
would become the post-structuralist elevation of writing, not only in 
Derrida but also in Foucault. Despite Deleuze’s celebration of Foucault’s 
corpus, he criticized Foucault for focusing on language as the locus of 
deterritorialization (Deleuze 1988): yes, literary writing would detach 
writing and the word from ‘man’ as a reasoning and communicating ani-
mal, but one could also imagine life, and not just writing, in a deterritori-
alizing mode. Here, Deleuze cited the force of silicon to produce synthe-
ses that would not be organic. We can look at the genealogy of this remark 
to assess its consequences for thinking about Bergson and modernism. 
First, looking back we can see that Deleuze (unlike Foucault, Derrida and 
other post-structuralists) took his departure not only from phenomenol-
ogy but from Bergson. Whereas for Husserl the thought of time would 
require us to think of something like pure synthesis, not a subject who 
synthesizes but synthesis as such or a transcendental subjective power, 
Bergson would regard subjects as effects of an impersonal, dispersed, and 
synthetic power that would have various rhythms and tendencies ranging 
from the matter of rocks to the expansive memory of the minds of saints 
and mystics. Derrida, always more in the phenomenological tradition 
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than Deleuze, would extend the phenomenological theory of temporal 
syntheses to see language itself as a power to create forces or ideas beyond 
intentionality and life. Not surprisingly, then, Derrida would turn fre-
quently to Joyce, the futural force of the word, the promise of spirit along 
with all the ghosts, hauntings, and spectres that could not be grounded in 
anything like life. 
The modernism of this post-structuralism would be critical of the 
closed efficiency of the organism, and would focus on the release of the 
word into a future that could be neither contained nor regarded as an 
extension of life as it actually is. One could cite, here, beyond the free indi-
rect and stream of consciousness styles of Joyce (and the tendency of the 
word to operate beyond intentionality and to open up networks and sys-
tems of its own), the mournful mode of Eliot’s The Waste Land where the 
bourgeois self-interest of bodies is at odds with the fragments of literary 
tradition, and where words indicate a lost lyricism or deeper meditative 
time in contrast with urban efficiency. One could also include Pound’s 
emphasis on the machinic qualities of texts, on non-phonetic script, on 
the autonomy of the image and the force of text. By contrast, although he 
was also indebted to phenomenology, Deleuze took up Bergson’s task of 
intuition and—though he referred to a modernist range of texts includ-
ing Joyce—made more of the work of Woolf and Lawrence. If one does 
not focus on the synthetic and futural force of concepts and their power 
to open up to an ideality that cannot be grounded in life, and if one does 
not regard time as tradition or history (as a panorama or wasteland of 
dead voices) but takes up Bergson’s challenge of destroying concepts to 
go back to the explosive power of life, then this might open up the impor-
tance of pre-linguistic forces and a radically geological atavism. 
Bergson allows us to think of a modernism that is pre- or counter-
linguistic, but this is so not because language is returned to organic or 
vital life but because, for Bergson, vitality is only one of the tendencies 
of life. Other tendencies, such as those in conflict with the organism, 
are not found in concepts—which are thoroughly organic and synthe-
sizing—but in intuitions or the tendency towards pure perceptions, 
which are fragmenting and dispersing. It is true that Bergson wrote of a 
human potential of spirit to open life beyond the closed forms of ‘man.’ If 
morality is enabled by bodies gathering together to maintain themselves 
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against others, then one can take that capacity for bodies to extend their 
interests into communities and moral groupings, and release that capac-
ity from any actual body and open an intuition of what it might be to act 
selflessly as such, not self-sacrifice now for the sake of gain later, but self-
sacrifice or self-annihilation (becoming-imperceptible as such) (Bergson 
1935). Contrast, again, with Derrida: Derrida recognizes that if we can 
operate with a comportment of justice or ethics towards this other here 
and now, then this is because there is something like the concept of ‘the 
other’ in general, which might be opened by a face to face encounter but 
always exceed that presence (Derrida 1978B, 102). The concept of the 
other in general, of hospitality in general, or democracy in general would 
liberate thought to move beyond actuality towards futurity. By contrast, 
even though Bergson (1935) does write of the saint or mystic who can 
think beyond any actual ‘humanity’ towards spirit in general, this power 
is not achieved through language and it is the same power that will oper-
ate in the smallest of intuitions. It is neither a futural move nor a nostalgic 
return but an explosive atavism that then allows for an inhuman future—
not a posthuman future, which would be man’s capacity to think beyond him-
self, but a thought of a world without man that is released from the orbit of 
evolving time. 
Here I would suggest that we take our cue from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
reading of Woolf and Lawrence in A Thousand Plateaus in order to open a 
modernism of inhuman time—not a modernism of either stream of con-
sciousness or stream of text (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 278). This ata-
vistic modernism might in turn allow for a re-reading of other modernists 
and post-modernism. Rather than posit something like tracing, marking, 
writing, text, differance or the word that would disperse and fragment any 
supposed grounding life, Bergson makes a direct claim about life as that 
which creates difference. Life is neither psyche, nor organism, and cer-
tainly not an inchoate chaos that is repressed by the order of psychic and 
organic wholes; life is an organizing power that operates in part by reduc-
ing the proliferation of intensive difference to allow for ongoing selfsame 
wholes, but life operates also by creating complexities and relations that 
cannot be contained by the human logic of organic efficiency. A modern-
ism that followed this positively destructive atavism of intuition would 
not look beyond man to some higher human promise, but would allow 
222 Chapter 10
the human to be invaded by the forces of the cosmos that he has all too 
efficiently silenced.
Consider D.H Lawrence’s poem, ‘The Shadow of Death,’ which opens 
with a description of the earth’s movement (‘again,’ so that we are already 
adopting a planetary duration). The point of view is initially not that of 
any human observer; a space, rhythm and ‘seeing’ that is non-human—
‘the sun stands up to see us’—precedes the poetic ‘I,’ and when the ‘I’ 
enters, it is as though the human is an emergence and intrusion from a far 
deeper time:
The earth again like a ship steams out of the dark sea over 
The edge of the blue, and the sun stands up to see us glide 
Slowly into another day; slowly the rover 
Vessel of darkness takes the rising tide. 
I, on the deck, am startled by this dawn confronting 
Me who am issued amazed from the darkness, stripped 
And quailing here in the sunshine, delivered from haunting 
The night unsounded whereon our days are shipped. 
Feeling myself undawning, the day’s light playing upon me, 
I who am substance of shadow, I all compact 
Of the stuff of the night, finding myself all wrongly 
Among the crowds of things in the sunshine jostled and racked. 
The human voice, far from being the word through which the world is 
mediated, seems to be nothing more than a deathly silence, incapable of 
viewing what is other than itself other than in terms of death (‘What are 
they but shrouds?’):
I with the night on my lips, I sigh with the silence of death; 
And what do I care though the very stones should cry me unreal, 
though the clouds 
Shine in conceit of substance upon me, who am less than the rain. 
Do I know the darkness within them? What are they but shrouds? 
As in most of Lawrence’s poetry, there is a transition from a sense of 
deathly struggle with a world of inhuman forces, towards a sense of the 
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perception of inhuman durations followed by a joyous sense of the minor 
resistance or rhythm of one’s own existence at odds with a complex time 
of the planet:
The clouds go down the sky with a wealthy ease 
Casting a shadow of scorn upon me for my share in death; but I 
Hold my own in the midst of them, darkling, defy 
The whole of the day to extinguish the shadow I lift on the breeze. 
The defiance of voice emerges as perception overcomes the sense of 
haunting and disjunction to intuit a ‘virility’ of life that is not that of man 
and that—more importantly—gives itself in the form of a ‘bright’ ‘liv-
ing darkness’:
And I know the host, the minute sparkling of darkness 
Which vibrates untouched and virile through the 
grandeur of night, 
But which, when dawn crows challenge, assaulting the vivid motes 
Of living darkness, bursts fretfully, and is bright: 
The poem then shifts from the relation between perceiving speaker and 
perceived world, to a perception of a ‘conflict’ of light, as though intuition 
had somehow passed from point of view and observation to something 
like the force of life as light:
 Runs like a fretted arc-lamp into light, 
 Stirred by conflict to shining, which else 
 Were dark and whole with the night. 
 Runs to a fret of speed like a racing wheel, 
 Which else were aslumber along with the whole 
 Of the dark, swinging rhythmic instead of a-reel. 
 Is chafed to anger, bursts into rage like thunder; 
 Which else were a silent grasp that held the heavens 
 Arrested, beating thick with wonder. 
 Leaps like a fountain of blue sparks leaping 
 In a jet from out of obscurity, 
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 Which erst was darkness sleeping. 
 Runs into streams of bright blue drops, 
 Water and stones and stars, and myriads 
 Of twin-blue eyes, and crops 
 Of floury grain, and all the hosts of day, 
 All lovely hosts of ripples caused by fretting 
 The Darkness into play. 
(Lawrence 1993, 132-33). 
If there is a vitality here it is not one of self-furtherance and homeosta-
sis, but one of splitting, bifurcation, recombination and multiple paths. 
From here it follows that concepts do not open life to some ideal and 
non-actualized future, but anchor perception into known forms; those 
forms can, though, be pulverized beyond human recognition and point 
of view, to achieve something like a ‘fretting’ of darkness. It is as though 
our usual notion of perception as illuminating representation, passes 
over into illumination as a fleeting ‘fretting’ of a deeper geological plane 
of darkness.
The waning of light and the increasing absence of human conceptual 
order is not presented by Lawrence’s poem as some descent into lifeless 
chaos, for the absence of light as we know it—light as cognizing illumina-
tion—gives way to light as the play of darkness, as though our perceived 
illuminated world were a fragment of a broader life, time and cosmos 
beyond the man of reason. Lawrence takes the great motif of man’s gaze 
into the cosmos (‘wonder’) and attributes it to the heavens, ‘arrested, 
beating thick with wonder.’ Far from this inhuman world being a nega-
tion or absence of life and order, the poem discloses rhythms (‘swinging 
rhythmic’), durations, and even ‘myriads / Of twin-blue eyes.’ 
Virginia Woolf ’s To the Lighthouse also describes a familial, gendered, 
historical and thoroughly archived world in the first section of the novel: 
Mr. Ramsay and his philosopher friends are concerned both with ‘subject, 
object and the nature of reality,’ and with their possible legacy and repu-
tation in the maintained tradition of philosophy. Mrs. Ramsay is caring, 
nurturing, primarily concerned with overseeing the marriages of the next 
generations and largely devoted to maintaining social cohesion. In this 
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first section of Woolf ’s novel, the younger Lily Briscoe aims to paint Mrs. 
Ramsay, even though she is told by Charles Tansley (an aspiring philoso-
pher) that ‘Women can’t paint, women can’t write....’ At the level of narra-
tive, this section of the novel, ‘The Window’ ostensibly concerns whether 
or not a journey towards light—a trip to the lighthouse—will be take 
place. As in the first stages of Lawrence’s poem, a human world of love 
and filiation is set over against a world of what can broadly be referred to 
as climate—forces that play havoc with human intentionality and cannot 
be mastered by either a philosophy of subjectivism or an art of represen-
tation. Accordingly the middle section—‘Time Passes’—shifts away from 
a human temporality of expectation and calculation to the falling of dark-
ness. Here the point of view shifts from the novel’s characters, with their 
desires and expectations, to rhythms, durations, and interactions of the 
earth’s forces entering the house. Narrated in third person, the subject of 
the journey through the house is not even the single personified wind, 
but ‘airs’ that question the stability and steadfastness of the human world 
(again, an inversion of the human observer looking into a cosmos):
Nothing stirred in the drawing-room or in the dining-room 
or on the staircase. Only through the rusty hinges and swol-
len sea-moistened woodwork certain airs, detached from the 
body of the wind (the house was ramshackle after all crept 
round corners and ventured indoors. Almost one might 
imagine them, as they entered the drawing-room question-
ing and wondering, toying with the flap of hanging wall-
paper, asking, would it hang much longer, when would it fall? 
(Woolf 2007, 337)
These ‘airs’ interacting with the human world of objects are directed 
by ‘some random light.’ Eventually the narration moves towards what I 
would refer to as the geological sublime: a sublime that is not that of the 
world appearing as if in accord with our intentionality, a world that is not 
that of harmonious order, but that is destructive of the anthopomorphic 
sense we make of things:
The nights now are full of wind and destruction; the trees 
plunge and bend and their leaves fly helter skelter until the 
lawn is plastered with them and they lie packed in gutters and 
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choke rain pipes and scatter damp paths. Also the sea tosses 
itself and breaks itself, and should any sleeper fancying that he 
might find on the beach an answer to his doubts, a sharer of 
his solitude, throw off his bedclothes and go down by himself 
to walk on the sand, no image with semblance of serving and 
divine promptitude comes readily to hand bringing the night 
to order and making the world reflect the compass of the soul. 
The hand dwindles in his hand; the voice bellows in his ear. 
Almost it would appear that it is useless in such confusion to 
ask the night those questions as to what, and why, and where-
fore, which tempt the sleeper from his bed to seek an answer. 
(Woolf 2007, 339)
Here, in conclusion, I would suggest that we take our line of think-
ing from Woolf ’s Bergsonian modernism—destructive of concepts, 
order, and any notion of a single illuminating light of reason—towards 
Deleuze and Paul De Man. De Man, discussing the sublime, insisted that 
going beyond the order and human harmony of beauty would allow for 
a thought, always resisting figuration, of a blank and inhuman material-
ity: ‘The dynamics of the sublime mark the moment when the infinite 
is frozen into the materiality of stone, when no pathos, anxiety, or sym-
pathy is conceivable; it is, indeed, the moment of a-pathos, or apathy, as 
the complete loss of the symbolic’ (De Man 1996, 126). Deleuze, writ-
ing on Bergson, also focused on the power of intuition to arrive at inhu-
man durations: ‘To continue Bergson’s project today, means for example 
to constitute a metaphysical image of thought corresponding to the new 
lines, openings, tracings, leaps, dynamisms, discovered by a molecular 
biology of the brain: new linkings and re-linkings in thought’ (Deleuze 
1991, 117). 
That is, to be after Bergson’s modernism, would be to continue the two 
tendencies of life: both the durations of matter, and the capacity—from 
those durations—to produce ‘a metaphysical image of thought.’ Art and 
writing in their human modes are neither mutations of a single archive of 
man (for the archive is in concert with times and rhythms not its own), 
nor would art and writing be simple extensions of the planet’s rhythms. 
Art and writing are pulsations that are irreducible to the cosmos, but also 
in vibration with the cosmos—the chaosmos. Those modes of writing, 
The Joys of Atavism 227
today, that are responding to the new rhythms of the earth—writing that 
aims to imagine what it might be to perceive a world without humans—
are provocatively postmodern. I would conclude, then, by contrasting 
various posthumanisms that aim to imagine one life of interweaving and 
interacting powers—where man overcomes his distinction to merge with 
digital technologies, animal life, or the ecology of the planet—to a more 
radical atavism, suggested by Bergson, where humans intuit rhythms 
that are distinct, inhuman, and beyond the time of the present. A post-
modernism of this mode can be discerned, not only in a range of texts 
that are concerned with life after the end of humans, but in new modes 
of writing that aim to take point of view beyond that of man as a speak-
ing animal. One example might be Don DeLillo’s Point Omega, which 
takes the novel form but adopts the point of view of a man viewing an 
art installation (Douglas Gordan’s 24 Hour Psycho), with the art installa-
tion, in turn, being a slowed down scene from Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho. 
It is as though DeLillo is at once writing in language in the genre of the 
novel, and yet tracing the temporality and distributed rhythms of non-
literary visual and cinematic forms. Just as Woolf concludes her novel 
To the Lighthouse with Lily Briscoe painting a single dark line down the 
center of a canvas, DeLillo opens Point Omega with sentences that fol-
low the path of an eye following the slowed down frames of a section of 
film. DeLillo writes of the movements of light and the display of unseen 
images before turning to the perceiving eye and its relation to the screen, 
as well as the screen’s capacity to produce cadences that alter the relation 
between eye and cognition. Eyes, screens, light, and images: all harbor 
their own tendencies, and yet all enter into contingent relations, generat-
ing distinct rhythms and lines of becoming. The sentences of the novel’s 
opening double the repetitive rhythm of the gaze and the different angles 
the screens are able to produce of the same scene; the simple syntax and 
shift to present tense empties the point of view of any mental content, 
affect or interiority—‘Anthony Perkins is turning his head’:
The gallery was cold and lighted only by the faint shimmer 
on the screen. Back by the north wall the darkness was nearly 
complete and the man standing alone moved a hand toward 
his face, repeating, ever so slowly, the action of a figure on the 
screen. When the gallery door slid open and people entered, 
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there was a glancing light from the area beyond, where oth-
ers were gathered, at some distance, browsing the art books 
and postcards.
[…]
The man at the wall watched the screen and then began to 
move along the adjacent wall to the other side of the screen 
so he could watch the same action in a flipped image. He 
watched Anthony Perkins reaching for a car door, using the 
right hand. He knew that Anthony Perkins would use the right 
hand on this side of the screen and the left hand on the other 
side. He knew it but needed to see it and he moved through 
the darkness along the side wall and then edged away a few 
feet to watch Anthony Perkins on this side of the screen, the 
reverse side, Anthony Perkins using the left hand, the wrong 
hand, to reach for a car door and then open it.
But could he call the left hand the wrong hand? Because 
what made this side of the screen any less truthful than 
the other side?
The slightest camera movement was a profound shift in space 
and time but the camera was not moving now. Anthony 
Perkins is turning his head. It was like whole numbers. The 
man could count the gradations in the movement of Anthony 
Perkins’ head. Anthony Perkins turns his head in five incre-
mental movements rather than one continuous motion. It 
was like bricks in a wall, clearly countable, not like the flight 
of an arrow or a bird. Then again it was not like or unlike any-
thing. (DeLillo 2010, 1)
It is true that Bergson regarded the cinematic camera as the ill of 
the modern eye: we carve the world into so many snapshots, and then 
regard the world as nothing more than a collection of unified images, for-
getting that the frozen image is a lesser cut in a complex and intensive 
‘open whole’ that cannot be reduced to a collection of distinct atoms or 
moments. But DeLillo’s style here takes a certain strand of modernism 
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and carries it forward into the perceptual power of the machine; the 
slowed down frames of Hitchcock’s Psycho allow the human eye to expe-
rience durations and angles not its own. That perceiving eye, in turn, 
allows for a mode and style of writing that is not the linear narrative of 
a novel, but closer to a haiku, as if composed forces yield a certain meter 
that allows writing to form. If Bergson’s modernism challenged the 
human point of view of subjects representing objects and did so by sug-
gesting that intuition might find other durations, he also opened a tra-
dition of writing that would not rest easily with its own structures and 
systems but would—through encounters with other perceptions—strive 
to think, from within language, of rhythms beyond language. 
I would suggest that Bergson’s formal method of intuition, whereby 
perception in the present decomposes the evolved forms of experience 
to disclose the tendencies from which bounded and organic life has 
emerged, enables a genealogy of the future. If we slow down the frames 
through which the world is given—not assuming one whole life of inter-
connected unity, but an open whole of divergent and incompossible 
potentials—then what has taken to be posthuman (or the vanquishing 
of our own being to perceive life as such in its full reality) may be sur-
passed by the counter human. Living beings are at once emergent from 
life and at war with life if life is defined as temporal progression towards 
complex and self-maintaining systems. If, however, there is no such thing 
as life as such—if there is only an ongoing war between bounded com-
plexity and unbounded dissolution—then we will be compelled to con-
front the human stain: ‘man’ cannot erase himself, for he has always com-
posed himself as self-erasure, as a being who can become nothing more 
than a life and world that he properly perceives. It is precisely this stain 
of non-erasure or the awareness of our geological mark on the time of 
life that may enable us to think a future that is neither posthuman nor 
human so much as superhuman. If humans exist it is through a deflection 
of survival, a strange torsion of being at once closed off from life while 
at the same time claiming to be nothing more than life: this history of 
the human as an oscillation between self-formation and self-destruction 
rather than the joyous and blind declaration of the posthuman provides a 
thought for the future beyond our assumed right to life.
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